I Know This Is Pedantry, But...
... what is being described in this article doesn't strictly meet the definition of MFA.
To clarify, MFA - Multi-Factor Authentication - means that in order to prove your identity the the bank's infrastructure, you would have to provide at least two of the following things:-
1. Something you Know [like a Password or Pin]
2. Something you Have [like a Physical Device - such as a token that generates OTPs]
3. Something you Are [i.e. is derived from your physical being, such as a retina pattern.
When we see discussions of "MFA" that include e.g. a Password, but then combined with a PIN or value sent to an email address, this IS NOT MFA... It's two instances of Single-Factor Authentication [something you know]. That's "better than nothing", but as this article then goes on to explain, it's far too easy for an attacker to compromise an email address. It's also far too easy for them to write an inbox-filter that pushes emails from a legitimate bank email address to a waste bin [or somewhere else].
Another dimension to the challenge here is that because mobile phones can receive both emails and SMS messages, it means that the handsets themselves represent a significant single point of failure in the authentication process.
Finally, it's worth noting that there are viable solutions to this - such as returning to the original type of physical RSA tokens. Even better, technology has reached the point where a physical token generator could be embedded in something with the dimensions of your credit or ATM card, if - *if* - the banks wanted to.
There's a reason that they don't - and it's cost. Basically, the calculus that the bank performs is to look at the cost of rolling out something like a credit-card-based token-generation MFA solution and compares that cost with the amount of actual card fraud they have to pay for. Note that this is not the same as the total amount of account or card fraud - because of course banks are getting better and better at side-stepping liability for breaches - using, can you believe it, their terrible history at preventing card fraud as illustrative of why customers should be more cautious.
The key point to remember here is that there are viable, reliable, effective solutions available today. The fact that they haven't been implemented it is simply because regulators are happy to turn a blind eye and not force the banks to eat in to their outrageous profits* in order to tighten up on security.
* JPMorgan net profit for 2025 - NET profit - was $57 billion. That's over a billion a week, in *profit*.
Citigroup net profit for 2025 was $14,3 billion.
HSBC net profit for 2025 was $23.1 billion.
So that's just shy of $100 billion in net profits from just 3 banks... yet they can't afford secure remote authentication for their clients? Pull the other one, cough, cough, it's got bells on...