Re: Let's help you out then :) @ukgnome
"scoff law"
Until this goes to the highest possible court we don't know what the law is so it's impossible to know who is scoffing at it. "We" includes the FBI. "Who" could also turn out to be the FBI.
42965 publicly visible posts • joined 16 Jun 2014
"Now MS is in contempt of court in the USA."
According to what I read at the time this was a technical step to clear the way for escalating it up to a higher court. This one will probably go right up to the supreme court at some distant point in the future. In the meantime MS is working on the contingency plan - host in the EU with a trustee looking after the data to put a proper firebreak in the way. Others will need to wake up and follow in due course when the Privacy Fig Leaf gets torn down.
"Also, be aware also that some serious contingency planning might be needed if Europe’s Data Protection Commissioners judge that the Privacy Shield does not provide an adequate level of protection."
Not contingency planning, just planning.
Schrems should have been a wakeup call. Until the US totally changes its prying ways and overall approach to personal data no fig leaf arrangement is going to get past the ECJ again. I suppose the US industry could buy itself a better government but it will be a lot cheaper and quicker to shift processing of data to non-US data centres protected from the US govt by an adequate legal firebreak.
This is not an issue that's going to go away.
And the UK govt. should consider the effect of continuing along its merry way in the event of a Brexit. It's going to make doing business with the EU a whole lot more difficult because they'll have put us in the same sin-bin as the US.
"Pingbacks were only ever an ego boosting tool used to make you feel good that somebody referenced you. They never really got used for anything important because they didn't do the very thing you describe Twitter and Facebook as being good at - aggregating things."
Usenet & IRC are the non-corporate way of aggregation. All pingback achieved was disrupting discussion threads on blogs.
"People quite like working in places where you can walk to work and at least some basic shops without getting a car every five minutes."
And the town planners over the last 6 decades or so have done more than anyone to prevent that. The brownfield site they've allocated to housing previously provided employment to those living in the housing around it. Now those living in both lots of housing are going to have to travel some distance to work because we've got to have houses and employment in different zones, preferably as far apart as possible. They shouldn't publish a report, they should publish an apology.
'Burner phones and poor social graphs (tight contact lists) make you stand out from "normal people."'
It depends what you mean by tight contact lists. I'm retired so I don't make business calls any more. A P&G SIM is sufficient. My mobile just has a few friends & family numbers & I no longer give its number out to businesses as that just invites SMS spam.
And running my own domain I use a number of burner email addresses so spammers can be cut off.
"Since when has any 'judge' been enpowered to make the law,"
No, they do that regularly. It's the basis of Common Law in England and all other countries which follow that principle. It's statute law they don't make.
"when it's their job to judge 'only',whether or not the case may be,if someone has broken the law."
Again, only partially correct. At the magistrate's court level (or whatever the equivalent may be in other jurisdictions) yes. And, as we're dealing with terrorism, in the "Diplock" courts in N Ireland*. But in jury trials it's the jury's job; the judge's job is to explain the law to the jury.
*In those courts the judge had to do something no jury is called on to do: explain the reasoning by which they arrived at the verdict.
"The passcode is needed to unlock the key with which the data is encrypted.
That key is a 256 Bit AES key. You can't brute force that"
Yes, but the whole point of this is that the FBI wants to brute force the passcode. Not the key, the passcode.
They seem to think it can be done if Apple would remove the limitation that 10 wrong guesses will wipe the whole thing. It's not immediately obvious to me why, if the flash memory were to be cloned, this couldn't be done in a VM as the whole memory image could be restored every 10 guesses.
I'd have thought that extracting and cloning such an image is something the NSA would have looked at already and had a method worked out. That makes me suspicious.
Consider the situation. The owner is dead and is unable to object. There's general acceptance that the owner committed several murders - and in due course we can expect a coroner's court to make that official. There's a strong argument that good intelligence relating to terrorism could be obtained. It's about as good a situation as TPTB could have to set a precedent which could be used later in weaker circumstances - a phone seized from a live suspect who's not been charged with a particularly serious offence let alone convicted - in other words a fishing expedition.
"Falque-Pierrotin said, though, that she does not think the Judicial Redress Bill will address those concerns because the Bill would not apply to cases concerning access to data for national security purposes."
It fails to address concerns at a much more fundamental level than that. Redress should not be in the US against whoever abused the data there; data subjects should not be subject to the trouble of taking action in a country in which they do not reside especially where it might well be the government of that country responsible for the abuse. Redress should be in the data subject's home jurisdiction against whoever transferred it to the US.
"I don't think the issue here is actually managers seeing that security is a barrier, it's security people creating barriers to business instead of realizing the security needs to follow the company line and enable."
One way of looking at security is that it's the ratio between the difficulty between someone trying to do something nasty and the difficulty of someone trying to do their job. There's no point in making the first impossible if you also make the second impossible.
"the reason I stopped using Streetmaps was because Google Maps was easy to move around and Streetmaps required me to press an arrow in the direction I want to go"
I find this statement surprising as I can drag Streetmap maps round in much the same way as Google maps. The big advantage of Streetmap is that they're actually full-featured OS maps. Ironically Google maps (as opposed to the overlaid aerial photos are just streemaps.
