Watchdog signals Boeing 737 Max jets can return to US skies following software upgrade, pilot training

Boeing 737 Max passenger jets are today closer to returning to service in the United States after America's aviation watchdog lifted a 20-month ban albeit with caveats attached. FAA boss Steve Dickson signed off paperwork [PDF] that "enables operation of Boeing Company Model 737-8 and Boeing Company 737-9 airplanes" once any …

[Anonymous Coward]

Two ideas

1) $50 million flight insurance free for every individual passenger on a Max, paid for by Boeing. It shouldn't be an issue of proving in court what _your_ future life earnings would have been, but rather pegging it to Boeing's future earnings. Isn't every single plane worth $5 billion or so in confidence? Hmm?

2) Name each plane for individual managers in Boeing and FAA, CEO on down. At 800 or so built so far, we're getting down to the lower level managers. Each one of those lesser-paid managers will be memorialized by their willingness to sign off on bad work. Time to take this personally - 346 people already have.

[FILE_ID.DIZ]

Re: Two ideas

So, name each plane kinda like how British Airways does for many of them?

Except for the opposite reasoning.

[Anonymous Coward]

I still ain't going

If it's a Boeing

[Danny 14]

Dont make a fuss,

Its an airbus

[SW10]

Avoid repeat disaster

Rewriting software to avoid repeat disaster seems like a low threshold: shouldn’t they be asked to rewrite software to avoid disaster, period?

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: Avoid repeat disaster

No, HCL don't proactively audit and change code. If Boeing don't open TIRs, they won't change a single thing no matter how many planes fall out the sky. And be sure to get the description exactly right or they'll close them because they can't reproduce it.

[bazza]

This does seem premature. The British pilots' union has said that a software fix alone is inadequate, that the limited utility of the smaller trim wheels should be fixed.

It's very clear that only the bare minimum has been done to fix the issues with the aircraft. The end result is an aircraft which is a hodge podge design largely dating back to the 1960s, with all the frailty that implies.

[MJB7]

Dating back to the 1096s

I *like* old designs. We've got most of the bugs out of them. The problem with this was the new bit of the design.

[Fursty Ferret]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

I disagree. Something that relies on a combination of physical strength and bits of string to control the moving surfaces of a passenger aircraft should be relegated to the past where it belongs.

Having a computer in the middle allows for enormous redundancy and improved safety, along with better passenger comfort.

[Intractable Potsherd]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

That physical strength and those bits of string have made the 737 a very safe and reliable aeroplane. Just because you *can* put a computer in the middle doesn't mean you *should*.

[Nonymous Crowd Nerd]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

The problem is that as you make the plane larger, the engines larger and increase the number of passengers, the physical strength required to get the plane out of trouble goes up. It's become a major problem and was significant in the crashes with the pilots in no position to concentrate on the technical issues when they were struggling to control the yoke and the trim wheel.

Ask yourself how enthusiastic you'd be to drive a full-sized 38-tonne truck without the servo assisted brakes that all large trucks now have, but did not in the 1960s?

[John Brown (no body)]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

Hence the hydraulic assisted controls on the Spruce Goose, the first to use it IIRC

[W.S.Gosset]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

747 Jumbo was "just a touch" larger than the 737, had 0 fly-by-wire, ie was entirely manual/physical albeit via clever hydraulics (including manual windings behind various hatches/floorpanels in case of mechanical failure), every pilot who flew it said it handled beautifully and effortlessly even in catastrophic/extreme conditions, had triple redundancy on EVERYTHING, and basically puts the lie to everything stated by everyone above re superiority of fly-by-wire (ie, talk only to computer, trust computer to talk to controls properly) in terms of controllability/flyability.

Eg, note any number of YouTube extreme crosswind landings, the bulk of the most-extreme you'll note are 747s. Like, crabbing in 60 degrees off the runway extreme. All purely manual effort by the pilot. No computer interstition.

EXCEPTION:

cost more to run because extra person(s) on flight deck due to more non-pilot engineering monitoring.

[Peter2]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

Having a computer in the middle does allow for enormous redundancy and improved safety.

It also (very evidently, since it happened in this case) allows for the computer to decide that actually, it wants to dive into the ground irrespective of the pilot control inputs, which is about what you'd expect from poor software development combined with modern management practices. Both need eradicating by application of criminal responsibility for the inevitable result of their decisions to the entire management chain, imo.

