Balance and counterbalance, we strive not for perfection, but simply equilibrium.
A body should generally be entitled to autonomy in its decision-making procedures (such as the process by which it forms advice.) However, if that advice is to be accorded special treatment, then it is reasonable for those according the special treatment to also establish conditions on the advice so entitled. If there is no special treatment (for example, the requirement for a specific Board vote to not follow it), then there is no need to establish any special pedigree for the advice. By insisting on special treatment for their advice, the GAC invites consideration of what type of advice shall be afforded the special treatment.
Similarly, seeking GAC decisional precedence within ICANN would be quite reasonable if ICANN preempted each government's ability to engage in national rulemaking (which occurs in various degrees with multi-lateral treaty structures.) However, ICANN is a coordination body, not a treaty organization, and therefore its coordination activities do not preclude governments from exercising their authority with respect to entities in their jurisdiction. Unlike other ICANN participants, governments already possess unique rulemaking powers that ensure their ability to carry out their public policy obligations, and that provides a more than adequate counterbalance to all other participants in the ICANN ecosystem and the outcomes that are produced.
A system with unequal forces quickly tears itself apart, and in the case of ICANN that would be a cost too great for the Internet to bear.
Biting the hand that feeds IT
