Re: Sounds like the student stool
If I remember correctly the legs it was done in a way to not support the centre of gravity of the stool and you haad to keep your own centre of balence forward.
175 publicly visible posts • joined 5 Nov 2019
Having written some petty cash software 15-20 years ago and customising ever since until my retirement last year I can understand what is happening. For over the last decade there has been talk of getting a commercial package to replace it but I had customised it so much that all the processes need reworking and management has chickened out. After much kicking the can down the road I'm now retired and back as a consultant while they finaly make massive changes to the system to be able to accept commerial software.
Not everyone -- I've done helpdesk with a lot of clueless users who dealing with tech don't know arres from st elba. Doesn't make them bad people or uncaring parents but their children can run rings around them when it comes to using computers. And that is the problem with not having ways of checking age for nasty stuff. However as usual there can be mission creep.
Yep had the same -- the problem machine in a distant country was taken the brands world wide outsourced third party repairs. They tested the machine and as the hard drive is encrypted they decide the drive must be corrupted so reformatted and installed with priated os. Sensitive information lost.
Our first office email system was a single box for the whole office (long time ago) and the messages were printed, cut into separate messages (folded and taped) and put in the persons pigeon hole. As such all messages were supposed to be clearly address to the person involved. Unfortunately, one time a highly confidential eyed only HR message came in unaddressed and it was necessary to read it to find out who it had to go to then act as if I'd never seen it.
I get what you are saying but we still have a problem of the clueless parent who doesn't know how to set up a firewall blacklist and doesn't have the tech skills to "protect" his connection (that is why modems no longer ship with a standard password or default ssid). So either he hires someone to come in and set it all up or else the ISP modems have blacklisting by default and the parent has to have the tech skills to make holes in the black listing thus unskilled parents can't access porn. However, no doubt the average teen is probably skilled enough to overcome the blocks with out the clueless parent being aware. This is why the home solution will not work.
Makes me wonder what was the data being used for -- bragging rights or something more malicious? If malicious and over such a long period as suggested then surely there would be traces elsewhere -- ID theft issues, bank issues...
In any case someone somewhere should be getting marching orders for poor credential security.
Define what you mean by privacy. Facial recognition is one thing but privacy outside of the toilet cubicle can allow space for abusive behaviour by pupils and staff. Check the safe guarding rules -- it is clear staff and pupils are not allowed to be in isolation together i.e. empty class room with out a window. In that sense there can't be privacy in school. FR is different in it can easily be abused and is unnecessary.
If it was designed with remote access for error correction then that is not a bug but someone abusing the system. So we're getting into the area of fraud by Fujitsu employees rather than a software failure. It is only a failure if remote access is not allowed. I can also see someone assuming is remote access means third party hostile remote access and not Fujitsu maintenance access. It is a bit like when seniour management want to know if there is a hacker on the network the only truthful answer is I don't see one at which point they go postal. You give them the answer that best fits their understanding.
Logging in to a community in teams is painful. Invited into a community I can only access the shared area if I use the initial invite (even then it doesn't always work telling me I don't have permissions to access it), I can't even book mark the link. The idea is nice the result fails to meet the promise.
The laws for handling the P.O. scandal already exist: starting with contempt of court, perjury, plus other things that a lawyer can update you on. In the end the problem was not the tech failure but the cover up and deceiving the courts. P.O. management, Fujitsu management and the experts who said everything was secure should be charged and not allowed to hide behind the corporation..
I don't know how the PO did their accounting but I would have though the yearly audit should have been showing that while X stock and services had been sold they took X+Y income. For example my shop has 100 pens in stock and at the end of the sales period I've sold 110 pens. Accounts should pick this up and ask questions shouldn't they and also be able to say the equivalent of 10 pens is owed?
I fear it relates how people get and process information. The drama appeals because you don't have to think just react emotionally. Panorama is work you need to think and be analytical (as with Private eye and computer weekly)-- the dispassionate "I say old bean isn't there something wrong" never quite has the same effect of "You what, mate" outrage.
Failed to edit in time -- did Fujitsu inform the PO that only the sub-post master had access i.e. PO management and employees didn't but not say that Fujitsu super users did because that was not what they were being asked. I saw that Fujitsu engineers are being investigated for perjury did they also mislead / lie to the PO as well. This is not an excuse for the PO as they should have realised that there was a change in the patterns of fraud and levels were not "normal". Odd behaviour is a sign that something is going on. The PO IT staff should have the awareness of opsec realities even if the board didn't and asked the relevant questions.
The cry out against the Post Office is loud and valid, what is terrible is the feeling that Fujitsu has only been named in passing when they are a central player. In my experience user don't understand the power of the sysadmin to access systems and over ride restrictions. That is why there needs to be audit trails so that "back door" access is at least logged. Management in the Post Office should have asked questions why the number of fraud detection increased so much once Horizon was deployed. The post office should have asked who had access though I suspect from experience if you tell management that you don't have access they tend to believe you. A person with sysadmin experience would ask what do I need to do to have access and how is it logged. Fujitsu should be front and centre here, and liable to compensate just as much as the Post Office is.
I had a similar experience where I was blamed for seriously delaying a project. Fortunately I had had a bad feeling about the whole thing and was careful to document and save emails which I was able to produce to show I'd been chasing the third part for months and had fulfilled my side of things. Sad that you have to do this but it can save you a lot of grief.
If he was sacked there must have been something already going on so why wasn't he locked out first? Basic opsec. As suggested he might have had a back door -- audits may have been his responsibility so he can hide but still... The guy needed to go so check that your car isn't beneath the chosen window.
As a charity we used to have board and trustee meetings where it became apparent people weren't paying attention (in the course of one meeting I received an email stating we had policy which contradicted what IT had recommended and I knew hands on leadership were pushing for and as well hadn't been voted at that point.) Very awkward for us getting the job done and telling recalcitrant volunteer workers to comply. From that point on I got the GDs permission to have a wifi outage during meetings. Attention increased, and under table chat was curtailed.