Sorry but he misses the point entirely
The point of contention is not comcast managing or restricting traffic as it crosses their network {as is their intent and right}
its the method they use to achieve the aim
sending tcp rst packets is not an acceptable way of doing this
{effective yes but not acceptable}
{a tcp rst based method relies on the intermediary performing a man-in-in-the-middle style attack on the connection by forging replies from the server to the client saying 'your request was canceled' and from the cleient to the server saying 'please cancel my request'.
this is obviously unnaceptable
the methods for asking a server to slow its responses and asking a client to do simmilar are already available within the scope of the icmp protocol,
forging rst packets stop dead any transfer,
if the client re-tries again later it is not due to the underlying design of tcp but rather through some re-trying built into the client to try and pre-empt this sort of malicious tampering {or in the case of bit-torrent to allow for transfers broken by one side re-booting to resume later} but the re-tries are not within a resonable or short period of time.
the basic issue is not comcasts attempts to limit the effect of this traffic on available bandwith its the method they are employing envolves feeding both sides eronious data, and doing so by forging the source to be the other party. this DOES set a worrying precedent as by allowing this it also opens the door for them to say return a forged page instead of the website you requested or any other type of forged reply, with you the user being none the wiser.
I see nothig wrong with badwith shaping or traffic limiting, {and there are many ways they can achieve this without resorting to this form of forgery, which is the only issue being debated}