Re: I don't see how this would be a problem for Apple
On its face, the draft law requires in Section 3a that a company that provides a device or encryption system "shall" perform certain actions under specified circumstances. How they provide for that (Section 3b) is up to them; the government cannot require a specific implementation (similar to the fact that they did not require a specific implementation in the recent California case). The imperative "shall" does not, on its face, allow for a "covered entity" such as Apple, for example, to evade this by implementing a security system in their product that they cannot, in fact, circumvent; the law, if enacted, will impose a requirement
The draft does not provide any information about the consequences for a "covered entity" that either will not or cannot comply. I can imagine a fine, possibly quite large, for covered entities that refuse and possibly injunctions shutting down sales of non-compliant products which the covered entity has designed so that it cannot bypass the product security. That would be a sad outcome indeed.
The proposed law still is pretty rough, and does not cover things, such as fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes that seem fairly obvious. There seems no very good reason, for example, to single out any particular type of crime for this treatment; it ought to be enough for a US or District Attorney to be able to convince a judge to issue a search warrant based on probable cause. (I expect that other types of court order, if included in an enacted version, would be thrown out on the basis of Riley v California, which found a warrant necessary for search of a cell phone, even incident to an arrest).
Biting the hand that feeds IT
