Re: The article leaves out important details
"The Ethiopian pilots left the throttle at takeoff thrust. This is why the aerodynamic forces were so high. Further, electric trim was available but they didn't use it to override the computer....the Lion Air crash, the flight immediately before the accident had the MCAS problem. Those pilots used their training to override the computer and land safely....one pilot responded correctly but the other didn't."
No. From NTSB report pp 2-3 https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf
During the preceding Lion Air flight on the accident airplane with a different flight crew, ...a 10-second automatic AND [Aircraft Nose Down] stabilizer trim input occurred, and the crew countered the input with an ANU [Aircraft Nose Up] electric trim input..captain moved the stabilizer trim cutout (STAB TRIM CUTOUT) switches to CUTOUT. He then moved them back to NORMAL, and the problem almost immediately reappeared. He moved the switches back to CUTOUT. He stated that the crew performed three non-normal checklists: Airspeed Unreliable, ALT DISAGREE (altitude disagree), and Runaway Stabilizer. The pilots continued the flight using manual trim until the end of the flight.
...Similar to the Lion Air accident flight, a 9-second automatic AND stabilizer trim input occurred after flaps were retracted and while in manual flight (no autopilot)...the pilot flying, partially countered the AND stabilizer input by applying ANU electric trim. About 5 seconds after the completion of pilot trim input, another automatic AND stabilizer trim input occurred. The captain applied ANU electric trim and fully countered the second automatic AND stabilizer input; however, the airplane was not returned to a fully trimmed condition. Cockpit voice recorder data indicated that the flight crew then discussed the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches, and shortly thereafter DFDR data were consistent with the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches being moved to CUTOUT.
However, because the airplane remained in a nose-down out-of-trim condition, the crew was required to continue applying nose-up force to the control column to maintain level flight. About 32 seconds before impact, two momentary pilot-commanded electric ANU trim inputs and corresponding stabilizer movement were recorded , consistent with the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches no longer being in CUTOUT. Five seconds after these short electric trim inputs, another automatic AND stabilizer trim input occurred, and the airplane began pitching nose down.
Biting the hand that feeds IT
