Re: It's not just cake which can annoy the real folk.
"piece and quiet"
Dammit. I'm having a bad weak with my tiepin.
40557 publicly visible posts • joined 16 Jun 2014
"oh the system supplier wont allow you to citing that their system is a medical device, not a computer system"
Which makes a big difference because it carries certifications against it in its original state and it costs time and money to recertify it in its patched state. It's time that whole arrangement was looked at again. Should certification lapse after some interval unless equipment has up-to-date patches?
"This is the NSA we're talking about."
This is some NSA staffer's home computer, not a work computer. Given what he seems to have been up to I doubt he'd venture to ask a grown up.
It's entertaining to imagine to conversation though:
"I have a machine at home. I want to install a cracked pirated version of MS Office on it an also play about with some of our own software on it. How do I secure it?"
"Just come with me to the security office."
"They know the timeline of everything he was doing with his computer, and with the DEFAULT SETTINGS downloaded the NSA's treasure trove (the presence of which on his computer is on the NSA guy and the NSA itself)"
Could you point out to me just where this timeline or everything is mentioned? All I can see are a few dates when the AV was run and found malware. In fact they specifically say that they don't know when some things happened because the AV was turned off? They also say that an archive containing samples of suspicious material was sent back. This is what AV systems need to do to get early detection of new variants. Given that a supposed security pro dumb enough to get infected didn't turn the default off what chances are there that there'd be enough community-minded folk dumb enough to be infected would turn the early warning system on if it was defaulted to off?
"No. It's a bunch of non-executable letters. Source code."
From TFA (my emphasis):
"The archive itself was detected as malicious and submitted to Kaspersky Lab for analysis, where it was processed by one of the analysts. Upon processing, the archive was found to contain multiple malware samples and source code for what appeared to be Equation malware."
I read this as indicating that the archive contained both binaries and source and that it was the binaries that triggered the detection and subsequent upload of the entire archive. No need for the AV to have recognised the source.
Kaspersky AV acted just like malware detection systems are intended to. This wasn't just malware, it was NSA malware. It sounds like a pretty good recommendation for anyone in the market.
If, like the NSA, you're in the business of producing malware you should expect malware detection businesses to be looking out for your work.
"An NSA employee with access to highly classified information is STUPID enough to run a crack? And disabled his AV to enable it to run?"
It's a conspiracy versus cock-up moment. Was he really that stupid or was this a sting operation with some chickenfeed to justify blacklisting Kaspersky?
"If you poled the entire UK then 90% would be against Scottish or N. Irish independence - doesn't mean the country is totally united"
I'm not convinced by that. I think if the Scottish independence vote had been UK wide it might well have been Yes that won.
"their abilities to change the behaviour of cops and people has been repeatedly called into question"
I don't see changing behaviour as being the essential function. I'd regard them as being a source of evidence of what the behaviour actually was. Of course evidence means the expensive business of putting together and presenting a court case. If someone was wanting them to change behaviour they were just trying to save money. It looks as if they still are.
"They can fine Microsoft all they want, but it's no longer physically possible without approval from a local data custodian in Ireland."
Is this actually the case? The only thing I've read on these lines is about this arrangement being put in place in relation to the new DC in Germany. It's possible they've rolled this out elsewhere and I've missed it.
"it should always go to domains@bigcompany.com which is aliased at the main server to whoever's employed to handle it."
1. Assumes that company policy allows names to be set up in this way.
2. Assumes someone is (still) employed to handle it.
BigCos, especially BigCos intent on becoming LittleCos (tto many of them these days) can be their own worst enemies.
"May I suggest Debian GNU/kFreeBSD https://www.debian.org/ports/kfreebsd-gnu/ ?"
Unfortunately see also: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2014/11/msg00005.html
"We discussed kfreebsd at length, but are not satisfied that a release with Jessie will be of sufficient quality. We are dropping it as an official release architecture, though we do hope that the porters will be able to make a simultaneous unofficial release."
"yes, regularly, aside from the above examples the police regularly do it to red light jumping twats at regent's park"
Good. What I'd like round here would be prosecutions for causing obstruction.
However things might be improving; I actually saw one yesterday keeping to the cycle lane.
Not everything - there is a "legitimate interest" exception.
Nevertheless it raises a number of issues. If, under legitimate interest a data subject's bank passes data to a CRA who then gets breached what are the responsibilities of the bank? If it were they and not the CRA who had been breached then clearly they could expect to be fined under GDPR. But they decided they had a legitimate interest in passing on the data. Should they not still be liable?
The data subject-facing business should remain liable under both civil and criminal law for any breaches further along the line, irrespective of how far the data gets passed. Apart from anything else it's the only way that the likes of Safe Harbour and Privacy Figleaf can be made to work. They should have to make judgements about the reliability of those to whom they pass data. It's not sufficient for data subjects to have to go to law in some other jurisdiction against a company with whom they have had no dealings although that should not preclude action under GDPR against all businesses in the chain.
"we welcome this opportunity to learn the lessons from this criminal cyber-attack in order for all businesses to better protect consumers in the future."
There seems to be an implicit message that this was a big mystery. How on Earth did such a thing happen?
They know perfectly well. They left themselves unsecured. They shouldn't have needed to learn anything. They should have kept on top of securing things. The only way they'll really learn anything is to be handled penalties by every regulator in sight to the point where they can't pay management salaries let alone bonuses.