Indeed
"we cannot imagine a controlled process that resulted in a scenario where "network engineers walked over each other's changes."
It's the most sarcastic thing I've heard this morning.
51 publicly visible posts • joined 22 Dec 2017
You can relatively easily deal with undesired SSL traffic by mandating the populace to have Roskomnadzor's root X.509 certs installed and running everything through DPI/SSL proxies. And drop (and flag) any traffic that is not decryptable by the proxies.
Anyways, it all will become moot when Russian users run out of ways to pay for their VPNs and/or the backbone providers cut Russian ISPs from the Internet for non-payment or for "security considerations".
"Alexa, hier spricht der BND, bitte schicke mir alle Gespräche über das geplante Bombenattentat" - so einfach wird der Zugriff auf private Daten des Sprachassistenten aus dem Hause Amazon zwar nicht. Der geplante Beschluss der Innenminister klingt aber auch so ziemlich bedrohlich.
https://web.de/magazine/politik/zugriff-alexa-smart-home-geraete-innenminister-planen-gesetzesaenderung-33775004
Come on, 77th Brigade, that's a cheap shot at the venerable aircraft manufacturer. Everybody knows it's in fact a дезинформационная кампания русских троллей.
How much of a "roller coaster" can you do at 2000' to 5000' AGL above a very mountainous terrain? And they didn't need it, anyway — all they had to do was use the goddamn ANU button. Just like Boeing and FAA wrote in November. And the button was perfectly functional when the electric trim was on (see 05:40:14 and 05:40:29), right before they cut the electric trim off.
Nothing happened at 05:43:11. There were two senseless clicks on the ANU button at 05:43:14 and 05:43:15, followed by apparent re-enabling of the electric trim in the next two seconds. MCAS, of course, kicked right back in, but there were no input on the ANU button anymore. I would guess full-on panic had already set in by then.
First, the Airbus dropped 4000 feet before the pilots cold arrest the descent. Second, it took the crew and the company engineers more than half an hour to make the airplane behave again — and even then they got lucky, as they turned off the only air data reference unit (not just a probe) that provided correct data, but it still helped as one of the erroneous ADRs had already been turned off, and the stall prevention system required at least two ADRs working in agreement. (BTW, the system correctly identified the same probe malfunction in the AF447 case, but we all know how _that_ ended ). Third, Boeing and FAA issued an emergency AD much sooner than 35 days after the Indonesian crash, 9 days to be exact. Fourth, did I mention the Airbus dropped 4000 feet uncommanded?
Obviously, because Boeing engineers are not as perfect as you are. Come to think of it, Airbus engineers are not as perfect either — they just been a bit lucky when their version of stall prevention system failed on D-AIDP in November, 2014. So yeah, both the industry behemoths should put your perfect self in charge of the system.
They could. You use the electric trim to remove the load and _then_ turn the electric trim off. MCAS doesn't interfere while you're pressing the trim nose-up button on the yoke, and when you let go of the button, the MCAS rate _is_ limited, so you've got plenty of time to turn it off before the trim moves too far, and have the trim in the range where it's easy to trim manually.
Boeing instructions did say in November:
Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any
stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be
used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB
TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT.
[end quote]
The Ethiopian crew just didn't follow them.
The previous crew realized that the system was trimming the elevator wrong (it's kinda hard to miss) and knew how to disable it.
Redundancy (sometimes it's hard to tell if and which sensors are malfunctioning) and full handoff to humans (they happen to lose their minds anyway) don't always work either.
Another bullshit. The software didn't force AF447 into the ocean — the software correctly detected that it couldn't make decisions based on the malfunctioning sensors and put itself out of the loop, making it very clear to the pilots. It was the pilots who dropped the plane into the ocean.
Multiple redundant do fail, too. In one prominent case, two of the three AOA sensors failed on an A321, which made the safety system to ignore the only sensor that was working and trim the airplane into a dive. The correct mitigating action was to disable the misbehaving system, and that was exactly what the crew of that A321 did. And that's what the crew of the penultimate fight of the crashed Boeing did, too. Everybody lived.
The Russian population is in fact the primary target of the operation, and the operation's main objective is to discredit whatever passes as the Russian opposition to the regime. But if it burns down, not many will notice — it's not Reichstag by any means.
BTW and IMHO, the American election thing was done mostly for shits and giggles, the guys and gals didn't expect all the brouhaha and were really amazed how the Americans lost their shit about it.
Are you claiming you are not a quadruple NSA/יחידה 8200/GCHQ/Роскомнадзор agent embedded here to plant FUD amongst us? Ah yes, that's _exactly_ what a quadruple agent would claim…
Anyway, my point is that ElReg gratuitously slapped Kaspersky and "Russian state-backed hackers" together again, while conveniently forgetting to mention that it was the Kaspersky folks who unearthed the LoJack vulnerability in the first place.