IIRC the trim should be used for making tiny adjustments to how the aircraft flies to make it fly in a straight line without control input. It was never supposed to be a flight control to stop the flight computer from killing you by pointing the front of the plane into the ground against strong areodynamic forces from non responsive primary controls, and one would imagine that it would requrie a heck of a redesign to be useful in the circumstances that you are suggesting.

[SkippyBing]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

The trim should be used for making small adjustments by the pilot, however it's also used by MCAS to stop the control forces coming too light at high angle of attack. It was found in the second crash that once MCAS had wound all the trim on* it was physically impossible to move the trim control and keep the aircraft level. To remain in level flight the pilots were applying full up elevator against full nose down trim, this created a form of geometric lock preventing any trim movement. The original 737 flight manuals suggested that if you found yourself in this situation you release stick pressure, wind the trim like mad, and then reapply stick pressure to try and regain height before repeating the procedure. That guidance appears to have been removed in the mid to late '70s.

So in the case of runaway MCAS the only way of getting out of it alive was by turning the trim motors off and manually re-trimming. Which proved impossible the one time it was tried. So a greater mechanical advantage on the manual trim wheel would be a significant improvement.

*Because why wouldn't you let the computer have full trim authority?

[whitepines]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

It also (very evidently, since it happened in this case) allows for the computer to decide that actually, it wants to dive into the ground irrespective of the pilot control inputs

Alright, who put Marvin the Paranoid Android in the captain's seat?

I'm going, I'm going!

[W.S.Gosset]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

Minor correction:

You could just switch off that subsystem and thus regain sensible behaviour.

And in fact a number of flights/pilots did just that, prior to these crashes. They were pilots on airlines like BA, Lufthansa, etc

To be clear: this subsystem had documentedly gone spastic on a number of prior occasions, but in each case the pilots in question realised and disabled the subsystem, and regained safe control of the aircraft.

This became public during the investigation.

[nematoad]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

"...along with better passenger comfort."

I would prefer to arrive safely than die in comfort.

Unfortunately for your argument it was the "computer in the middle" that caused these crashes. And the failure of Boeing and the FAA to catch the problem before it even got off the ground.

I do feel that the FAA patting itself on the back for a job well done in supposedly fixing these problems is in poor taste. After all it was their laxity which allowed it to happen in the first place

[ChrisC]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

More specifically though, it was Boeing's half-arsed attempt to quietly graft a degree of fly-by-wire control into an airframe that was never designed to work that way, in order to work around a fundamental aerodynamic problem which would have otherwise rendered the Max uncertifiable as an airliner, and in a way which minimised the amount of type training required for the flight crew and avoided the need to recertify the Max as something other than just another boring old iteration of the 737 design to which grandfathered certification could still be applied.

Not saying that aircraft designed to be FBW from the outset can never suffer from problems of their own, but it's easier to design the system not to do something monumentally stupid, and to then failsafe in the event that something does still go wrong, when the *entire* system is designed from the outset with FBW is mind, than when it's mutated over the decades into the current poorly matched combinations of traditional and modern subsystems we now see in the Max.

So my preference would be to fly on a modern fully FBW airliner, then on a more traditionally controlled one, and then way way down at the bottom of the list, after other options such as "ferry", "train", "car", "walking" and "just not going at all" have been exhausted, would I finally reach "Max, or whatever stupid name the airline has given it to try and disguise its origins". I mean, if I was trying to escape a zombie horde bearing down on London, and the last flight out of Heathrow was a Max, then I guess the Max would be the lesser of two evils, but given a free choice in the matter I'll quite happily avoid flying on one. Ever.

[Danny 14]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

It was because Boeing tied all the fly by wire computer data input to one sensor. One. It did have a second sensor available as an optional extra.

Now have 3 sensors with a discrepancy alarm and the pilots would have had a fighting chance.

[NetBlackOps]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

There's still that computer that kept getting overloaded just with two input channels. I'd sure like to know how they fixed that design limitation.

[MJI]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

Now if I was in that situation I would be asking around to see if anyone could get the mothballed SST going.

May as well go in style.

[oiseau]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

...computer in the middle allows for enormous redundancy and improved safety, along with better passenger comfort.

Indeed ...

We've seen how the redundancy has worked (see sensors) with regards to safety.

As to passenger comfort, I guess that the bottom of the sea or a nice casket can be quite comfortable.

