Re: MCAS from a Systems Perspective
Thanks for that. I was just sent a link to a document written by a pilot who has also an IT background, and it makes, frankly, for horrific reading.
As a matter of fact, I preserved it, just in case Boeing tries to get it offline because it is a sane but wholly damning review of what happened, and why. I quote:
If I have not been clear, so far, let me say it succinctly.
Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 MAX. That is big strike #1.
Boeing then tried to mask the 737’s dynamic instability with a software system, similar to the systems used in dynamically unstable fighter jets (though those jets are fitted with ejection seats). Big strike #2.
Finally, the software system relied on systems known for their propensity to fail (angle of attack indicators) and did not appear to include even rudimentary provisions to cross check the outputs of the angle of attack sensor against other sensors, including the other angle of attack sensor. Big strike #3.
None of the above should have passed any muster. None of the above should have passed the “ok” pencil of the most junior engineering staff, much less a DER.
Go read it. After that, I suspect you won't go near a 737 MAX ever again, even after the patch.