Today ....
.... that sort of thing just wouldn't fly!
Welcome, once again, to PWNED, the weekly column where we gawk at organizations that have made serious security mistakes. Normally, we’re talking about businesses or maybe the odd school that messes up, but today we’re writing about a serious IT screwup in the world’s most powerful military. Have a story about someone leaving a …
In August 1944, the SS Richard Montgomery arrived in the Thames Estuary carrying thousands of tons of bombs and ammunition intended for the Allied forces in France. She needed somewhere to wait for a convoy across the Channel. Given her cargo, you might think finding a berth with enough water beneath her would have been fairly high on the list.
Lieutenant Roger Foley certainly thought so.
Foley was the Assistant King’s Harbourmaster. His superior, Lieutenant Commander R. J. Walmsley, had allocated the ship an anchorage off Sheerness that left very little clearance beneath her heavily laden hull. Foley spotted the problem and proposed a straightforward solution: exchange places with a shallower-draught ship already sitting in deeper water.
According to the published account, his suggestion was rejected. Foley then asked for the order in writing, which gives you some idea of his confidence in the decision.
The argument attracted an officer senior to both men. He backed Walmsley and rebuked Foley for questioning someone with greater experience. Two days later, Foley was transferred elsewhere.
The officer who raised the problem had been moved. The ship remained where she was.
On 20 August, the Montgomery dragged her anchor and grounded on a sandbank. As the tide fell, her weight bore down on the stranded hull. Steel buckled, plates cracked, and the ship began coming apart.
Salvage crews worked to unload her dangerous cargo, recovering roughly half before flooding forced them to abandon the operation in September. The wreck eventually lay in two sections, with thousands of munitions still inside.
Foley was not called to give evidence at the subsequent inquiry. Accounts differ over the findings, and I could find no reliable record establishing what punishment, if any, Walmsley received.
What happened to the surrounding community is rather easier to establish. Eighty-two years later, it is still living beside the consequences.
Around 1,400 tons of explosives remain in the wreck, roughly a mile and a half off Sheerness. There is an exclusion zone, radar surveillance and regular monitoring. The government considers a major explosion unlikely, but “unlikely” offers a particular sort of reassurance when the explosives are sitting just offshore.
For decades, the Montgomery’s three masts stood above the water, making her both a local landmark and a reminder of unfinished wartime business. They have now been removed because of concerns that they could collapse onto the wreck and its cargo. That reduces one risk. The bombs remain.
People have grown up, raised families and retired with the Montgomery just offshore. They have inherited the monitoring, the uncertainty and the question of what should finally be done about her.
Foley’s proposed solution would have involved moving two ships. Generations later, we are still dealing with the decision to leave them where they were.
In 1972 a crack commando unit was sent to prison by a military court for a crime they didn't commit.
These men promptly escaped from a maximum security stockade to the Los Angeles underground.
Today, still wanted by the government, they survive as soldiers of fortune. If you have a problem,
if no one else can help, and if you can find them, maybe you can hire: the A-Team.
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> It was more difficult
Just as rivers will always find the easiest path, so humans (when faced with computers) will do exactly the same. If a security system makes an operation more difficult, it will be met with resistance. Make it too inconvenient and the security will be ignored or circumvented.
The only exception is when staff are paid by the hour and have no deadlines to meet. A situation that rarely occurs in the real world.
We need to launch these missions today vs. ordering official USB keys take 6-8 weeks.
Result,: people work around official USB key procedure
Response: ordering official USB keys can now only be done by new top secret procedure that we can't tell you about. (Note: mission still needs to launch today)
That was done by Sony on Sony's Read Only discs, not by a 3rd party.
I get your point, but it's not the same thing.
Now if you said writable CD's could be infected by the first and thanks to Microsoft's dumb f**king Autoplay idea, it was easy to infect another just, then you'd be vang on.
