"New"
perhaps they can squeeze in a new version of the MCAS so pilots do not need to certify for this type *wink* *wink*
Boeing on Tuesday celebrated the certification of its latest passenger plane, the 737-7 MAX, 15 years after it announced the type and seven years after the first model rolled off the production line. The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified the plane on Monday, saying its decision “reflects years of sustained work …
The FAA came in for significant criticism when it was found they’d allowed Boeing to do all sorts of things they really shouldn’t have. Hoping that’s been fixed.
Plus Boeing have now got rid of the ‘money first’ attitude that has dogged them since the McDonald Douglas merger and rightly gone back to ‘engineering first’. I couldn’t be happier for them (but I still like flying Airbus aircraft better).
The FAA came in for significant criticism when it was found they’d allowed Boeing to do all sorts of things they really shouldn’t have. Hoping that’s been fixed.
Doubt it, back to BAU, and Boeing marking their own homework:
https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/after-months-safety-review-faa-allows-boeing-resume-issuing-certificates-new-airplanes
"The FAA came in for significant criticism when it was found they’d allowed Boeing to do all sorts of things they really shouldn’t have. Hoping that’s been fixed."
Are you by chance talking about the FAA that didn't do anything after the Windsor Incident? That same FAA that didn't do anything with Convair's serious concerns, with all the aforementioned leading to THY 981?
The same FAA that has dragged its feet on rolling out new ground control systems for at least the past 15 years? The same FAA that was aware of the congestion around DCA but did nothing, leading to PCA 5342?
etc, etc, etc.
You mean, *that* FAA??
They didn't invent to term "tombstone mentality" for no reason...
>But the FCC don't regulate anything anymore
Its found a new life as the agency that bans imports of things. The way they do this is that anything with commnications capability in it needs FCC certification. This was once pretty routine -- once radios and antennas were certified (a tedious process) then the chipsets and designs would be forklifted into all sorts of products which would automatically get certification. Not any more. The FCC is refusing to give type approval to -- effectively -- anything made in China which is a de facto blanket ban on imports of Chinese made equipment and components.
Don't forget that we have a government stacked with lawyers. It explains why they are often not 'reality based'.
Post DOGE I'm guessing FAA approval is checking if the president is happy with the things Boeing has said about him, whether they have contributed enough to his ballroom and other projects, whether they have done very very bad things, things many people are calling treasonous and worthy of the death penalty, things like speaking to democrats or worse contributing to any cause the president has a current dislike of....
"When he complained about the cost of the new Air Force 1"
AF1 is a very custom aircraft. The OML (outer mold line) may look like a certain model, but from the skin inwards, it's much different. That's not going to be cheap. To make it even more difficult, it contains loads of things that can't be talked about so the engineers and mechanics all have to be cleared and the aircraft built in a secure hanger.
IIRC a couple of presidents earlier had decided that the current 747 had to meet civil specs ( to make servicing easier) but it had been built to military specs so something ridiculous was needed, like drilling out every rivet to replace them with identical rivets with civil aviation paperwork
I though this was hyperbole until I worked on medical devices
"but it had been built to military specs so something ridiculous was needed"
Oddly enough, civil aircraft requirements are far more stringent than military. It's a huge PIA to get a military aircraft legal to fly in the US. The big issue is the paperwork, if any, will not be adequate so one starts with all of what's required to re-document an aircraft whose logs are missing. That's a whole tear down and detailed inspection. Most of the time, if the log books are gone, a GA aircraft is scrap.
"There are a handful of precious civilian C130s while 100s of retired military ones in storage can't be sold because they lack civilian paperwork"
I met somebody that bought a L-39 from Czechia (I think) and it had to be partially dismantled to go in a couple of shipping containers so it was easier to do the full inspection. I love those jets, but there's not enough banks in my area to rob to be able to afford one AND be able to afford to fly it.
"The FAA came in for significant criticism when it was found they’d allowed Boeing to do all sorts of things they really shouldn’t have. Hoping that’s been fixed."
That's government trying to save money by not doing the things it should be doing. Funding the FAA so it can have the staff to do the certifications doesn't buy votes. They tried to allow the companies to do it themselves and now the FAA has egg on their face when everybody else could see that train coming.