O.

[Commswonk]

Re: Dating back to the 1096s

We've seen how the redundancy has worked (see sensors) with regards to safety.

And unless I missed it there is no requirement to double up (triple up?) the number of AOA sensors.

So ultimately we finish up with a hardware design shortcoming "fixed" by a software fudge and some pilot training.

Not good enough IMHO.

[Roland6]

It's very clear that only the bare minimum has been done to fix the issues with the aircraft. The end result is an aircraft which is a hodge podge design largely dating back to the 1960s, with all the frailty that implies.

From what I've read there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the airframe - dating back to the 1960's. The problems stem from Boeing decided to install engines that fundamentally were too big for the airframe. To achieve this, they did a hodgepodge design and mounted the engines further forward and higher, changing the flight characteristics and handling of the plane, to mitigate this they installed additional sensors and automation. The problems arose because these systems were poorly designed and implemented...

Thus the obvious solution is to replace the engines with smaller - but less economical - engines (ie. engines of a size the airframe was originally designed to take) and largely strip out the additional systems...

[Chris Coles]

My original comment made some time ago on The Times, London web pages remains valid; that the control of trim is always under the complete command of the pilot and should never introduce any form of external input from what would have to be recognised as a "second pilot". All aircraft fly under a simple rule, the pilot flying hands over the flight controls to another pilot with the phrase; "you have control" to which the other pilot then responds; "I have control". Introducing a new "pilot in command", a computer system, not under the full control of the "pilot in command" to manage the trim system is a doomed concept and should never have been permitted. Now I made this point as the new wording for the certification reads;

"The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flightcrew’s ability to control the airplane’s pitch by using only the control column. This means the pilot will have sufficient control authority without the need to make electric or manual stabilizer trim inputs. The new flight control laws also include FCC integrity monitoring of each FCC’s performance and cross-FCC monitoring, which detects and stops erroneous FCC-generated stabilizer trim commands (including MCAS)." (page seven; Department of Transportation [4910-13-P] https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/boeing_reading_room/media/737_AD_2019-NM-035fr.pdf )

If I understand this paragraph correctly, it removes any possibility of commanded changes to the trim. Again, there is no report that the necessary changes have been made. So all we have so far to date is the requirements delivered by the FAA, and not a note to describe the changes have been made by Boeing.

[Chris G]

An innately unstable aircraft that relies on a combination of software, new training and minimal material changes to stay in the air for hours at a time, that carries hundreds of passengers and flies over population centres, is not a viable proposition.

Ungrounding is an interesting use of English, ' Fasten your safety belts and prepare for ungrounding'.

[lglethal]

"An innately unstable aircraft that relies on a combination of software, new training and minimal material changes to stay in the air for hours at a time, that carries hundreds of passengers and flies over population centres"

is the description of every single modern aircraft in existence. Aircraft are designed to be innnately unstable as you get far superior performance. There hasnt been a computer in the modern era that didnt have some sort of computer assistance to account for this.

No, these 2 crashes, came down to a few simple things:

Boeings regulatory capture of the FAA ("It will be fine, dont worry about it!"),

The cost cutting of installing a single sensor/computer system in such a critical juncture instead of the traditional 3 independent systems,

The attempts to hide that this was an all new aircraft by claiming it was just an upgrade and not requiring the level of additional training and certification that it actually required as a new aircraft.

The failure to actually review the software to an acceptable degree.

All of this points to a managerial culture concerned purely with profit and that unfortunately cant be fixed by a simple software update.

[Peter2]

Military fighter aircraft are designed to be innately unstable for superior performance.

Civilian passanger aircraft are and should be designed to be stable since they are supposed to take off, turn once and fly a steady course for a long time before then making another turn and landing.

Making multiple G manouvers is in fact something these planes are designed not to do, because a multi G manouvering enviroment would probably kill some of the passangers as hand held equipment (phones etc) became high speed projectiles.

[SkippyBing]

The 737 is innately stable. The issue with the Max is that the control forces reduce at high angles of attack which could lead to the pilot stalling the aircraft without changing the pressure on the control column. This is the issue that MCAS fixed by applying a nudge of trim if the pilot was approaching that area of the flight envelope, where in 99.999% of operations they'd never get.

[Electronics'R'Us]

Stable?

