On Leaving West Germany and Taiwan to Their Fates
Political and practical considerations often outweigh what is "logical" in warfare. Considering Taiwan first, no Republican President since Eisenhower--not even our current dimb-wit--would ever allow Taiwan to militarily fall. To do otherwise would be to turn the "you lost China!" claim historically leveled by Republicans against Democrats on its head. There is also the simple practical consideration that the Taiwanese have a well-equipped, well-trained military (with a outside potential for nuclear weapons itself) that would make a cross-strait assault by the PRC very, very expensive.
Considering West Germany next, politicians like to "win" wars, and feeding West Germany to the Warsaw Pack is not a "win." Like it or not, American "progressive response" nuclear employment was designed particularly for this scenario. My sector along the IGB (Inter-German Border) would have been instructive: Should war break out, the 12th Panzer Division would occupy forward positions along the IGB with a very simple operational order: DIP (Die in Place). My positions would have been about 4 km behind--along with my 6 nuclear weapons. The practical consideration is very simple--these weapons will not be surrendered under any circumstances. The easiest way not to surrender them is to employ them. It was my professional opinion at the time that all six of my weapons would have been employed against a variety of targets within 45 minutes of the lead Soviet Armor Corps trying to cross the IGB in sector. I may have been too conservative. Moreover, the likelihood that the Soviet commander, if successful, would have stopped at the Rhine is nil. He would already have had to engage French forces on his way to the Rhine, so there would be no sense of "neutrality." And the only sure way you can prevent French nukes being used on Soviet forces is to occupy France. I doubt that would be a very pleasant process.
Biting the hand that feeds IT
