Five Eyes: Watch out for odd LinkedIn connection requests, China's back on the hunt for state secrets MI5 and its international allies are once again warning that China is shopping for state secret leakers on popular recruitment platforms, including LinkedIn, Indeed, and Upwork. In a fresh advisory published on Wednesday evening, the UK’s domestic counter-intelligence agency said China is using an increasing number of platforms …
Who already isn't on the look out for odd LinkedIn requests. If I don't know them I just ignore them, there's even a button for 'I don't know this person'.
Anyone even advertising their highly sensitive job on LinkedIn needs sacking in the first instance. Someone who lets everyone add them on LinkedIn like it was Facebook should never have got the job in the first place.
Agreed but hardly much better than a chap knows a chap he was up with at Trinity. ;)
I thought real counter·intelligence people always had truly boring jobs, like clerk of household toilet roll inventory, as cover stories even for their families — I suspect here implausible as the clerk would likely be paid more (plus the perquisites. ;)
There is actually one for DV and SC cleared!
If that isn't something that says 'here are people with lots of juicy information' I don't know what is.
There is actually fairly strict guidance that you never show any security clearance on public profiles (which includes so-called 'private groups' on any social media).
Evidently they haven't heard of poisoning the well.
Nothing is more fun than to build up plausibility and trust with stuff that's actually moderately public and then start seeding nonsense into the mechanism. You obviously need to do this with a group of people and vary the results a tiny bit so the data is collaborated but does not appear to be from a single script, but I'd use this to create a dependency that can be used against espionage when it counts.
It's not even a new technique either, sometimes the old ones are the best and in my opinion the only thing LinkedIn is good for.
Evidently they haven't heard of poisoning the well.
I wonder if they would be interested in the new AUKUS submarine base in Mt Isa.†
Only thing is I wouldn't relish a visit from their toe·cutters — I vaguely recall from childhood that Sexton Blake in his run·ins with the Tongs wasn't too keen either.
In AU even preparing a report purely from publically available material can land you in seriously hot water — I assume it is the consorting that is the offence not the material itself which could be just published even as a Grauniad article.
On the other side the Orange Shitgibbon is imposing a 12.5% tariff on Australia, alleging the country has failed to take action to promote slavery and forced labour. I might have misread that but typos frequently reveal deeper truth. Friends like that…
† by the time AU gets the submarines (if ever) the rise in sea level might make this less ridiculous.
Given the slop on LinkedIn these days it's not like I need another reason to ignore connection requests.
Whilst I still get a lot of work from there it's messages from recruiters I know, very rarely see any actual work advertised on there but it might just be hidden by all the people desperate to be business influencers.
For the short time I maintained LinkedIn account, under a nom·de·guerre, to follow the shenanigans at a previous employer, the whole boiling seemed an order of magnitude dafter than Facebook.
Both vacuous enough to make the Kardashians appear veritable intellectuals.
Anyway when the subject my interest settled down to inept predictability I just Slinked·Off.
>> Chinese military intelligence officers specifically target security clearance holders, including marks working in defense, security, and foreign affairs, military personnel, and those with indirect access to government information, such as academics, journalists, think tank employees, and others.
As do the bomb-loving Americans. And their poodles.