From other comments long ago, I seem to recall that the 737-NG could not power out of an incipient stall, unlike the predecessors which could (i.e. applying power in the older versions could solve the problem).

The nose had to be lowered first (second nature to glider pilots).

The MAX has an instability (and a critical non conformance to the part 25 rules) in a small part of the flight envelope which MCAS was 'designed' to handle. Thus a computer that was bolted on to an otherwise dumb aircraft that had full trim authority (that was not even properly documented in the engineering documents).

At full extents, the elevators have insufficient authority to overcome it because the elevators are tiny compared to the trim area.

Aircraft automation is great, but without a proper design process it is asking for trouble.

Let's be clear; MCAS is (was) an autonomous flight control system that had crap engineering all over it (I do not blame the engineers, I blame the management as they could override engineering concerns based on business issues, not engineering risk analysis).

Where an aircraft has been designed to be fly by wire from the outset (the B777 comes to mind as I am familiar with the system) and has been properly engineered the risks are incredibly low. (I am not referring to the latest version of the 777 here incidentally).

That was clearly never done for the MAX.

[Allonymous Coward]

I'm never going to fly an airline that flies these things

Not a totally outlandish stance. Almost all the airlines I fly with (which is none at the moment anyway) don't use them.

[Grumpy Rob]

The bigger picture..

Really annoys me that the focus is all on Boeing. Yes - what they did was unforgiveable, BUT Southwest Airlines have 34 737 Max aircraft, first flight on 1st Oct 2017, until grounding in 13th March 2019. Zero crashes, and as far as I know zero incidents. So how come Southwest can fly the MAX OK, but some South East Asian and African airlines can't? And in the case of the Indonesian airline there were three successive flights with the faulty aircraft (FFS!). One flight was completed with the stick-shaker going off THE WHOLE FLIGHT. In Europe or the US the first pilot would have landed immediately AND defected the aircraft. And the aircraft wouldn't have been flown with passengers until it was test-flown first.

My point is there there has to be a combination of factors to cause an accident, and at the moment everyone is attacking Boeing, while the airlines seem to be escaping any blame. How are things ever going to improve if the airlines escape their (deserved) share of the blame?

The cynic in me thinks that there might be some astro-turfing going on, since the ambulance chasers know that Boeing has deep pockets, whereas attacking the airlines may be much more difficult due to country of jurisdiction - but I'm old and deeply cynical.

Reminds me of the Japanese tsunami and all concentration on the dangers of nuclear power - FUKUSHIMA DISASTER sells papers. But the real culprit, who seems to have got away relatively unscathed, was the plant operator. ALL the newer Japanese reactors (22 IIRC) automatically and safely shut down. But the Fukushima plant was the oldest, NOT fail-safe, and well past its design life. The operator kept it running anyway.

So I do wonder about what is posted online, and who is behind it.

..Adjusts tinfoil hat..

[Chris G]

Re: The bigger picture..

The bigger picture would have to include an aircraft that was sufficiently well manufactured that it wouldn't put smaller third world airlines in that position in the first place.

It is not acceptable that a fully certified aircraft can produce a ' stick shaker' that needs specific software and training to deal with.

It stinks of shortcuts and collusion between Boeing and the FAA.

[TVU]

Re: The bigger picture..

"It stinks of shortcuts and collusion between Boeing and the FAA"

...which is why I will not now trust FAA recertification for the re-engineered 737 Max. The verdict to look for is the one from the independent European Union Aviation Safety Agency and they have stated that the 737 MAX is now safe enough to be certified although that technically hasn't happened yet.

That said, there is no way that I would now trust a 737 Max and Boeing will almost certainly not use the Max designation now so it will not necessarily be clear to unwitting passengers that they will be flying in a 737 Max II. It reminds me of the old McDonnell Douglas DC10 that developed a poor safety reputation over time and so they rebadged it the MD11 to get away from the DC10 stigma.

[JetSetJim]

Re: The bigger picture..

> It stinks of shortcuts and collusion between Boeing and the FAA.

IIRC, didn't the FAA subcontract a chunk of their certification work to Boeng, anyway?

[hammarbtyp]

Re: The bigger picture..

Why did SouthWest airlines 737 Max not crash?

Probably luck

https://www.courthousenews.com/%EF%BB%BFus-pilots-have-reported-issues-with-boeing-737-max/

[cdrcat]

Re: The bigger picture..

“but it is not the MCAS. The autopilot has to be off for MCAS to kick in.”

