Posts by ThomB 20 publicly visible posts • joined 21 Mar 2011
Seems Mr Sharwood has his figures a bit wrong. The 175 million websites running WinServer 2003 were found in July, but he connects them with the totals reported for August, leading to the one fifth estimate. However, Netcraft's July survey said there were totals of 849,602,745 sites and 5,350,323 web-facing computers. While that doesn't changer a whole lot in terms of percentage etc., it's still a mistake that should be corrected.
"No, Firefox is not geared toward Enterprise adoption. Mozilla chose not to do that many years ago as the Mozilla Suite wasn't well received among the Enterprise community when they tried pitching it to several large corporations. To my knowledge, albeit limited as I was in the Active Component of the United States Army at the time..."
The problem with this approach, and Dotzler's/Mozilla's as well, is that it completely ignores the user/customer base outside the US. This base is/was largely made up of enterprises that attempted to make their websites more standards-compliant while at the same time avoiding the security risks connected with ActiveX controls/BHOs etc. Examples include Fujitsu as well as some major publishers on this side of the pond. In fact, part of the huge success FF has had in Europe (especially Germany) directly results from adoption in the enterprise. So yeah, it's at least short-sighted to kick these loyal followers in the groin.
On the other hand, I've lately seen companies switch to Chrome mainly because FF was lagging so far behind in comparison. Which obviously means that shorter refresh cycles can be handled without too many problems. The same might be true for FF - which I'm keeping for pretty much the same reasons as you do.
...point taken. You didn't, and it is.
Regarding TEPCO, my being condemnatory results from the company's track record of cover-ups in previous years, cover-ups they themselves have admitted to on several occasions. In my eyes that takes away a big chunk of their credibility.
As for "too much raw data and not enough context", that's a problem indeed, and not just for TEPCO. It's been an issue in the ongoing discussion about LP's articles as well, what with pointing people to databases and IAEA logs that provide 'more of the first and less of the latter' -- at least from the perspective of a non-engineer. And that is exactly where part of the trouble comes from: roughly 99 percent of all people don't have a degree in nuclear physics etc., so they *need* context, which is exactly what the expert sources don't give them enough of. As a result, there's growing mistrust -- and quite naturally so, considering that the technology at hand is permanently linked with Hiroshima and Chernobyl. Maybe not technically, but symbolically, in people's minds.
But that's psychology, not physics.
Quote:
"The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was developed in 1990 by international experts convened by the IAEA and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) with the aim of communicating the safety significance of events at nuclear installations."
Source:
INES -- The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale: User's Manual, 2008 Edition. Co-sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency and OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency. Vienna 2009. Available online under: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/INES-2009_web.pdf (4-13-2011)
That might suggest the scale is indeed a measuring stick, even if it only covers the "safety significance of events at nuclear installations" (relative to what?) and not the "relative severity of two accidents", as you call it.
Another quote:
"Scope of the Scale
INES applies to any event associated with the transport, storage and use of radioactive material and radiation sources, whether or not the event occurs at a facility. It covers a wide spectrum of practices, including industrial use such as radiography, use of radiation sources in hospitals, activity at nuclear facilities, and transport of radioactive material.
It also includes the loss or theft of radioactive sources or packages and the discovery of orphan sources, such as sources inadvertently transferred into the scrap metal trade. When a device is used for medical purposes (e.g., radiodiagnosis or radiotherapy), INES is used for the rating of events resulting in actual
exposure of workers and the public, or involving degradation of the device or deficiencies in the safety provisions. Currently, the scale does not cover the actual or potential consequences for patients exposed as part of a medical procedure.
The scale is only intended for use in civil (non-military) applications and only relates to the safety aspects of an event. INES is not intended for use in rating security-related events or malicious acts to deliberately expose people to radiation.
What the Scale is Not For
It is not appropriate to use INES to compare safety performance between facilities, organizations or countries. The statistically small numbers of events at Level 2 and above and the differences between countries for reporting more minor events to the public make it inappropriate to draw international comparisons."
Source:
INES -- The International Nuclear and Radiological event Scale: Fact Sheet, published by the IAEA and the OECD/NEA. Available online under: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf (04-13-2011)
So the last chapter from the fact sheet says the scale is not fit "to compare safety performance between facilities, organizations or countries." Okay, let's accept that. The question remains why IAEA, NISA and others have recently used it for the exact purpose of comparison. First to underscore that the accident wasn't as bad as Chernobyl, now to say 'it's still not as severe, but much worse than we initially thought'. And next to say what?