"So £2000 is nothing."
OK, so it's nothing. For one house. Now roll it out to a million houses. Pretty soon all those nothings start to add up to real money. The there's the logistics. Let's say you have 100 teams and each team can connect a house a day*. If you want to connect a million homes then that's going to take 10k days, 27 years working 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year. How do you scale up the number of teams? Who's going to train them? Where? Are you going to pull workers out of the active times to provide the training and slow the rate of installation down in the mean time? And when they've finished connecting up every home what will the redundancies cost?
*If you have real figures as opposed to illustrative ones please feel free to substitute them.
"On the other hand, if FTTH were introduced from the start, you would have a ready-made replacement to LLU "
Wrong tense.
s/were/had been/
How short-sighted of the telecoms industry way back in the last century to lay copper (which they had technology to make and use) instead of fibre (which they could neither make nor use).
"If the Openreach arm of the business was taken back into public ownership (i.e. a public service) then no, it won't have shareholders."
And if the GPO days are anything to go by it wouldn't have much in the way of investment either. Why do you think BT was privatised? Big clue - HMGs of all hues had fought shy of putting money into it at anything like the required rate. Nationalised GPO was the black telephone rationing company.
"or to provide free, unfettered access to the ducts and poles"
And the RoI for this will be exactly the same for the competitor as for BT. Or would they have some other advantage which would enable them to do better? Do they have a huge army of fibre layers chomping at the bit that are somehow unavailable to Openreach?
It's partly material costs and partly man*-hours. Both cost money and the rate of supply of man-hours is governed by the number of available men. You could, of course, increase the supply of men but to do that you'd probably have to pull some of the workforce out of the field to act as trainers, then the trainees have to get up to speed.
DAMMIT!!! It's 40 years - FORTY WHOLE YEARS - since Brookes published TMMM and we still have people who don't get it.
*Where "man" signifies a human of any gender.
'But we should have looked more at the investment path for super fast broadband and fibre to the home.'
True. But then she'd have no excuse for magical thinking where all you need is a plan and not money: 'Digital connectivity must be a priority, with a proper plan to roll out networks, according to Onwurah. "I think we should be looking at fibre to the home, although that doesn’t seem to be BT’s view.”'
"The kind of glass that you have in a police line up - not that I've ever been in one ha!"
It works by splitting the light, some reflected, some transmitted. If the witness is watching from a darkened room there's little light coming through and it's easily swamped by the reflected light from the room where the line-up is taking place. Inside the viewing room there's little light being reflected back so it doesn't interfere with the light from the viewing room.
There's nothing "one way" about it, it's just a coating that reflects some but not all light. If both sides of the mirror are well lit each side will see a dim reflection and a dim transmitted image.
"Block out the useful parts of the light spectrum as well?"
Interference filters can have very sharp responses. As they're thin films deposited on a glass substrate it would be practical to have several filters laid down on a visor blocking just a few nanometres of the visible spectrum in total.
"They need to be certified as safe for aviation use, not interfere with daylight operation and have a lifespan in place of at least 10 years."
So they should be certified. In fact there's a good argument that NOT being so protected is unsafe. And if they're worn rather than fitted to windows why would they need to not interfere with daylight operation and last 10 years?
"Given that commercially available lasers use only a few restricted light wavelengths, isn't it possible to add filters for these to the cockpit windows??"
I was thinking along similar lines. Glasses to be worn when near the ground. It's not particularly new technology. I remember using the converse case - a narrow filter mimicking the sodium doublet at 589.29nm for calibration purposes decades ago.
"it's the numptys that badly configure both OS's that are to blame for 99% of attack vectors."
Numpties clicking on unsolicited files attached to unsolicited emails is another vector. Tell me again, why Windows is configured out of the box to hide suffixes?
"The facts in your suggested case aren't likely to be materially different to those in the assumed one....In reality a private prosecution would fail miserably, the courts would never rule against the government not even in a civil case."
OK, let's think what the facts might be. Say TPTB suspect a particular employee or customer & hack into the business. First of all the business will say "we're a legitimate business. We'd have been happy to cooperate if they'd approached us directly (employee) or with a warrant to cover out backs (customer)." Then they point out that the hack was damaging. A specified back door was left which competitors, criminals, foreign states etc. might have used. They also point out that they're concerned that even if the back door wasn't used by someone else they can't be sure of what data might have been changed by the "authorised" intruders so they've had to pay for an independent audit of their entire data assets in addition to a thorough review and repair of the system software. All costed out to a huge amount. Those would be specific facts which are couldn't be covered by a set of assumed facts in a general hearing.
Cue accusation of misfeasance in public office by the SofS on the basis that it wasn't necessary accompanied by huge bill for all the costs. Then there's reputational loss. Wouldn't a jury find against them on the basis of clear evidence?
The likely situation would be a big out-of-court settlement on the basis of keep quiet and take the money. Which makes one wonder how often that's already happened.