Worth pointing out that *all* previous versions of the 737 were *also* approved for commercial use - and that didn't amount to a hill of beans.
To clarify a bit further... when the first 737 Max crash took place, the "FAA Inspectors" working at Boeing were in fact *selected* and *paid for* by Boeing. Sure, they went off and did their FAA training like good little civil servants, but they did so with a very clear understanding of who was paying their wages.
We know this as "regulatory capture".
Aircraft manufacturers call it "Business As Usual".
Its a bit like, but on a smaller scale, estate agents that do the contracts for landlords.
Like the incident on reddit other day on the DIYUK section. Someone asked if the big cracks appearing in their rently were anything to be concerned about. That had gotten bigger over the year. With the final photo showing the whole house moving away from the small extension, with a large gap in the bricks.
The agents for the landlord did their inspection and said "Oh that's normal it will be fine. Nothing to worry about". When its really fucking clear the house is close to collapsing! All because the agents don't want the expensive of moving the renter and telling the owner they'll have to pay put a large sum to fix their house. Because the agents just want their commission to continue. Fuck the person living in that house life.
"All because the agents don't want the expensive of moving the renter and telling the owner they'll have to pay put a large sum to fix their house."
The renter should be documenting all of that. What can happen is a much larger court case involving blood sucking lawyers that will cost the owner heaps more money. The management company will then get sued by the owner for not being honest about the crack if they told them about it at all. The renter could also call the local building department and have them inspect the issue which might rain down a load of official notices of condemnation. If you pull that trigger, be ready to move right away.
The last home I rented, I got a copy of the property report so I knew who the owners were and their contact information. If you ever need to bypass a manager, it's good to have that. You may also find that the property is in limbo. The county where I am is only concerned there is somebody paying the property tax. If I found a property where the owner has died or may be in a home with no relatives, I could make sure the tax is paid, fix the place up and rent it out. Unless somebody comes forward to make a claim on it, there's no barking dog. If you find yourself a renter in a home like this, the "landlord" has no legal way to evict you from the property. They can try, but if they can't show a good title or a power of attorney that lets them act on the owner's behalf, they'd fail in court. You, on the other hand, in many US states could work towards getting the property through adverse possession. The fake landlord couldn't as they don't occupy the property and might be disqualified through acting in bad faith. YMMV and things could get ugly, but if the fake landlord is being a hardass, it may be nothing but bark.
I have read some stories of people getting homes this way in the US and UK. One was a contractor who was doing some work on the home when the owner passed away and wound up needing to put a lien on the property to preserve their claim to be paid. Nobody turned up and he found no contacts. He was checking the mail to see if any family/friends were trying to make contact although the deceased owner lived elsewhere. After a while, he finished up the renovations on his own dime and moved in with his family. If somebody did come along and make a claim, he would have had some time with no rent and the claimants would have to pay off the lien to get a clear title. I'm not sure what happened to the owner's other house. He couldn't make a claim on both as continuous occupancy by the claimant is a requirement for adverse possession. Tell a mate?
>Boeing pitched the 737-7 as larger and longer-legged than the Airbus A319neo, [...]
While this is sort of true (the 737 is two metres longer) and therefore can theoretically fit two extra rows of seats (172 Self-loading-cargo vs 160 in the 319), it is also 15 cm smaller in Diameter, resulting in even less comfort than a minimum dignity version of the 319. And yes, the 737-7 goes a rounding difference further than the A319 (95 miles) but will lose this advantage on every turnaround - being a 737 from 1967, it still can't take AKHs [1] and has to load every piece of freight by hand.
[1] the freight version can, but that model is even more pointless than the passenger one.
sure, they couldn't care less. They'll be more concerned with more narrow aisle between the 3+3, which also increases turnaround time. Especially with a dozen more idiots fighting about their overhead and underseat luggage during boarding and exit.
"Discount airlines like Ryanair and Easyjet shouldn't be allowed. "
Those bottom of the barrel operators make it very easy to justify paying more if you use them even once. If price is such a huge factor, do I really need to be traveling by air? For some things, maybe, but not on a holiday or other planned trip. If I can't afford what used to be coach dimensions in the 1980's, I won't be flying (not that I do). I'll pay more for the train or drive.