Just to get this out of the way: pressure from the public and the media exists, no question. So the PR guys at those organizations as well as those from the Japanese government have to respond to it. Still you'd expect them not to dish out safety significance ratings that seem to be of limited value at best, considering how they've been going up over the past month and how they may be going down again in a few weeks from now. This strategy is actually the worst you can apply here; it's been used after Chernobyl as well and has cost politicians and the nuclear industry more credibility than the disaster itself. Of course, that was a "Soviet" reactor, so much of the downplaying that happened back then can be attributed to an information policy created at the Kremlin. The problem is that lately we had to learn that the information policy in Western/G7 countries isn't so different after all.
One last thing: I do understand that the Fukushima accident was triggered by a giant earthquake, an ensuing tsunami, and a number of severe aftershocks. I also understand that these aren't regular operating conditions, and that the facility has done better than you would expect under these circumstances (and please note that this argument was first introduced by the pros). I even understand that in a relatively small country like Japan you'd built the facilities 'on the coastline', in hopes that *if* an accident occurs most of the waste gets washed away by the sea. Just as I understand the logic of 'it can't happen here' (simply because I trust my fellow countrymen more than some 'bloody Ivan') and that -- statistically speaking -- accidents that deserve an INES Level 4 rating and above are only likely to happen every few thousand years. But I also know that by official IAEA accounts six of those accidents have occurred since 1957. And they have a tendency to happen 'here and now', to an unsuspecting public and to politicians, scientists, engineers and journalists that seem largely unprepared.
Not that you could/would do much to prepare for an accident deemed so unlikely to happen. Or could you? If so, what?
"And he (and his government) have looked pretty inept so far."
Yup. Agreed. As have the TEPCO management and the majority of people concerned with this case, explicitly excluding the rescue/safety teams on site, even if they sometimes were helpless as well.
Problem is, anyone who's not totally blind could notice that ineptitude (or those respective ineptitudes) early on. And that impression doesn't go away just because suddenly someone attempts to 'look better'. Which likely explains why TEPCO's former president fell off the face of the earth -- health conditions aside.
So the gain, if it exists, is minimal at best. You have any other ideas?
"The re-evaluation of the Fukushima Daiichi provisional INES rating resulted from an estimate of the total amount of radioactivity released to the environment from the nuclear plant. NISA estimates that the amount of radioactive material released to the atmosphere is approximately 10% of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, which is the only other nuclear accident to have been rated a Level 7 event.
Earlier ratings of the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi were assessed as follows:
On 18 March, Japanese authorities rated the core damage at the Fukushima Daiichi 1, 2 and 3 reactor Units caused by loss of all cooling function to have been at Level 5 on the INES scale. They further assessed that the loss of cooling and water supplying functions in the spent fuel pool of the Unit 4 reactor to have been rated at Level 3.
Japanese authorities may revise the INES rating at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant as further information becomes available."
(Source: http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.html)
So the first thing the IAEA states in this small paragraph is that the accident at Fukushima has been re-evaluated by NISA. I won't speculate on the reasons; however it appears as though they are now offering a 'combined' rating for all damages and their effects instead of 'split' ones for every single reactor. Seems somewhat odd, because a. it makes one wonder why that wasn't done earlier and b. why it should be more convenient now that some of the countermeasures appear to have worked. And yeah, I know, there have been more earthquakes, but they haven't made the situation a lot worse, or did they?
Secondly, again according to NISA estimates, the "amount of radioactive material released to the environment is approximately 10% of [...] Chernobyl". Still, it gets a level 7 rating. That could either mean the whole INES concept is sh**, as it allows you to lump Chernobyl and Fukushima into one category, despite obvious differences. The trouble with that is twofold: number one, neither the pro- nor the no-nukers get sufficient, reliable data/ratings to back up their respective position -- they do not seem to exist. Number two, the INES was put together/initiated by the IAEA and the OECD/NEA; so the question arises whether the scientific work that allegedly went into it was worth a whole lot. In the context of this discussion, I find it a little strange that doubts about the rating are often expressed by members of the pro-nuclear faction, who are otherwise referring to the IAEA as a central authority on the subject at hand. -- Alternatively, it's also possible to consider the INES ratings the best we have; but in that case, one might ask if Chernobyl was probably underrated.
Thirdly, it is stated that NISA's INES rating may be revised "as further information becomes available". That seems to indicate that these ratings are performed on a provisional or interim basis; more bluntly put, they're made up as the authorities and TEPCO go along. That doesn't look particularly trustworthy, and it likely will not inspire confidence among those who have been evacuated -- even if you accept the fact that it's far too early to make any final judgments from a scientific angle.