Surely the "In this case" is superfluous , just as when I was a lad there were people at the main meeting place in Cheltenham, (& I expect elsewhere) selling a newpaper called "Socialist Worker"
does any one know any others?
The russian newspapers "pravda" and "izvestia", ("truth" and "news") of which it was always said there was no news in the "truth" & no truth in the "news".
In the days when the Red Army was still around a policy was in place that no toilet paper should be issued. Apparently the generals who were in charge of procurement thought that not supplying toilet paper would do no harm and would reduce their logistics problems.
Out in the field the soldiers, faced with a lack of arse-wipe, improvised. Paper was the thing they wanted and if it was fairly smooth paper then all the better. What happened is that all manner of documents got recycled and discarded into the field latrines, which were again the simplest design that could be made, namely a hole or trench in the ground. The end effect was that the field latrines ended up laced with all manner of documentation, some of it highly classified.
When this was realised by Western intelligence officers a new Worst Job was born: latrine-mining for intelligence. Documents would be retrieved, cleaned, very thoroughly disinfected, dried and photographed for the Western intelligence agencies. The Soviets never realised that this was going on.
When I saw the phrase "in this case", I almost wanted to cry. What has happened to the cynical El Reg of years past, the El Reg that was "biting the hand that feeds IT", the El Reg with Paper Airplanes Released into Space (PARIS), the El Reg never afraid to push the boundaries.
Sigh.
A while back I bought a number of USB drives from a well known UK online IT vendor.
When they arrived I plugged one into a machine and Windows Defender flashed up a virus warning.
There were 6 hidden files in the root directory which matched the details of a trojan when I searched a couple of the virus information websites.
I tried the other drives, and every one was infected the same way.
I complained to the vendor and they said the drives came straight from the manufacturer.
I bought a docking station that supports Display Link. Despite no words in the blurb, the dock comes with a built-in USB drive that contains drivers for Display Link.
Please stop trying to be helpful. If I want drivers I’ll get the latest from the official web site.
A story as old as time itself.
It's often not just 'not being listened to'. It is usually accompanied by an unwavering but misguided belief that what is done is infallible, can't be bettered. Even when the evidence shows otherwise.
And, if anyone should become a whistleblower for the greater good, they run the very real risk of being severely punished for doing the right thing.
Those who are intolerant to suggestions of change deserve everything they get, and should be held accountable for the harm they do.
I've seen articles about how refusing an illegal order is treated as guilty by default for insubordination until a tribunal examines things X months down the line. (And that assumes the tribunal is fair and not covering senior officer's arses)
This.
And then you have to account for the fact that most subordinates aren't well versed in civilian, military and constitutional law*. Creating a crisis in confidence among those with moral qualms. They might be right, but the odds of getting it wrong will be rewarded by time spent in the stockade.
*Quite a few, based on some of my reading on various social media sites.
It's how you do it that counts. I had a (very good) boss years ago. One that had no problem with my sitting down with him and pointing out alternatives. Sometimes the decision had been made and there was no turning back, which he acknowledged. Other times, he'd change his position and announce that he was modifying policy or design to the group. And I'd just sit there and grin. He'd grin back and, more often than not, a raise would be in the offing.
At some point during the long wars I read of Armed Forces security personnel walking through offices in Iraq sealing USB ports with dabs of glue. For the life of me I can't remember whether this came from The Register or from comp.risks. But I can see that what worked well enough for networked PCs on the ground might not do so well for jets.
I remember a military supplier making a 38999 USB receptacle and 38999 shelled USB drive (at about 2 orders of magnitude more expensive than the usual version).
They were showing it off as super secure and impregnable, which was true, when it was sealed up.
I just took off the 38999 shelled USB drive and slotted in a basic USB drive I happened to have on my person!
They looked dumbfounded that I had circumvented their security. DOH!
I've not worked with squaddies, but I've worked with enough hospital nurses and indeed software engineers to know that it is definitely possible to plug a variety of electrical connectors in upside down and bend the pins or casing.
