Woosh... Went right over you right?
90 posts • joined 17 Oct 2013
Apple drops a bomb on long-life HTTPS certificates: Safari to snub new security certs valid for more than 13 months
I for one do NOT see this as being reasonable.
I have hundreds of certificates on different embedded-like endpoints. They get certificates with very long lifetime from the internal PKI. They are (currently) secure and changing them cannot be automated.
If other browser makers follow suit I'm forced to just start living with certificate errors - there's no way these will be changed yearly.
It seems idiotic, the browser could test if the certificate is weak instead of just blindly warning on lifetime!
He’s a pain in the ASCII to everybody. Now please acquit my sysadmin client over these CIA Vault 7 leaking charges
As pressure builds over .org sell-off, internet governance bodies fall back into familiar pattern: Silence
Facebook: Remember how we promised we weren’t tracking your location? Psych! Can't believe you fell for that
Re: "the company presents a national security risk"
Oh please. Everyone in the industry knows that security of Huawei products leaks like a sieve and the software engineering culture is not on par to C/J.
If the US was serious in wanting to keep appearances they would focus on that instead of the ridiculous "the government backdoors".
*Maneuvering Characteristics* Augmentation System
I do not agree.
Many in the industry seem to think that the reason for MCAS is simply the FAA certification requirements for handling characteristics i.e. "as nose pitches up, increasing aft stick force must be required" (paraphrasing but the FAA original text may be found easily from a certain forum or with much more effort from the original text (FAR?)), without MCAS the stick would lighten due to the aforementioned engine nacelles generating lift.
The other opinion is that it is there for FAA longitudinal stability requirements.
In a way both of them *do* protect against stall but especially Boeing is adamant that it is not stall protection system. And specifically, this is different issue from classic pitch/power couple that many seem to mistake it for.
Personally, I believe it is due to the former certification requirement. It may have something to do with type rating - but the aircraft would be simply uncertifiable without MCAS, type rating had little to do with it.
Cram this in your Pai hole! New York, Cali, eight other US states sue to stop T-Mobile-Sprint merger
Re: Every Two Years...
There just isn't any technology available that can meet all the use cases where tape is needed currently.
If there was then tape *would* already be dead!
Fact is, tape is not going anywhere until some new breakthrough is found in storage media. 3D storage was mentioned earlier. Cheap NAND flash could *maybe* be an option if adapted to some kind of cartridges.
Durability, transportability, speed, ...
Re: Bye-bye tape drives
And after a disaster, how do those hard drives in Romania get the data back to you?
Over the Internet?
Better have a 10G upstream connection, then.
I won't even bother to calculate how long it would take to download any larger than "small" amount of data. Can those cloud storage services even send the data back at 10G? Especially if the location needing DR does not directly peer with the cloud provider (which is usually the case)?
Since we are talking about LTO-8, we are obviously backing up mid-high double digits to few hundred TB minimum here.
Uh-oh .io: Question mark hangs over trendy tech startup domains as UN condemns British empire hangover
I am *very* well aware of this Max issue. See my post history.
Boeing actually did test the aerodynamic forces on the STAB and apparently a fairly big woman could not move the trim wheel in a test bench at high air speeds and trim near extreme.
This, as we all know now, did not change anything at Boeing.
FAA requires the operation to be possible "without exceptional skill", Boeing failed on this with the trim wheel. Yes, there is the "rollercoaster" maneuver that might not be possible in 4000' and IIRC was not included anymore even in the NG FCOM...
Regarding your last sentence, I actually disagree. The Lion Air crash flight had the captain successfully fight MACS 20+ times before the FO lost it. The flight before on the same plane landed, thanks to a jumpseat pilot.
My point is that there is some truth to the "just fly the plane" adage. Both accidents indeed were chains of events. Boeing was the biggest culprit here but an "above average" pilot could have saved the flights, perhaps with some luck.
Just keep hanging the ANU trim switch, not a half-a**ed blip here and there.
Both airlines have serious issues (as do Boeing and the FAA), flying to destination with stick shaker on all the time?? Hello? Trying to engage AP with stick shaker on? and not following the *memory items* for unreliable IAS (power, pitch)?
I am not blaming the pilots. They were a product of their training and airline culture. Seems a bit of a case of the children of the magenta.
What *almost everyone* has missed was this mention in these comments is an *extremely important point*: AoA disagree was marked "where fitted"!!!
This totally contradicts the "oh it should be there in all the planes, we just made a mistake" line from Boeing, if true!!
Also initial reports I read said that this definitely was listed as an option, I am not clear on if it was to be included in the 50k AoA indicator or a separate option.
Regarding simulators: Southwest contract with Boeing had a clause that if any sim training is required there is a penalty of 1M per airframe.
Normalization of deviance - as so often.
The real villains of this sad story can be found at higher levels of Boeing and at the FAA.
The article contains some factual errors.
1- The nose-up condition is not due to pitch/power but due to the engine nacelles creating lift at high AoA.
2- MCAS is not a stall-prevention system but simply, as the name states, modifies the maneuvering characteristics i.e. control forces on the yoke, in effect causing the yoke to need increased power to be pulled aft as the AoA increases. This is simply an FAA certification requirement and the airframe could not be certified without a system such as stick pusher, MCAS, etc. The additional lift of the nacelles would otherwise cause lessening of required control forces as the aircraft approaches high AoA/stall. Possibly aerodynamics could be altered also such as slots on the nacelles, vortex generators, canards, devices at the tail of the plane such as seen on some BJs etc. but these would come at increased drag i e. reduced efficiency.
Re: Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam...
I remember being excited when HoTMaiL (get it?), which was how it was initially stylized, IIRC, came available. It was pretty revolutionary: web interface, free.
Whippersnappers of today have no idea how it was back then and how useful Hotmail was.
Outlook.com has one extremely useful feature that the free Gmail axed: use your own domain name.
We were testing the 1803 upgrade on 6 PC out of 150.
So far 3 PC upgraded without issues, 2 not upgraded yet, and 1 has similar problem. Black screen after login, but no error messages and keys like Win-R do nothing. So we cannot try to process listed on many sites (run setup.exe from installation media).
Thanks MS... I have pushed back the phased deployment schedule for at least 1 month for the next phase, waiting for June's Patch Tuesday.
Re: My "kerberos for Dummies" question ...
This whole krbtgt debacle is usually misunderstood. Same as the last two Reg articles about the same 2 years old+ "new" vulnerability.
This is mostly a persistence mechanism. After a DC is popped the access can be regained unless krbtgt is changed.
(Over-)Pass the hash is even older technique.