@ Andydaws
They often do. However, I suppose that in this case the term "masters" would apply to the Japanese government. If you agree on that, please explain to me what these people hope to gain from constantly pushing up the incident's INES level -- billions in foreign aid?
As far as I recall, the original post said the plutonium they found may be a leftover from the nuclear bombings that took place at the end of WW II.
Fine and dandy, but that would suggest there currently is no way of finding that out, unless -- amateurishly spoken -- by comparing contamination before and after, which of course requires that data from before the accident exist -- which I don't know. But what I do know is that the probability of more plutonium being added doesn't seem like something to look forward to. And please note that the OP did not contest that probability, for very obvious reasons.
As far as "you can't tell when any other element was deposited in the soil" is concerned, I don't know how experts in geology and astrophysics think about it. Anyone here who can clue us in?
All I stated was that they failed twice to give the correct data. That doesn't have anything to do with accusing them of actively falsifying the results, as you seem to think. And if they are scared in the way you assume, they have enough reason to, given their track record of past cover-ups.
Essence: nobody said anything to suggest that TEPCO was or could be double dealing -- but thanks for making the point.
Given TEPCO's double failure in reporting correct radiation data, I would venture the guess that this organization is simply out of its depth when it comes to dealing with the damage. It's a piss-poor performance, even if you're all for building more nuclear power plants. And those responsible deserve to be fired and sent to jail.
Regarding dosimeters, yes, the majority was lost in the tsunami. But it couldn't have hurt to pick up a few in addition to the 320 or so that were left by official accounts.
So, your reasoning is that since the soil is already contaminated (read: still contaminated after 66 years, with 22 more years to go - statistically speaking of course), it's alright to dump more of the same substances in the same places? That way pushing half-life to what, 176 years?
Sounds like an idea from a Monty Python script. Only expected to be taken seriously.
the thing that irks and partially scares me is that even TEPCO and the IAEA don't seem to grasp what is being measured and/or what the exact results were/are -- cf. the "10 million/100,000 times the normal level" information disaster from this weekend.
Aside from that, a free press may have its disadvantages, and lots thereof. But I suppose you can protect yourself from sensationalist TV/radio/papers/magazines by not buying, watching, listening to them. Tens of thousands of people evacuated from the Fukushima area did not have that same chance.
For those still interested in this thread, I found an article on the NYT web page that outlines the situtation and doesn't seem particularly "scaremongering"; in general, it underscores what mayn posters have stated: nobody knows all the details yet, and that is what makes the situation not just difficult, but scary -- if not for IAEA and Japanese officials, then definitely for the public.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/world/asia/27japan.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Amano&st=cse
So El Reg tells us that since RSA doesn't hand out useful information regarding the data theft they fell victim to, we best assume that SecurID's broken -- even if so far there's no factual proof, no confession of a disaster, no whistleblowing of any kind -- just silence.
Seems to me TEPCO's information policy isn't so different from that, as their press department tried to downplay things for a good while as well. But we're to believe nuclear's safe.
Or am I just missing the joke in all of this? Actually, this latest article was so pro it had a satirical quality. Maybe that was LP's hidden agenda all along? In that case, hats off
that apparently nobody knows the specifics well enough or is ready to disclose (all) the facts. This may be a sign of incompetence, or part of an elaborate plan to avoid a mass panic after the combined disaster that struck Japan on March 11 and 12.
As a result, most of the coverage one gets to read/hear/see in recent weeks borders on speculation, whether it is "pro-nuclear" like Lewis Page's articles or "anti" like the BBC reports so many posters complain about. Sadly, that's all you can be sure of at the moment where Fukushima is concerned, as neither TEPCO nor the Japanese government seem to be very consistent in their information policy, which leaves even local media in the dark.
Moreover, whatever your position on nuclear power may be, it's hard, if not impossible to deny that TEPCO has a history of false reporting and systematic concealment regarding plant safety incidents. A CNN report from September 2002 revealed that the company "[had] submitted a list of 29 cases of possible cover-ups of cracks on the core of 13 nuclear reactors, at three plants" (read here: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/09/02/japan.tepco/index.html); other sources claim that the company later acknowledged there had been 200 such cases between 1977 and 2002 alone (cf. Stephanie Cooke, "In Mortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age", Bloomsbury Publishing 2009, p. 388). Still other sources say that more accidents were reported in 2007 (cf. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0198-391032/Criticality-accident-may-have-happened.html; I searched the English version of TEPCO's press release database but didn't find anything related to this particular announcement.) So I guess it is safe to say that the company itself has contributed a great deal to the mistrust and fears surrounding the latest tragic incidents. And no amount of science can explain that away.
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