This included the big metal mil-spec amphenol connectors!
> Today’s tale comes from Justin Henkel, the CISO of IT monitoring and service company SolarWinds.
This would be the same SolarWinds providing "IT monitoring and service" in a rather notorious "supply chain attack" that breached "multiple parts of the United States federal government"1?
Askin' for a friend.
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1 Wikipedia: 2020 United States federal government data breach
Okay, so let me see if I get this right....
This was right around the time Stuxnet was being deployed to jump the air gap and compromise SCADA devices in Iranian nuclear reactors. Infected USB drives were used for the task. And the USAF was buying infected foreign USB drives and plugging them in to mission computers at the same time??
Yeah, that is a cock-up. Both sides using the same techniques to attack the other, yet not defending against it. But I think there was something to learn here, and I'll bet we did learn: Open up the info channels between the offensive & defensive sides of cyber security. Enter CISA in 2015.
So the next time us civilian sector folks see a public alert from CISA about patching immediately....there may be a very good reason for it. Something like "We already know about this vulnerability and have been abusing it for a long time. Now that it is public info, you should patch ASAP."
After 30 years of claiming Iran was 2 years/months/hours/minutes/life cycles of a frog from creating nuclear weapons you still really think Stuxnet was actually real and/or actually effective? Furthermore you also believe that some Iranian boffin plugged some random USB stick into the air-gapped network of a uranium centrifuge in some secret location that has never been explained and the fallout of said Uranium caused zero effects.
Do you also believe that the Gruffalo exists?
In the early 2000s, when I was working for a non-DOD US government agency, the warnings came out: "Don't ever put a USB drive you happened to find in the parking lot into a government computer." Evidently the sta=ern warning didn;t take at the defense agencies, so DOD started filling all USB ports with epoxy.
Long before that, an acquaintance who had been an Air Force ROTC cadet, and later went on to being a brigadier general told me the gag line, "Pilots play hearts. Navigators play bridge." I suspect the updated version has the weapons officers playing whatever the electronic version of bridge is.
C'mon, el Reg, was the primary image for the article also an AI decision?
The F-14 Tomcat may have begun as an inspiration by the U.S. Air Force, but it's always been a Navy platform. Just ask Goose, Maverick, Slider, and Iceman. Well, unless you're an Iranian military pilot.
Icon --> imagery pedantry, not grammar police
missed a trick - once they found out the US airmen* were buying these at local shops, they should have got a load of them branded/customised as "Taliban" and scatted them across the countryside - for the US forces to pickup
*No relation to the "British airmen" hiding in the cellar at Café René. Or are they?
Proper right pondian term is "flying machine"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Those_Magnificent_Men_in_Their_Flying_Machines
I got on base one day and noticed that everyone was happily typing away on their brand new shiny WIRELESS keyboards! 1st thing I did was rip the keyboard out from under the commanding Brigadier's hands - who looked at me incredulously. When I promptly explained that anyone outside his window could be monitoring his every keystroke, he blanched and ran out to help me remove the remainder from the other users.
Bluetooth keyboards now use AES128 encryption, significantly stronger than the 56bit DES standard for secure data back in those days.
And you can easily read the signals on the wire of an old 5pin DIN plug 80s keyboard. That's why we had the computers in a screened room, despite being a mile from the heavily patrolled perimeter fence.
I think we may have had an overly high opinion of Soviet electronics technology
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The technology has come so far since the "free for all" days of using any untrusted storage devices - and more specifically a flash drive which is supposed to be encrypted and certified for government use. However, the government has largely not kept pace with the technology and still allows untrusted data movements rather than deploying a viable option to restrict access to networks to only government approved vendors (FIPS validated? Common Criteria? Remote Management?). In the case of the Snowden event, the device could have been locked down and either unusable or remote wiped. There is still only marginal movement from the US government to adopt these stances across the board.