I have one trip I'll need to do from the US to wind up in Wales at some point, but I'm looking into traveling by cargo ship. Partly for the novelty and partly to NOT fly. I've heard that customs is not as much of a personal violation. Yes, they check your baggage, but not your colon. You aren't hit with mm wave radar as the danger of some passenger hijacking a cargo ship and crashing it into a building is nil.
"172 Self-loading-cargo vs 160 in the 319"
They could also go to fewer all-premium seats and use the aircraft for coast to coast flights in the US or long routes where there's enough demand for non-stop service that they'd sell those seats, no problem. It's not hard to find 737 type certified pilots so while an airline might not configure a bunch of these in all-premium, they will have trained crews and maintenance for them that can be assigned to other routes as needed. I used to always look for non-stop routes. Even at a higher cost, the time savings could be worth it. It also eliminates needing to make connections and have a chance that your luggage winds up in Murmansk. These days I can't fold up into the space allocated to the lowest priced class of freight for any length of time so if I were ever to fly commercial again, it would be in a more premium class.
Still won't fly on one.
The flight deck is old
There is no safety culture
whistleblowers are still coming out
the "safe" 777 - they are still trying to blame the pilot, when in fact journalists researching the crash have had whistleblowers from the AIB and Boeing looking into it, the 777 has it's entertainment and air con on the same bus as the engine control systems.
On one podcast a retired air safety bod said that he was able to, without even trying, track 5 777's starting to taxi to the runway and then have to return to the terminal for repairs in the few hours he was looking. "Warning Bells Podcast" - available wherever you get your podcasts.
If it's Boeing I ain't going.
The flight deck isn't the problem, but I completely agree that the over-complicated electronics are a major problem.
As someone who spent 10 years designing controls for complex chemical plants (thing throughputs of 500,000 tonnes / year size) some of Boeing's systems make me wince.
The 737 Max crashes were directly attributable to cost cutting i.e. using only one Angle of Attack (AOA) sensor - which is a critical flight instrument, thus a single point of failure can bring an aircraft down, especially when you allow a single instrument to take control of the flight computer (MCAS) without an obvious OFF switch.
On the gas plants I worked on we had a Two out of Three voting system for critical instruments. I wonder whether Boeing are even aware of LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) or SIL (Safety Integrity Levels) or MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) or even FMEA (Failure Mode And Effect Analysis).
Some of Boeing's error messages on their control systems are often cryptic and I have stories of pilots having to dig into the flight manuals to understand them.(To be fair Airbus are just as bad on this).
In addition, having to go down 3 or 4 levels of menus to identify a problem or turn something on or off is ridiculous when you are trying to control an aircraft during takeoff or landing.
As for multiplexed systems, wiring looms passing through fuel tanks etc, don't even get me started on that one.
[/OFF RANT]
On our (relatively simple) rotating-machine applications, we use three sensors for critical measurements. They never agree exactly, but it is clear when one has gone off on a journey of its own.
As a newly-qualified engineer, I was asked to uprate a set of machines so I needed to know the parameters they were working on, in particular, the working pressure. The customer confidently told me the actual pressure: Exactly 25 bar. In fact it was the one constant that never changed. To prove it, he removed the pressure gauge, placed it on his desk and took a photograph: the indication remained at 25 bar.....
I have distrusted Bourdon-type gauges ever since.
one of my big problems with developers is that - for example on the 737MAX - they seemed to think it was ok for THEM to over-ride the pilots - the ACTUAL experts, you see this across the board in all software, which is why I don't trust self driving cars. Additionally, they should have refused to write anything that worked with a single sensor, baking in the requirement for 2 independent sensors into the code so Boeing didn't have the choice to offer it as a cost cutting option.
It stings that devs call themselves engineers when they do things like this, when a legally registered engineer would never do anything similar as they would be legally liable for it.
The 777 apparently has triple redundant electronics, but a single arc can take out all 3 circuits and the engine electronics are labelled CRITICAL, but then they plug into the central bus which is apparently labelled MEDIUM.
