Posts by A Non

UK ISPs agree to menace their filesharing users

THIS WILL NOT WORK!!

It is little wonder why more and more of the public are saying 'NO' to being ripped off by greedy music companies, and are instead using peer-to-peer file sharing technology to download for FREE!!

With many P2P clients allowing the user to;

1) Randomize the port used for incoming connections, each time the software is used.

2)Either Enable or Force Protocol Encryption, to make it difficult for ISP's to track P2P traffic.

3)Use 'Blocklists', most P2P clients can download and use one. A decent one can be found here: http://www.bluetack.co.uk/. Alternatively free software like PeerGuardian can be used. http://phoenixlabs.org/pg2/

How would ISP's and the music industry implement such a scheme?

How would they cope with P2P using TOR to connect to the trackers to give a limited measure of anonymity. Or even using a matured I2P protocol in the future?

Or even 3rd Generation networks such as ANtsP2P? http://antsp2p.sourceforge.net/

The latest version (beta1.6.0) was released on 26 January 2008.

Not to mention commercial VPN solutions ie Swedish based https://www.relakks.com/ !!

Geert Wilders faces legal threats over footage copyright

Threats force Liveleak to pull "Anti-Islam" film

The film in question can now be found at:

Geert Wilder's Fitna: English Language Version

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=42427935813490087

Alternatively Bitorrent users can download the torrent for the film at;

http://torrents.thepiratebay.org/4102738/Fitna_the_movie_-_English_-_AVI_and_FLV_format.4102738.TPB.torrent

or

http://torrents.thepiratebay.org/4102692/%5BAVI%5D_Fitna_by_Geert_Wilders_-_English.4102692.TPB.torrent

This attempt at Internet censorship by Islamist extremists has backfired

Home Secretary in ID card gaffe

AN UNPRINCIPLED SCHEME

AN UNPRINCIPLED SCHEME

The Home Secretary has announced the government's 2008 'Delivery Plan' for the ID scheme, a plan that NO2ID showed - with leaked documents <http://wikileaks.cx/leak/nis-options-analysis-outcome.pdf>[PDF] - in January to be little more than a marketing exercise. Nothing has changed.

On the same day, almost a year late, the Treasury published the review that Gordon Brown commissioned from Sir James Crosby in 2006. No wonder it's been kept under wraps for so long. The government's own advisor lays out ten broad principles for the design of a "consumer-driven universal ID assurance system" scheme - and the Home Office ID scheme breaks them all.

1. Any scheme should be restricted to enabling citizens to assert their identity ... BROKEN

2. Governance should inspire trust. It should be independent of Government ... BROKEN

3. The amount of data stored should be minimised. Full biometric images (other than photographs) should not be kept ... BROKEN

4. Citizens should "own" their entry. It should not be possible, except for national security, for any data to be shared without informed consent ... BROKEN

5. Enrolment should minimise costs and give citizens a hassle-free experience ... BROKEN

6. To respond to consumers and give benefits, it should be capable of being rolled out quickly ... BROKEN

7. Citizens who lose cards or whose identity is compromised should be able to get it fixed quickly and efficiently ... BROKEN

8. The scheme's systems should work with existing, efficient, bank systems to reduce risks ... BROKEN

9. To engage consumers enrolment and cards should be provided free of charge ... BROKEN

10. The market should play a role in creating standards, to ensure ease of use and minimise costs ... BROKEN

And finally - unless we've overlooked something - the Home Office published the results of its latest survey <http://www.ips.gov.uk/identity/downloads/IPS-Omnibus-Report-Wave-3.pdf>[PDF]. The Home Secretary bluffs and blusters that the benefits of ID cards are "undoubted", but her own department's research shows that while three-quarters of people consider the claimed benefits to be "very important", only just over one quarter consider them to be "very believable".

Unprincipled. Unchanged. Unbelievable.

[For an explanation of how each principle has been broken, see NO2ID's press release on the Crosby Review <http://www.no2id.net/news/pressRelease/release.php?name=Crosby_10>.]

UK rattles 'three strikes' filesharing sabre (again)

Such a scheme could easily be circumvented!!

It is little wonder why more and more of the public are saying 'NO' to being ripped off by greedy music companies, and are instead using BitTorrent peer-to-peer file sharing technology to download for FREE!!

With many BitTorrent apps allowing the user to;

1) Randomize the port used for incoming connections, each time the app is used.

2)Eiither Enable or Force Protocol Encryption, to make it difficult for ISP's to throttle-back P2P traffic.

3)Use 'Blocklists', most P2P clients can download and use one. A decent one can be found here: http://www.bluetack.co.uk/. Alternatively free software like PeerGuardian can be used. http://phoenixlabs.org/pg2/

How would ISP's and the music industry implement such a scheme?

How would they cope with P2P using TOR to connect to the trackers to give a limited measure of anonymity. Or even using a matured I2P protocol in the future?

Or even 3rd Generation networks such as ANtsP2P? http://antsp2p.sourceforge.net/

The latest version (beta1.6.0) was released on 26 January 2008.

Not to mention VPN solutions ie Sweden based https://www.relakks.com/ !!

