Re: Feynman
"If you really want to make a good point, it helps to actually know the story."
Fair comment, though I'm not sure I'm reading the same review you're reading (a review of a book by a sociologist, which in itself would amuse Feynman given his views on "social sciences").
E.g. I see a paragraph in the book review that says:
"In a move to save cost, NASA decided to cut cost on safety testing, this was divergence from the earlier Apollo Program. The Covert report (Eugene Covert, Department of Aeronautics, MIT) concluded that the key components may not have been tested sufficiently and certification of components required more time than that given by NASA, leading to problems with the main engine. Due to economic constraints, success of the program was heavily dependent on success of its business model, which was based on maintaining high frequency of launch to meet financial goals."
Which is pretty much what I said, except mine was shorter.
Other primary references for the Rogers Commission can be found via
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report
So rather than a review of a sociological investigation into the failure, should we look direct to Feynman's own words on the subject, unsummarised, unedited? They're in Feynman's Appendix to the Report, which can be found at, for example:
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/Appendix-F.txt
Back to Feynman's appendix: here are a couple of unedited highlights, but please read the whole document for context:
"if we are to replace standard numerical probability usage with engineering judgment, why do we find such an enormous disparity between the management estimate and the judgment of the engineers? It would appear that, for whatever purpose, be it for internal or external consumption, the management of NASA exaggerates the reliability of its product, to the point of fantasy"
"Let us make recommendations to ensure that NASA officials deal in a world of reality in understanding technological weaknesses and imperfections well enough to be actively trying to eliminate them. They must live in reality in comparing the costs and utility of the Shuttle to other methods of entering space. And they must be realistic in making contracts, in estimating costs, and the difficulty of the projects. Only realistic flight schedules should be proposed, schedules that have a reasonable chance of being met. If in this way the government would not support them, then so be it. NASA owes it to the citizens from whom it asks support to be frank, honest, and informative, so that these citizens can make the wisest decisions for the use of their limited resources.
For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
Biting the hand that feeds IT
