Re: "Purported"
UEFI in reality has far worse security than BIOS's.
Signatures and boot/remote attestation have nothing to do with security - it's about restricting the user (i.e. restricting what the user can boot and restricting the user from patching antifeatures out of the UEFI).
Giving microsoft more money is an immoral act, so the user being able to patch a SLIC table to remove an antifeature wasn't a bad thing, although running microsoft's software is only slightly less immoral than giving microsoft more money.
While signature checks and attestation almost all of the time does successfully restrict the user, such signing schemes are always implemented wrong - meaning attackers have no problems in practice carrying out exploits - all the signature check does is prevent the user from fixing the vulnerability themselves (there are pages and pages of such articles, but 3 is enough);
https://cybersecuritynews.com/uefi-secure-boot-bypass-vulnerability/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LogoFAIL?useskin=monobook
https://www.tomshardware.com/pc-components/motherboards/critical-uefi-vulnerabilities-found-in-gigabyte-motherboards-allow-attackers-to-bypass-secure-boot-and-install-firmware-backdoors
While an attacker previously had to tailor a BIOS exploit per BIOS vendor - maybe even per motherboard, how most UEFI's use the same bloated TianoCore EDK II and image rendering libraries, an attacker now can prepare a single cross-architecture exploit image that will successfully exploit almost all UEFI's with custom image support.
Due to the digital handcuffs, the user is dependent on the manufacturer supplying a UEFI update for the bug to be fixed (it seems 90%+ of existing UEFI implementations have not received an update and never will) - the signature check prevents the user from fixing the exploit themselves by a patch that replaces the image loading function call with a NOP instruction - as if the user applies such fix, the UEFI will no longer boot.
If you want security, step number 0 is to remove each and every proprietary program.
GNUboot has way better default security than every last UEFI and BIOS (due to lacking backdoors) and as every last line of source code is available under a free license, any and all bugs are possible to fix.
If you are concerned about an attacker writing to the SPI flash, you shouldn't waste time with signatures - you should instead desolder and lift the write-enable pin on the SPI flash and and wire up a physical switch (GNUboot by design doesn't write to the SPI flash, so it's fine for it to be RO and it doesn't really care about a corrupted NVRAM either).