I take it this will be one of those permanent temporary closures - where a cash-strapped public sector organisation never quite has the resources to ensure it is safe for public release and so it remain temporarily closed for ever?
NHS to close-source hundreds of GitHub repos over AI, security concerns
The UK's National Health Service (NHS) is ordering all of its technology leaders to temporarily wall off the organization's open source projects over concerns relating to advanced AI and Anthropic's Mythos. According to guidance shared internally within the organization and seen by The Register, GitHub repositories must be set …
COMMENTS
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Wednesday 6th May 2026 15:57 GMT Fustbariclation
Insecurity through obscurity
It's worse than that. Making it closed-source will give a dangerously false sense of security.
Existing open source code will still be useful to bad actors.
Besides, with the old source code as a guide, even fairly pedestrian LLMs, with a bit of encouragment, sould be able to reverse assemble the new closed-source binaries to reveal updates in plain code.
Newer LLMS should make short work of breaking code hidden in this way.
Meanwhile, they miss the many-eyes security protection that Open Source can give.
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Tuesday 5th May 2026 11:49 GMT steelpillow
H'mm
I'm guessing it's a measure to cut the flood of AI vuln reports, so that ransom gangs are less able to identify and exploit them before they can be patched.
But hey, this is Socio-Political Bureaucracy, and in the UK to boot, so I'm not placing any bets.
And is GitHub secure enough to deliver anyway? Now who owns it, can anybody remind me?
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Tuesday 5th May 2026 12:41 GMT An_Old_Dog
Public Repos are *PUBLIC*
"Public repositories materially increase the risk of unintended disclosure of source code, architectural decisions, configuration detail, and contextual information..."
Disclosure is the reason for making repos public. It's an intentional act.
This sounds like an attempt to retroactively compensate for poor development practices (putting credentials in repos, leaving [at management's orders] security "for later", etc.).
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Tuesday 5th May 2026 13:09 GMT heyrick
"We will continue to publish source code where there is a clear need."
And there will never again be "a clear need".
How about this. If it isn't being done in the public good (publishing source), then don't expect public money to pay for the development any more. You can take it out of management budgets...
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Tuesday 5th May 2026 13:19 GMT Graham Cobb
Have they checked their licences?
Have they checked the licences of software they rely on?
IANAL but I would have thought copyleft licences might require software under those licences which they have modified and then distributed to be published. What counts as "distribution"? I don't know.
Even permissive licences may require attribution to be published somewhere. Particularly where some sort of "service" is being provided using the software.
I'm not saying everything has to be published, but that unpublishing definitely requires a legal review before it happens.
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Tuesday 5th May 2026 16:13 GMT doublelayer
Re: Have they checked their licences?
Pretty much nothing requires that except AGPL, and then only to users which could be done without having a repository on GitHub. Open source licenses don't mandate how and where you distribute the sources, at least not this specifically, and most of them won't apply to most of this code.
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Wednesday 6th May 2026 08:44 GMT geospacedman
Re: Have they checked their licences?
Once something is open licensed, that version is out there, it can't be "unpublished", and your licensed rights can't be revoked. People are already panic-archiving NHS repositories and duplicating the current versions in anticipation of a mass `rm -rf /github/nhs` event.
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Tuesday 5th May 2026 15:28 GMT mpi
And that is supposed to accomplish...what exactly?
It's a pretty safe bet to assume that any repo, that was public at any public git/DevOps platform at ANY point in time, has been scanned, forked, cloned, or otherwise read by at least one automated system somewhere, and in all likelyhood more than once. Meaning, a complete copy of any such code is almost guaranteed to already exists somewhere else.
So, what good is closing the repos now?
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Tuesday 5th May 2026 17:54 GMT Ken Hagan
False positives
"Anthropic has still not yet revealed the number of false positives the model throws up when running vulnerability scans, which is a common issue with AI thus far."
Neither has it made much noise about how many could be found using traditional tools like compiler warnings, lint, and valgrind, all of which are much cheaper than AI.
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Wednesday 6th May 2026 17:53 GMT doublelayer
Re: False positives
No, you can't. You can only assume that if you also know one of these:
1. You run them yourself and see that they don't find anything.
2. The people who wrote the code indicate that they always run all those tools and fix anything they find.
Many do not run those tools at all. Some who do don't bother to fix everything they warn about, either because they don't understand why it's a problem, don't have the skill or time to distinguish between true and false positives, or don't consider the bugs to be worth the time to proactively search for and fix. To some extent, that attitude can be justified because those tools, and for that matter LLMs, are capable of spitting out a ton of findings, some of which aren't real and some of which aren't important, and developer time is limited. However, a lot more of it is developers who don't know or care about security and don't even try to find problems until someone else reports one and announces that it will be made public so it would be great if they fixed it before then.
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Wednesday 6th May 2026 08:24 GMT Tom Womack
I'm wondering how much of this is more connected to the NHS Biobank Data leaks, things like
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/clyedyn6pz7o
There is a difficult line to thread between 'your processing methodology ought to be open-source for good science' and 'there are great scientific benefits from processing large-scale NHS data'; checking your anonymised chunk of extracted data into your GitHub feels necessary by option 1, but when your analysis is on the metadata then there is almost always enough information in the metadata to deanonymise.
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Wednesday 6th May 2026 09:01 GMT bitwise
Who made this decision
No word on who was in the meetings making this decision.
This will handicap development across government l.
As it is government departments all use libraries written to GDS standards and freely reuse fork and take over projects as needed.
This is going to be counter productive and result in slower and less secure apps
Who benefits from this?
I can imagine certain vendors being in favour of this got sure.
We paid for this stuff, it should not be closed.