“The pilots said that soon after engaging the autopilot on Boeing 737 Max 8 planes, the nose tilted down sharply. In both cases, they recovered quickly after disconnecting the autopilot.”

So the article is probably not MCAS related.

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: The bigger picture..

>>as far as I know zero incidents.

you don't know much.

>> My point is there there has to be a combination of factors to cause an accident

The buck stops at Boeing. Period.

Whether it was a specific weather factors, bad training plans, incorrect manuals, faulty parts used on cheaper model variants - WHATEVER. Boeing made the plane and sold it. They said it was air worthy. They did not ensure it was airworthy in all circumstances. Their own internal designed system intervened. Recovery best case requires the pilot to undo the error, which Boeing did not require training for.

For all your tin foil hattery, if there was *remotely* a way for Boeing to get out of this, they would have. They are on their home turf here with the faa. Americans would be signing a very, very different tune if this was a domestic crash in the US. It took China and the EU to get America to act.

If I bought a car that required a special 16 point steering/brake/clutch manouevre to clear an ECU error and not crash, that no other car does or did, I would say the fault is absolutely with the car manufacturer.

Stop deflecting from Boeing. It is pathetic and shameless, for the gross indecency this company has done in the name of profits.

It is corporate manslaughter that you are apologizing for.

[SW10]

Re: The bigger picture..

So how come Southwest can fly the MAX OK, but some South East Asian and African airlines can't?

I will ignore the dogwhistle racism I sense in your post.

However, to extend your logic:

- Lufthansa can't fly 747s

- Air France can't fly Airbus A330s

- British Airways can't fly 737s

- Delta can't fly 727s

- and Southwest Airlines can't fly BA146s, 737s, 727s...

Accidents are caused by pilot error, design faults and maintenance faults. We should strive to eliminate all of these, but design faults are the most egregious as they affect every model of a given plane.

[Chris G]

Re: The bigger picture..

The design fault in this case was deliberately accepted as a measure to be able to compete economically with Airbus, nothing to do with honest mistakes or unkowns in design, it was solely about money.

I class the entire issue as criminal on the part of both the FAA and Boeing

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: The bigger picture..

> I class the entire issue as criminal on the part of both the FAA and Boeing

But don't forget the FAA can only do what it is told and allowed to do. I would bring the US government into the frame when it comes to criminality and the support they give to Boeing.

[Strahd Ivarius]

Re: The bigger picture..

I don't think that any US government ever required the FAA to rely on self-certification by Boeing.

The government may have crippled FAA operations by under-funding it, but in that case FAA would only have to delay certification up to the time Boeing asks US Gov. to provide the proper budget.

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: The bigger picture..

"My point is there there has to be a combination of factors to cause an accident, and at the moment everyone is attacking Boeing, while the airlines seem to be escaping any blame. How are things ever going to improve if the airlines escape their (deserved) share of the blame?"

You didn't follow the story closely as I see it.

There WERE multiple causes, like in almost every accident:

- faulty sensor: oh, wait, it is not redundant !

- hidden SW, called MCAS, pulling the aircraft to the ground

- AOE condition preventing any manual measure after MCAS deactivation

All the above point at a defective design. No pilot should ever be put in such condition.

Therefore, Boing's fault, end of the story.

The fact other flights were lucky enough to NOY have all 3 conditions during their operation is irrelevant. The conditions exist and are deadly.

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: The bigger picture..

@GrumpyRob : "Look, a squirrel!"

Please don't do that.

Boeing/FAA got it very very wrong. So did TEPCo/NISA (those are the names you didn't mention re Fukushima). Come to think of it, various companies (and *people*) involved in the precursors to the Grenfell Tower tragedy were also variously guilty of complacency, incompetence, negligence, corruption, and other downright criminality.

There was, in each of these cases, money to be made by shortcuts and in particular by "light touch regulation". And what systemic changes are to be made to reduce the chances of similar things happeing in future?

Rules, like taxes, are for the little people.

"Reminds me of the Japanese tsunami and all concentration on the dangers of nuclear power - ... the real culprit, who seems to have got away relatively unscathed, was the plant operator."

The company in question would be TEPCo (Tokyo Electric Power Company?) who indeed had had their wrists slapped pre-Fukushima for a number of operational failures (the usual stuff, missed maintenance etc, and failures to implement required construction changes - e.g. move critical systems to higher levels so they'd be above foreseeable flood levels, rather than below them).