RIPA could be challenged on human rights

RE: Comment by 'Anonymous Coward'

RE: Comment by 'Anonymous Coward'

Posted Friday 25th January 2008 12:16 GMT

".. this law will only apply to the law-abiding. The real crims/terrorists/kiddie fiddlers will simply set up an encrypted wireless hard drive, bury it in a wall, and ensure they configure their software (which probably won't be windows in that case) to use that for it's cache and main storage."

An external hard drive is not even necessary. Encrypted files can simply be stored safely on the Internet.

One such system is the OFFSYSTEM the Owner Free File System

"As in any local File System, you can store and retrieve files. In the OFFSYSTEM is that done online, which means, any user having access to the Internet, can store or upload and download own, foreign or public files".

"All files, which you upload to the OFFSYSTEM, are cutted into a kind of small pieces, bits and bytes - called them Blocks -, which are then stored by peer-to-peer-technology into the machines of other users".

"That is all absolutely safe and secure, the Block has no reference to the original file, because in the OFFSYSTEM a byte-range of several different original-files perform one Block. The Block has nothing to do anymore with the original file. You can imagine it as encrypted, though it is not encrypted, but it is data, which was "mixed" out of several original files. One Fragment can have multiple, contingent meaning - as they are build out of different original files".

"So you can store as well your private files in the OFFSYSTEM, no peer will ever be able to read them. The peers share only hundreds of small and mixed together Blocks - "white nose data". Blocks are algorhythm generated random data, which no one owns".

http://offsystem.sourceforge.net/index.html

Of course, a simpler option would simply to use the 2Gb of storage space provided with a GMail email account and only connect via TOR.

TrueCrypt's "aleatory" defence against RIPA

TrueCrypt http://www.truecrypt.org/ provides an "aleatory" defence against RIPA, and, indeed, against any similar legislation. This defence works because TrueCrypt makes encrypted material indistinguishable from pseudo-random data. And before the authorities can insist that you hand over an encryption key, they would first be obliged to prove to the satisfaction of a court that you were in possession of encrypted material. Depending on how TrueCrypt is set up it might be obvious that you have some pseudo-random data in an atypical location on your computer, and you might well be asked how it got there. Now, there are many computer processes that produce pseudo-random data, and you are not obliged by the legislation to account for the origins of every file on your computer that contains such data given the tens of thousands of files on the average PC this would be an impossible task. However, TrueCrypt can also provide you with an excellent and highly plausible reason as to why you possess such a file of pseudo-random data irrespective of where it is found.

Will Darling's data giveaway kill off ID cards?

NOW THE DATABASE STATE CLAIMS 25,000,000 BRITISH VICTIMS

It's hard to know whether to laugh or cry. The cabinet insists we should trust them to manage everyone's life through a National Identity Register. Meanwhile HMRC has mislaid discs containing the names, dates of birth, national insurance numbers and bank details of 25 million British people — more than seven million families.

The package was sent in the state's internal post — and was neither recorded nor registered. The value to organised crime of the information on the two "lost" discs is incalculable — but certainly runs into hundreds of millions of pounds. The government, of course, blames junior officials for a failure to follow protocols.

But it simply should not be possible for junior staff — or the chancellor himself — to collect or copy such details in one place. That it is, is a direct result of the government's obsession with centralised databases and its contempt for citizens' privacy.

Something positive may come of it, though. With your help, NO2ID can use this a clear illustration of the real danger in state control of personal identity to defeat the ID scheme quickly.

The news comes just as NO2ID is raising desperately needed funds for a legal challenge to the database state. We have contacted all 11,000+ citizens who pledged to contribute £10 to a legal defence fund. If you didn't join that pledge, it's not too late to help.

If you're one of the 25,000,000 people who have already been exposed by the government, please help us make sure that this never happens again. If you're one of those lucky ones whose private information hasn't been lost in the internal post, please help us keep you safe.

To win the fight we don't just need funds for legal action. To keep up the pressure and battle the government's publicity machine costs money. If you haven't joined NO2ID already, or if you haven't given to our general funds recently, please do so now. Thank you for your support.

http://www.no2id.net/

UK police can now force you to reveal decryption keys

DriveCrypt Plus Pack and "plausible deniability"?

I believe it may also be possible to use DriveCrypt Plus Pack to achieve "plausible deniability"

DCPP is supposed to enable the user to hide an entire operating system inside the free disk space of another operating system. Two passwords are required: One password is for the visible operating system, the other for the invisible one. The first "fake" password grants access to a pre-configured operating system (outer OS), while the other gives grants access to the real working operating system. This functionality is extremely useful if the user fears that someone may force them to provide the DCPP password; in this case, the user simply gives away the first (fake) password so that the snoop will be able to boot into the system, but only see the prepared information that they wishes them to find. The attacker will not be able to see any confidential and personal data and he will also not be able to understand that the machine is storing one more hidden operating system. On the other hand, if the user enters the private password (for the invisible disk), the system will boot a different operating system (the working system) giving the user the access to all the confidential data.

The creation of a hidden operating system is not obligatory and as such, it is not possible for anyone who does not have the hidden OS password to know or find out, if a hidden operating system exists or not.