The 777 is well known for it's battery fire issues and the NASA register which allows pilots to report cases that weren't emergencies but could have been if they hadn't fixed them on the fly (no pun) is full of 777 anonymous reports. I haven't got it to hand but the podcast listed a pair of airlines, Sprint was one & I think the other one was Canadian, one runs mostly Boeing, the other Airbus and the difference in numbers of anonymous reports of , I think they are called Pre Cursor Events - is shocking.
I genuinely would refuse to board a Boeing if one popped up at the gate as a replacement.
IIRC the software was outsourced to India.
They migh have been very skilled developers but if before they always worked on "smart" vacuum cleaners they might not have the right mindset for critical software for aircrafts.
I've read of similar issues with the 787 assembly, moved to a different location where there was no 'aircraft culture'
I really don't think the nationality matters as much as the skill (and pay grade). If Boeing pay more than other companies in India and invest in training and retaining their staff, they'll be good. If Boeing pay less than the best in India and don't show any career path for local staff then they'll get sub-par work that _just_ meets the specifications, with no questions asked about the validity of those specifications.
Many articles say Boeing developed the MCAS software in house in his Seattle facilities, it's unknown if the software was actually written by employees of Boeing, Rockwell Collins or the lowest bidder from India, only some unspecified software was actually outsourced.
I've worked "with" and "for" and indian "body-shop" and once I've asked one of their 'consultants' why they kept using spanish since they were always talking about "Señor developers" (I know this joke is been around, but I came up with the same by myself back then) [* because clearly they were hiring anything and everything as long as was barely able to write some code and selling them as seniors, nothing wrong with India, but that's often how it is when you source developers there]
There is something to be said about the 787 assembly in that yes, South Carolina does not have the engineering-first culture that Seattle (Renton and Everett) had/has.
The Boeing plants in Washington state are all unionised, whereas SC is an at-will state with no union. One of the biggest Boeing critics (the former Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al-Baker) famously said that he would refuse acceptance of *any* 787 built in Carolina (after it was found that some 787s built in Carolina had sub-standard manufacturing), which forced Boeing to make sure all Qatar jets were built in Washington, where possible. But since *all* 787 production has been moved to Carolina, it remains to be seen if Qatar (now that Al-Baker has departed) would buy more 787s.
The 777 is being built in Washington. The 737 fuselage is built in Kansas and sent by rail to Washington to finish off and commission (this is where Boeing threw shade at Spirit Aerosystems during the 737-9 door plug debacle, claiming that Spirit messed up, which turned out to be wrong).
There were 2 AoA sensors available (but it seems there was the option to only have a plane with 1 AoA sensor?) - although the budget programmers were order to only use 1 AoA sensor at a time, as it originally was only designed to operate at high airspeed and with little force, who proceeded to do so without complaining.
Then a further change was ordered to make it work at low airspeed and enough force to override the pilot, which was done without a complaint too (if being fired for merely disagreeing is possible and unwanted, do most say anything but yes sir?).
As well, unless the airline paid extra to make available the "visual indicator" function, the "AoA disagree" warning that a AoA sensor has developed a fault, would not show up on the display.
Simon wrote:
"Many of the 737-7’s problems were also present in the 737-8 MAX, which suffered fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019 due to faulty software."
He's referring, of course, to "MCAS", the "Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System", which took over control of the crashed 737 Max aircraft and literally over-rode their pilots, flying the planes in to the ground. However, to be pendantic - sorry, but it matters here - that's only a small fraction of the story... Without going in to all the technical details about engine sizes and telescoping landing gear and so on - and just sticking to the "fault" bit...
First, came the actual specification of the aircraft involved in the crashes. Not all 737 Max aircraft were vulnerable to crashing through this specific failure mode. The reason that the MCAS software "took over" and flew those aircraft in to the ground can be traced back to a [foreseeable] flight event and a cascade of subsequent and bad decisions. The flight event concerned something called the AOA Sensor - a bit of widgetry that helps the aircraft systems figure out the "angle of attack" at which the aircraft was flying. By "angle of attack" I mean the angle of the aircraft relative to the air through which it flew. When an aircraft goes in to a "nose up stall", for example, the aircraft pitches up as if it were climbing, even though it may be descending. This happens if/when the wings stop generating lift.