Further reading: see e.g. a 2012 white paper from the Carnegie Endowment on "why Fukushima was preventable", well worth a read:

https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361

...

The Fukushima accident was, however, preventable. Had the plant’s owner, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), and Japan’s regulator, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), followed international best practices and standards, it is conceivable that they would have predicted the possibility of the plant being struck by a massive tsunami. The plant would have withstood the tsunami had its design previously been upgraded in accordance with state-of-the-art safety approaches.

The methods used by TEPCO and NISA to assess the risk from tsunamis lagged behind international standards in at least three important respects:

* Insufficient attention was paid to evidence of large tsunamis inundating the region surrounding the plant about once every thousand years.

* Computer modeling of the tsunami threat was inadequate. Most importantly, preliminary simulations conducted in 2008 that suggested the tsunami risk to the plant had been seriously underestimated were not followed up and were only reported to NISA on March 7, 2011.

* NISA failed to review simulations conducted by TEPCO and to foster the development of appropriate computer modeling tools.

At the time of the accident, critical safety systems in nuclear power plants in some countries, especially in European states, were—as a matter of course—much better protected than in Japan. Following a flooding incident at Blayais Nuclear Power Plant in France in 1999, European countries significantly enhanced their plants’ defenses against extreme external events. Japanese operators were aware of this experience, and TEPCO could and should have upgraded Fukushima Daiichi.

[continues]

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: Fukushima was preventable

2012 white paper from the Carnegie Endowment on "why Fukushima was preventable", well worth a read:

https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361

"One year after the Fukushima accident, however, a picture is emerging that suggests that the calamity was not simply an “act of god” that could not be defended against. There is a growing body of evidence that suggests the accident was the result of failures in regulation and nuclear plant design and that both were lagging behind international best practices and standards. Had these been heeded and applied, the risks to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station would likely have been recognized and effective steps to prevent a major accident could have been taken. In this sense, we believe the Fukushima accident—like its predecessors—was preventable."

Also at e.g.

https://web.archive.org/web/20161211184603/https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361

Change the company names and it describes 737MAX/MCAS and FAA.

[Potemkine!]

Watchdog or poodle?

FAA showed too much collusion with Boeing to be trusted anymore. Fixing the MAX is one thing, fixing FAA is another. Both should be fixed before both can ask to be trusted again.

[TVU]

Re: Watchdog or poodle?

"FAA showed too much collusion with Boeing to be trusted anymore. Fixing the MAX is one thing, fixing FAA is another. Both should be fixed before both can ask to be trusted again"

One of the most egregious things there was the FAA's use of self-certification by plane makers themselves and that aspect really does need to change. Independent FAA engineers and pilots from outside the aircraft companies ought to be the only ones doing the final airworthiness certification.

[cornetman]

I imagine that people are queuing up to fly on those aircraft. Not.

I don't know how they are going to convince people to get aboard.

You can count me out.

[Anonymous Coward]

How to convince people to get aboard?

Cheap tickets.

In Europe, the largest airline is Ryanair. They run 737s (exclusively, I think), and had 40 or 50 MAXs on order before they were all grounded. If they are still planning to take delivery, then these will be added to their fleet. And they are cheaper to operate (the whole point of the MAX project), so will be used. In a year or so people will want their cheap overseas holidays again, and will be throwing their money at Ryanair and their low-cost competitors. They will be clamouring to get on these planes.

[John Sturdy]

Re: How to convince people to get aboard?

Unfortunately, the way many people have flocked into tightly-packed socializing areas, and done whatever they can to get round holiday travel restrictions, despite the coronoavirus risk, leads me to think you're right.

[MJI]

Re: How to convince people to get aboard?

EasyJet use Airbus, fly them instead.

All they need to advertise is we fly Airbus not Boeing 737 Crashamatics.

[ChrisC]

Re: How to convince people to get aboard?

The good thing about Ryanair wanting to operate the Max is that it makes it even easier for me to avoid ever flying on one...

[macjules]

Re: How to convince people to get aboard?

Ah Ryanair, as in "Can we put your children in the overhead locker sir?"

[Adair]

Re: How to convince people to get aboard?

Sometimes you just get the feeling that it would do the human race (and the planet) no harm to allow natural selection to take its natural course. Enough already with trying to keep self-absorbed idiots alive beyond their natural span.

