Misinformation aplenty
Reading some of these posts, it seems there might be a lot of misinformation regarding the technical implications of Heartbleed. Without writing a huge article, here's a brief overview of critical points.
The flaw affects BOTH servers AND clients. The heartbeat command that is generated that causes the flaw is like a ping. The server can "ping" the client and the client can "ping" the server. Granted, a server would have to be specifically set up to send malicious heartbeat packets sniffing for data, although it's still possible. Embedded devices, like routers, WiFi access points, etc. are potentially affected because they can be running a "server" too (although this should make people take a good look as to whether you really need that WiFi access point interface to be accessible to the whole internet over port 443).
A MITM attack is NOT needed for a random third party to (potentially) obtain username/passwords that are sitting around in memory on a server. All that has to be done is for someone to attack a vulnerable server with forged heartbeat packets, then sift through the returned data. Would it be difficult to find usernames and passwords? Potentially, as the leaked data is whatever random data was stored in memory at the location that was copied. It could return useful information after only one request, or it could return useful information only after 10 millions requests. Now when it comes to sifting through that data, that's a whole other issue.
A MITM attack IS required for someone to pretend they are another site, IF they happen to get a copy of the server's private key. Because of that IF, this is why people are recommending revoking SSL certificates. Just like the usernames and passwords, they might get the private key easily, or they might have a really hard time getting it. One they get the key, they still have to get the end user to visit their site (to avoid certificate warnings, they would need something like DNS cache poisoning to redirect someone to a different IP while keeping the domain the same).
As an end user, you visit a lot more than just your "ISP's server". Any web site you visit over SSL poses a potential risk.
All in all, I still agree that the media over-sensationalized this quite a bit. Odds are most people will not be affected by it. Sure there will be some (especially considering known attacks started up shortly after the vulnerability was revealed), but most will not, simple because they first have to attack a server that vulnerable, then they have to hope the server leaks the credentials, then they have to actually be credentials for you.
Kudos to the majority of the staff out there that got things patches up quickly (I'm probably a little spoiled, as I keep the 50 or so servers I manage up-to-date on a regular basis, so a simple apt-get upgrade is easy. The SSL certificate revocations was a little bit more work).