The aircraft that crashed had each been fitted with a single AOA sensor and the subsequent electronics/displays in the cockpit.
It turns out that this was a customer-selected option. In other words, it was possible for an airline to specify a configuration for a new plane that was inherently risky. Critically, however, the decision to drop from a pair of AOA sensors to a single sensor was not explicitly called out in the options, but it was rather bundled with other [I think cockpit related] choices made by the commissioning airline. In other words, as an airline, you might receive an aircraft with a single AOA sensor and not even know it.
So rather than just being 100% a software issue, the "first domino" was in fact the failure of a SINGLE piece of critical hardware [the AOA sensor]. If the aircraft had been fitted with two sensors - and something like a locust got jammed in one AOA sensor, the aircraft would respond by issuing a warning and poking the pilots to investigate - but it would not assume the data from the blocked sensor was correct. It turns out that when the aircraft had a single sensor, that sensor getting blocked sent signals to the MCAS suite that looked like the aircraft was in a dangerous stall, even when it wasn't.
So... the MCAS software wasn't "faulty", per se ... rather, it was being asked to act on incorrect information.
Second, came testing. It turns out that the design of MCAS underwent a bunch of changes during the development of the aircraft... and that the scope of what was needed to effectively test it changed as a result. However, the inquiry found that the ACTUAL TESTS PERFORMED were against the original specification for MCAS, which it passed... and not the correct and more stringent tests, which it would have in all likelihood failed.
This also wasn't a failure of software; rather, it was a failure of adequate controls around the "design change process" and it manifested in an aircraft not being tested correctly before it's Certificate of Airworthiness was issued.
Third, we get to training. Boeing was under huge commercial pressure from Airbus - the A320NEO was decimating sales of the 737 and airlines wanted the ability to get the new model added to their fleet with the minimum of delays and costs. This meant that the "flight characteristics" of the Max needed to be as close to those of the 737 as humanly possible... but it also meant that Boeing told airlines that anyone certified to fly on an existing 737 could be type-certified on the Max with nothing more than a "Differences Course" provided on an iPad.
Critically, the "Differences Course" didn't even *mention* MCAS, let alone explain what it did.
So the third fault basically was that pilots were being asked to fly an aircraft which, in a vulnerable configuration [single AoA Sensor variant] had the potential to exhibit extreme, unpredictable and extremely dangerous "self flying" behavior - without being told that any of that potential capability was in their aircraft.
Fourth, last, and most important of all, we get to greed.
Greed from the airlines, who wanted to drive down operational costs by blackmailing Boeing with threats to switch to the much-more-economical Airbus unless Boeing could match or beat the A320NEO's performance...
Greed from Boeing, who wanted to retain existing customers - *at any cost* - and did so by cutting away redundancy of critical systems to reduce hardware costs; and by glossing over the presence of MCAS to reduce downtime/training costs...
And a Blind Eye from the FAA, who set up an inherently irresponsible governance process for the design and development of commercial aircraft, allowed a manufacturer to cut corners on design and development, then wonder how aircraft built by that manufacturer could possibly crash with the loss of life of all aboard.
So was this a software issue?
If we squint hard we could probably agree that "software was in the mix" - and that would be fair.
But as is often the case, the devil was in the detail. It would be more accurate to say that "the MCAS software intervened in exactly the way it had been designed, but did so based on faulty data from a fault-intolerant physical sensor".
Not quite the same thing.
I agree with all of the above, but I remember some details that are worth adding (unless my memory is wrong, soffy).
So even if you did have 2 AOA sensors, the accident could still happen. MACAS only took one input, left or right. And, the cockpit warning "AOA disagree" was also optional. Subsequently Boeing made it standard, so now we're all safe.
I believe that on other Boeing airlines there is a 3rd "Synthetic" AOA input, but too expensive to backport to the Max. So is it really the maximum of what Boeing can do?
Correct. The 787 has a third, synthetic, input that comes from other sources, not just the 2 physical AOA sensors. And that was one thing Boeing specifically feared - that they would have to rework both the 737-7 and the 737-10 (both are MAX models, by the way, just like the 737-8/9) to add this synthetic input (and that that would cost yet more millions and time and changes in certification).
