Re: What's in it for us?
Ever since the 3-day SMO became the 3+ year SMO, you have been desperate to portray the war as one that was always intended to be a war of attrition, which is clearly complete poppycock.
As I have previously pointed out, if that was the case, the Russian Army would not have invaded along limited axes of advance, with inadequate flank protection, enabling their best trained and equipped units to be decimated by Ukrainian territorials equipped with NLAW, but would instead have started the invasion advancing on a broad front, to engage as much of the Ukrainian army as possible.
If the war had been intended to be attritional, the Russians would have called up reserves from the start, to maximise the amount of manpower they could deploy from day 1.
If the war was intended to be one of attrition, the Russians would have established adequate medic facilities for their huge numbers of casualties.
If the war was intended to be one of attrition, the Russians would have established a training capability that ensured that new recruits were properly trained before being sent to front line units, rather than one that sends Russian volunteers to the front with maybe two weeks training, and would not have needed to beg for tens of thousands of troops from North Korea or trick citizens from various African countries to travel to Russia before they are conscripted and used up as disposable infantry, or even (1 confirmed case) turned into involuntary suicide bombers (except that the guy was able to surrender instead).
If the war was intended to be one of attrition, the Russians would have increased armaments production before the war started, rather than after.
If the war was intended to be one of attrition, the Russians would have taken older vehicles from their stockpiles and started the refurbishment process before the war started, enabling the most technically capable systems to be restored first, rather than taking the easiest to restore first, after the war had started.
The Russians launched a 3 day SMO, that was designed to overcome all Ukrainian resistance in ideally 3 days, 10 days at the most. It was supposed to be a shock-and-awe campaign.
What is being attrited is Russia's oil industry, with regular and frequent strikes by the Ukrainians on oil refineries and other oil industry.
What is also being attrited is Russia's Shadow fleet of tankers, which the Ukrainians are steadily targeting - though scrupulously when the ships are empty, to minimise any risk of environmental damage. An activity which has, of course, been aided by a certain US president that shall not be named, who's targeting of Venezuelan tankers wasn't deterred even after one of them re-flagged as Russian.
As for the Russians trying to take Odessa - well, they were unable to do that in 2022, when they had the advantage of operationally surprise at the start of the war and where able to cross the river and taken Kherson, plus had an intact Black Sea Fleet including the guided missile cruiser Moskva and multiple specialist amphibious landing ships, and the Ukrainians had no significant coastal defence weapons systems apart from a few early production Neptune missiles.
Moskva is now an artificial reef, most of the amphib ships are burnt out wrecks, and the Black Sea Fleet has run away so far, it should probably be re-named the Caspian sea Flotilla.
The Russians were also forced to withdraw from Kherson and are now on the east side of the River Dnieper, and despite the perception that the old Soviet Red Army was good at river crossing operations, the current Russian army has shown itself to be anything but - and that was earlier in the war when the troops may have had more than 10 days training.