Re: Simulators
I am *very* well aware of this Max issue. See my post history.
Boeing actually did test the aerodynamic forces on the STAB and apparently a fairly big woman could not move the trim wheel in a test bench at high air speeds and trim near extreme.
This, as we all know now, did not change anything at Boeing.
FAA requires the operation to be possible "without exceptional skill", Boeing failed on this with the trim wheel. Yes, there is the "rollercoaster" maneuver that might not be possible in 4000' and IIRC was not included anymore even in the NG FCOM...
Regarding your last sentence, I actually disagree. The Lion Air crash flight had the captain successfully fight MACS 20+ times before the FO lost it. The flight before on the same plane landed, thanks to a jumpseat pilot.
My point is that there is some truth to the "just fly the plane" adage. Both accidents indeed were chains of events. Boeing was the biggest culprit here but an "above average" pilot could have saved the flights, perhaps with some luck.
Just keep hanging the ANU trim switch, not a half-a**ed blip here and there.
Both airlines have serious issues (as do Boeing and the FAA), flying to destination with stick shaker on all the time?? Hello? Trying to engage AP with stick shaker on? and not following the *memory items* for unreliable IAS (power, pitch)?
I am not blaming the pilots. They were a product of their training and airline culture. Seems a bit of a case of the children of the magenta.
What *almost everyone* has missed was this mention in these comments is an *extremely important point*: AoA disagree was marked "where fitted"!!!
This totally contradicts the "oh it should be there in all the planes, we just made a mistake" line from Boeing, if true!!
Also initial reports I read said that this definitely was listed as an option, I am not clear on if it was to be included in the 50k AoA indicator or a separate option.
Regarding simulators: Southwest contract with Boeing had a clause that if any sim training is required there is a penalty of 1M per airframe.
Normalization of deviance - as so often.
Regulatory capture.
The real villains of this sad story can be found at higher levels of Boeing and at the FAA.
Biting the hand that feeds IT