Thank you - that was the optional component I alluded to but didn't explicitly name.
The reason I wasn't specific was because I could not recall if the AoA DISAGREE could be "directly specified" - i.e. that it was a line item in the "Options" list from Boeing, or whether it was bundled with other client-selected options. From what I could remember, it was the latter case.
And I know we're digging over old ground here, but these are exactly the sorts of lessons that are worth going back to with each generation of [air craft designers / technologists / aircraft manufacturer management / etc. ] that come along, because institutional memory fades with time, and we really don't want to repeat these errors. Ever.
If I remember correctly, back when the MAX crashes happened I read somewhere (on el Reg?) the second AOA sensor was a $50k option. It is beyond apprehension Boeing made such a critical item optional… Airlines are a pretty thin margin business so I can understand whey they specced the MAX without this option to save a few $. Maybe airlines did not know how critical the second AOA sensor is, but Boeing surely knew and has no excuse. Epic fail on part of Boeing.
No. Every 737 jet has two AoA sensors. On the Max, MCAS just switched between them each flight (so the port one on one flight, the starboard one the next, and then back to the port one the one after that). It was the DISAGREE alarm that was optional. The whole thing was an absolute shit show (pardon my French). That's why Boeing's critics also demanded that the certification of the -7 and -10 (post a date cut-off) should be contingent on the AoA sensor issue being a majority-vote thing (whether synthetic AoA à la B787 or something else) to prevent such cockups ever happening again.
> No. Every 737 jet has two AoA sensors. On the Max, MCAS just switched between them each flight ..
You've been misinformed. MCAS used the one AoA sensor and was designated a “limited augmentation function” and not a “primary flight-control system”. Which would have necessitated pilot re-training and a total aircraft recertification. MCAS to compensate for the pronounced nose up attitude of the aircraft under high thrust. Caused by mounting the newer bigger engines higher and forward of the wings on the 737. Extending the life of the 737 airframe rather than having to design a brand new aircraft.
The thing everyone is missing is that MCAS had a reset timer as well
So the pilot gets trim down warnings along with stall warnings caused by the single AoA sensor , MCAS takes over and trims the nose down. pilot reacts to the nose going 15 degrees down, over rides the MCAS and pulls the nose back up level while trying to figure out what is going on. 10 seconds after the over ride MCAS cuts back in again and forces the nose down, this is not in the manuals, or the fault checklist or anything else the pilots know about, over ride again pull the the plane up level, 10 seconds later MCAS cuts back in forces the nose down 15 degrees, pilots over ride again but dont have time to level the plane......
A few corrections:
First let us recall that a Boeing engineer was convicted and sent to prison for lying to the FAA about whether any of the technical changes affected handling and required pilot retraining.
There were always two AoA sensors fitted to the MAX. MCAS always alternated between which used. The cost option was only in the visual status display and associated control functions. The idea that a modified MCAS for only one sensor, without the alternation, would be cheaper is not tenable - especially in the short timescale available for development.
The low-cost option was partly to blame, as the display gave insufficient information about what was going on, while when MCAS kicked in there was no way to permanently disable it and it kept kicking back in. Even on the full-cost option, there was no pilot training on any of that.
Just waiting for one of those vulnerable vanes to get knocked by a passing ground vehicle.
Boeing was just told last week to fix a bunch of defective seats in at least 450 Max planes.
Why is that not included in this overly-rosy report?
https://www.reuters.com/world/faa-says-seats-hundreds-boeing-737-max-were-incorrectly-installed-2026-07-27/
Since the debacle of 2018/2019, the 737-MAX aircraft have spent years with a proctologist checking everything. Uncovering the -7's anti-icing issue is an example (as reported in the article).
I submit the MAX aircraft, as they stand today, are the most thoroughly inspected commercial aircraft platform currently in service.
I have flown on one - Ryanair removed the word "MAX" but you can find the info...
However please note that the Boeing message about being the most inspected aircraft was before the door blew out. Since the blowout, not so much.
Personally I found the seats very uncomfortable, Easyjet was noticably better (same day flight).