mSecure
Now renamed as emm... secure?
Password manager mSecure has warned customers to change their passwords, reset two-factor authentication, and potentially remove their passkeys after detecting suspicious activity, but it has not explained what happened or whether anyone's secrets were exposed. In an email sent to customers on November 3, seen by The Register, …
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I realise that I may have just sounded like I was being horribly smug, but it makes a point: paper is safer. We should not be letting anything we want to keep secret connect to the net. Write it down and hide it. Since AI arrived, we should not trust anything with a net connection to be secure. The only thing AI does reliably is hack.
A strictly local password vault that doesn't provide plaintext access to a "cloud" anything won't be compromised by a problem at said cloud provider.
You can have convenience, or you can have security. Seems you cannot really have both.
Security involves difficult trade-offs, and it's about more than just confidentiality. Loss of availability can be just as bad as the former, and unless very carefully managed a "strictly local" vault can be a liability on that front.
No sensible cloud-based password vault intentionally exposes plaintext passwords to the cloud (though LastPass did expose plaintext metadata, which was bad). That doesn't mean there aren't risks from operational security or cryptography mistakes - e.g. LastPass's screw-ups with password stretching. Integrity of the browser plugin supply chain is another obvious risk - though one that equally applies to "strictly local" vaults. My guess is that one of these, combined with someone lifting the encrypted data, is the problem here.
But convenience, for the average person, really does matter. If you live and work at home on your own, only access services from one desktop PC, and are a skilled techie with iron discipline shuttling USB devices offsite on a regular basis, a local password manager is a good fit. The rest of us might need to sync multiple devices, commute or travel regularly, share household-level passwords, want additional break-glass recovery options, or value hassle-free backup - and critically have this in a package that non-techies in the family can use without making awful mistakes. If you've got a local only setup that replicates this, please do share what it looks like.
Despite having been bitten due to being an early LastPass user, having to migrate and change hundreds of passwords in a hurry, I still think that cloud based is the right trade off for most people. Nowadays I use Bitwarden - the increased transparency brings some comfort and I can run Vaultwarden locally importing occasional backups so that I'm assured access to most of my passwords if the cloud service went pop. Yes, there are risks, but I don't see a risk-free, practical option.
I use KeePass with syncing to my encrypted-at-rest cloud storage. I use a long, complex password with Argon2id KDF rounds that solve in excess of a second on my fastest device. IMO this is much safer that the one-stop-shop target for crackers that is the cloud password vault providers. And since it is on my cloud storage, I can sync with all the devices that need it.
If you’re syncing the results via cloud storage it’s actually not very much different from e.g. Bitwarden in terms of the security model. Bitwarden supports Argon2id too. The server only ever sees passwords encrypted under a derived key.
Fundamentally, any well designed password manager should be secure for decades under the assumption of vault storage compromise. Vault storage security, wherever it is, should be the cherry on top.
On the latter there is a security by obscurity argument that because whichever cloud storage you use is not used exclusively for passwords, it’s got less of a target on its back. However cloud storage services are high value targets in their own right, and a successful attacker will probably do an automated search for password files as the first thing to lift. You might make an argument that e.g. Google have more security resources and expertise to protect Drive than <small password manager provider>.
Ultimately you have to decide whether the (dubious, imho) benefits of hiding the vault vs the benefits that specialised cloud passport vaults offer.
The attack I really worry about is the supply chain one, which is generic to all password managers. How sure can you be that a compromised Keepass binary will never silently send your unencrypted vault to a pastebin?
>but I don't see a risk-free, practical option.
Arguably a copy of the encrypted password vault on a shared storage service is better than an online password manager.
At least GDrive/OneDrive/DropBox/etc don't know it's a password and don't have the key.
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"So, um, what's going on?"
"Nothing. Just change all your settings, right away. It's a perfectly natural step for every user to be taking."
"All at once? Now? I thought you security guys were all about transparency?"
"Oh, we are, we certainly are. Fr' instance right now we are clearly covering our asses. Now set your passwords so nothing happens."
People using Closed-Source PW mangers should think again. For me a Closed-Source PW manger is utterly unacceptable. If PWM, and there are very good reasons to employ one, then only three viable products are to choose from: Bitwarden, the Keepass Family, and Proton Pass. I for one use Bitwarden. You can host the vault locally with Vaultwarden.
I've used Bitwarden for quite a few years, jumped ship from LastPass just in time. Now running Vaultwarden on a Pi4 using Docker and Caddy and it just works. That said, you really need to be running a registered domain of some sort along with a static IP address, otherwise things can get tricky. Back when I tried it using it with dynamic DNS, sorting out certificates was a nightmare and I only ever got Bitwarden to work on a Windows desktop, the Android version refused to connect.
I’ve used mSecure for several years, one reason being because it rarely appeared in comparison reviews (and was less likely to be a target for hackers). Like others, I have hundreds of passwords stored, all long and complex, and it would take days to change them. Fortunately, my main bank passwords aren’t in there, nor are any passkeys. My suspicion (and hope) is that it was mSecure’s sync server that has been hacked as I don’t use that - I have a local store. Nor do I use it for any auto entry - for me, it’s a vault to store data - so I might or might not be affected. For the time being, I’m shutting it down until mSecure are more forthcoming about the hack.