Problem is that I too am a 'self-absorbed idiot' - at least some of the time!

PS - maybe it was 'saving the planet' rather than 'profit' that was motivating Boeing and the FAA? No, it wasn't.

[Mike 16]

Re: Natural Selection?

So, you would apply the same logic to those who were foolish enough to be on the ground in the vicinity of the crashing plane?

Do you suggest everybody move out of any country that Ryanair (et el.) fly to/from?

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: How to convince people to get aboard?

Plus they could rename the 737 MAX to 738 MOCKS. Nobody will notice.

Boeing itself could change its name to WHAMMO!

Artificial Intelligence can always be overcome with a splash of Natural Stupidity, spiced with a dash of greed, and seasoned to taste with spoonful of corruption.

[Anonymous Coward]

"I don't know how they are going to convince people to get aboard."

Simple: good buy 737-MAX who's scaring the shit out of everyone. Hello 737-8 or 737-9. Same Titanic, different name.

There will probably be a lot of different brands as well, but reasonably, no-one should ever approach anything matching *737*.

[PhilipN]

Scares the pants off me

The relationship between the human brain and the computer is not symbiotic. Put it this way : as a kid I drove a beaten up old Morris Minor like an idiot because everything was under my control. Over time you learnt the car's foibles. Now I drive a car full of F1 technology which is a no-brainer. Except it isn't. It will have its own foibles which are not at all knowable after lengthy driving experience so I have no idea what the limits are.

Then, being human, we try to find those limits or, worse, **** with the onboard computer (same thing) by doing something different just to see what it will do. For fun.

Tragically the pilots on the two flights in question did not know the limits of their software, nor was the software sufficiently self-aware (God forbid) to know it was screwing up. Double failure.

Nothing coming from the FAA or Boeing reassures me that this will not happen again. The only failsafe mechanism I want to see is one with a brain. A real one.

[oiseau]

Re: Scares the pants off me

Nothing coming from the FAA or Boeing reassures me that this will not happen again.

+1

Exactly what I was about to post.

Not a plane I will be getting on if and when I have to.

O.

[SkippyBing]

Re: Scares the pants off me

Strictly the pilots of the second accident aircraft did know what was going wrong and initially took the correct action of turning the electric trim off. However they then discovered the forces on the control surfaces from the trim being fully nose down and the elevator being fully nose up meant they were unable to manually trim the aircraft. To do that they'd have to relax the pressure on the control column and allow the nose to drop, which wasn't a particularly enticing option and was removed from the flight manual about forty years ago. It appears that as they were getting nowhere manually trimming it, and were probably getting tired holding the control column fully aft* they attempted to turn the electric trim back on and trim off as much pressure as they could.

Long story short, even if you knew what was going wrong there was no easy option to get out of the situation.

*This requires quite a force due to the artificial feel designed to prevent the aircraft being over stressed.

[First Light]

Boeing not Biden their time

They're likely concerned about the impact of a Biden administration on the certification hence the need to get it done before January. However, the takeover of the FAA has been going on across multiple administrations so I'm not sure the rush was worth it. The Dems listen to their big corporate donors.

[Xalran]

Training Program for pilots

And the whole point of the MAX was to avoid having to recycle pilots to the airplane type through a training program so that it could compete with the A320NEO.

( which, since it sits higher on it's landing gear didn't need any new training when new, bigger, engines replaced the old ones... while Boeing had to do some shenanigans to put those engines on the MAX )

That's basically going to kill the Max new sales. ( as there's already more than enough planes sitting around for the foreseable future compared to the number of people that travel. )

[TVU]

Re: Training Program for pilots

"That's basically going to kill the Max new sales. ( as there's already more than enough planes sitting around for the foreseable future compared to the number of people that travel. )"

^ I actually hope that really does happen because only then will Boeing learn the hard lesson that they must never again place bean counting, cheapness, ease of convenience, etc ahead of reliability, test checking, airworthiness and passenger and pilot safety.

[Grease Monkey]

One of the less well publicised issues found with the 737 MAX was that the redundant wiring to the rear control surfaces wasn't particularly redundant. Running as the two sets of cables did far closer to each other than is allowed. The FAA mandated that this issue had to be corrected on every plane. Boeing have agreed to carry out the work, but refused to accept that this is a problem.

Just think about that in the context of Boeing's approach to certification and safety.

