Run the numbers?
Has anyone done an informed estimate, comparing how much Boeing expected to save by kludging oversized engines onto a half-century-old airframe design (and the inevitable chain of further kludgery), with the eventual likely losses incurred by the consequences of the two crashes?
I am 100% certain that plenty of engineers, both junior and senior, will have raised increasingly worrisome issues as the 737 kludging progressed. It seems equally certain that damnfool greedy management ignored them.
The fan sizing fiasco lies at the heart of this, necessitating one compromise after another, increasingly nasty kludges to try to rectify a problem—often caused by the previous 'fix. Undercarriage length; engine pylon re-placement; CG problems; handling changes and trim issues: eventually leading to a clumsy attempt to cater for the resulting pitch-up-on-power tendency—which then had to be tucked away, to preserve the supposed common type rating in order save money on pilot training.
Managers will have been repeatedly warned, by worried engineers about this chain of kludgery. What did they say? What did they do?
Someone, or several someones, in very senior positions at Boeing said: "We've gone too far now. It'll cost the company (and my bonus) too much to change course to a new airframe. Keep quiet. Keep kludging."
The human and financial cost of this shortsighted, weaselling greed has been staggering.
Who made those decisions?