#1 Boeing apparently self certified this part of the plane even though it clearly did no pass certification. Even though this did not contribute to the crashes Boeing should be subject to a massive fine for this dishonesty and they should never be allowed to self certify anything again. Not even the coffee machines.

#2 Even though Boeing blatantly broke the law they are refusing to accept this is a problem. This clearly shows that they think that certification is nothing more than an inconvenience.

The FAA however need to take some responsibility for this. They clearly had insufficient oversight of the certification process. It is a convention that if the FAA certifies a plane then most of the world's regulators will rubber stamp the certification. This debacle alone shows that FAA certifications are worth less than the paper they are printed on. As such if the world's regulators simply rubber stamp this decision then they are every bit as bad as the FAA and Boeing.

Boeing have complained that rectifying all the issues on all the planes will cost over $1m per plane. I believe a fine of significantly more than that should be levied for every single plane sold as a punishment for selling dangerous and incorrectly certified planes. Of course the FAA would never do this as they are equally culpable for allowing Boeing to carry out their own certification.

Maybe next time they want to compete with Airbus Boeing won't try sticking modern engines on a 50 year old airframe. I'm not holding my breath though.

[sanmigueelbeer]

The FAA must approve 737 Max pilot training program ...

Exactly WHO in the FAA will do the approval? Permanent FAA staff or Boeing staff seconded to the FAA?

[Strahd Ivarius]

Capita?

[Dabooka]

So it's inherently safe without MCAS?

Reading this, Boeing claims it's a safe aircraft. MCAS only deploys when a problem occurs.

Now it deploys once. And a buzzer goers off. And it's easier to override.

Can't help but feel if it's safe without MCAS it shouldn't be needed at all and a simple warning would be sufficient? Surely if this additional training is to combat the effects of a system deployed to combat the effects of the flight dynamics it would be preferable to simply train the pilots in the flight dynamics.

Seems to me the additional training to be signed off on MCAS is exactly what they tried to avoid about recertification. I also assume they'll be having to sweeten the training costs for operators on top of the picking up the tab for modifications.

[SkippyBing]

Re: So it's inherently safe without MCAS?

MCAS deploys when the extra lift from the larger engines causes a reduction in the control force needed to deviate from the trimmed speed. This should increase with increasing deviation from the trimmed speed but in the 737 MAX at high angle of attack it decreases. This isn't allowed by the certification regulations for the good reason that if you kept the same pressure on the control column you'd enter a stall. Which is considered bad form in an airliner.

[Gotno iShit Wantno iShit]

Re: So it's inherently safe without MCAS?

"Seems to me the additional training to be signed off on MCAS is exactly what they tried to avoid about recertification."

It's a documented fact. MCAS was designed to make the max behave like the earlier iterations at all corners of the flight envelope. This was so that pilots did not need to be re-trained & certified avoiding great cost for the airlines. Pilot flies 737 on Friday, pilot flies (cheaper to fuel) 737-max on Monday.

In fact the max does behave just like the earlier models in the vast majority of the flight envelope, I don't know if, testing aside, a max ever went into that corner. Trouble was a) a simple fault made MCAS think the aircraft was in that corner and b) MCAS had the power to take the aircraft entirely outside the flight envelope.

[spireite]

Renamed to Bargepole 737 8

Apparently will be renamed to an 737 8

8 being the number of years before I set foot on it, (at a minimum), but also the number of accidents it's going to see in the next 8 years....

The world biggest lawn dart.... not going to see me anywhere near it, except if it's a static display at an airshow... At least then I can appreciate the demonstration of how to modify a 60s airframe one, maybe two many times.....

[NetBlackOps]

Re: Renamed to Bargepole 737 8

Thankfully, I no longer live under one of the main flight paths of our local (so-called International) airports.

[julian.smith]

If it's Boeing .... I'm not going

Die in a fire American capitalist jerks

[W.S.Gosset]

"amusing" failure of this MAX's key point

The entire reason for this stuff up was the mgt bureausites (bureaucrat+ parasite) seeking to smooth+improve the sales process as a hassle-free upgrade.

By blagging the certification process, it would require NO Additional Training to be rated for this model.

Major cost benefit, massive scheduling+faff benefit for the airlines.

But now the key fix is: Training.

100s dead, and right back where they started.

(Also, use both bloody pitot tubes not just one, you drongoes.)