Earlier Horizon rollout could widen net for quashed Post Office convictions The Post Office's Horizon computer system may have been deployed earlier than thought, potentially affecting which convictions get automatically quashed under legislation introduced to speed up justice in one of the biggest scandals in recent British history, MPs heard yesterday. Amanda Pearce, casework operations director at …
Software doesn't just magically appear. There are betas, pilots, and so forth.
I worked at ICL from 1995 to 1998. I was at the FCY03 building in Footscray, Sidcup. It was a three floor building with many outsourced support helpdesks in it. The flagship client was Microsoft, but there were many others - Escom, Seagate, Compaq, Polaroid, Motorola, Apple, just to name a few. (Actually if I recall correctly Apple were in FCY02, but many of their systems were hosted in FCY03 as 02 was a tiny outhouse of a building by comparison.)
I recall that in 1998 a small helpdesk for the Post Office was set up. It was on the ground floor, near the front of the building, at least to start with. I think it was intended to be around three to six people, quite small by our normal standards.
I'm sure I was told that it would expand as we were going to be supporting a new system for post office branches. I don't recall it ever arriving whilst I was there, and I think that when I left ICL that helpdesk was mostly supporting the Post Office's Post Code Database software. But there was a constant rumour that this tiny helpdesk would expand "soon" as they were just about to start rolling out this new system to post offices.
Aaaaaany day now. Any day. No, really, it could be any day now. Honest.
The reason this sticks in my mind is that there wasn't much more space on the ground floor. If they were going to grow that team, they'd probably have to move it to another floor. Maybe even another building. Which would mean not just repatching network ports but possibly also running new connections between floors or buildings, and all the hassle that can entail.
Around mid 1998 this ceased to be my concern as I moved on to pastures new.
But it wouldn't surprise me if there were some earlier cases than 1999. My recollection is that they were definitely saying they'd be supporting it. Any day now... so there were wheels moving in 1998, and someone may well have been using it in a pilot somewhere...
Software doesn't just magically appear. There are betas, pilots, and so forth.
For a team following some vaguely sane development practises I'd expect this. But can we be sure Fujitsu were? (You have seen the example code fragments from Horizon posted online, haven't you?)
ICL were my first employer. I was later very shocked to find out that other companies did not work the same way.
I have many stories which not only prominently feature their unusual management practices, but would be impossible without them.
So yes, it's quite possible that there was no beta or pilot.
But the one thing I'd like to stress is that a pilot would probably be billable. And being billable made almost anything possible within ICL.
Therefore I suspect the chances of a pilot were high.
When I reflect on my time at ICL I come to the realisation that baffling, trying circumstances were inevitable. The only difference between billable and non-billable bafflement was that Management would acknowledge, even celebrate, the billable bafflement. Non-billable bafflement was ignored or actively denied, despite its obviously plentiful portions.
Until 2001, I actually worked for ICL in the same building as the Pathway group (FEL01, Feltham).
They arrived with a lot of grandeur. Old offices without air conditioning were completely rebuilt, "ICL PATHWAY" logos adorned doors and halls, and all the other departments looked decidedly second-rate in comparison.
I don't think the programmers were based there, I think it was mainly flashy suited sales and pr folk.
They were obviously ICLs "golden child" despite my team (ICL CFM) being the one to make the most (if any) profit most years)
This extract from EPOSSCore.d11 has been written to reverse the sign of a number and is equivalent to the command :-
d= -d
-------
Public Function ReverseSign(d)
If d <0 Then
d = Abs(d)
Else
d = d - (d "2)
End If ReverseSign = d
End Function
-------
Whoever wrote this code clearly has no understanding of elementary mathematics or the most basic rules of programming.
Well, in the time-honoured way for software it was almost inevitably rolled out earlier. Full of bugs and incomplete functionality making the user the guinea pig. So save on creating test cases/environment and more importantly able to surreptitiously claim payment milestone.
"I think that would be detrimental to society [and] the UK government."
Said some random mouthpiece that is sent in to deny, deny and deny.
As far as I am concerned, both Post Office and Fujitsu are equally responsible. Both parties should be coffering up and setting right, as far as money can of course, the wrong that they both manifested on these poor individuals.
W.Anchors.... the lot of them.
Hear ends the rant/sermon.
"But your refusal to tell us how much Fujitsu will pay into a £1.8 billion bill for taxpayers leads people to the conclusion that, frankly, Fujitsu is behaving like a parasite on the British state"
^ Those were strong words from Liam Byrne and they were fully justified given Fujitsu's poor conduct. For example, when the Horizon system was rolled out back in 1999, sub postmasters started putting in complaints about Horizon but no one listened. I would want Fujitsu to put in hundreds of millions of pounds into that compensation fund since they were the authors of that Horizon abomination.
This is a relevant article:
Fujitsu bosses knew about Post Office Horizon IT flaws, says insider
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252496560/Fujitsu-bosses-knew-about-Post-Office-Horizon-IT-flaws-says-insider
If you've been following, the police are working on this. But gathering evidence of a quality that will result in a conviction takes time and effort, so IIRC they've said it'll probably be another year or three before prosecutions start. This blog seems to sum it up.
They've already said that they have to wait for the full inquiry report which is due to be published this year
They will then read it, analyse it and decide what charges to to be pressed, and the police report handed to the CPS.(2028 at the earliest)
Then people will be charged, and any trials will be arranged , more than likely for 6 -9 months after charges, followed by 6 months of trial, followed by an appeal, followed by more indecision, then the whole thing is scrapped because vennels and co will be 80+ and unfair to send a doddering old pensioner to jail.
Not that that ever stopped vennels and co
What's needed is to begin proceedings now and adjourn them. And have an interview now and again.
The idea to apply the same process-is-the-punishment that has been applied to some non-Establishment figures, so they will live out their lives always waiting for the knock, and never really enjoying their unearned wealth.
Fujitsu bosses knew about Post Office Horizon IT flaws, says insider
“A former senior developer who worked for Fujitsu on the Post Office IT system that led to subpostmasters being falsely accused of fraud, has claimed bosses knew of fundamental flaws before going live”
As of december 2025, the postoffice CEO was STILL calling the affected victims "money-grabbing parasites" in unofficial correspondence. By unofficial I mean alternate outside-the-investigation means such as using personal email to instruct staff how to throw roadblocks and for which claimants.
They're delaying the compensation KNOWING some of the postmasters will die before seeing a penny. Then they plan to "negotiate down" with their beneficiaries or fight through the courts to delay again saying they shouldn't have to pay dead people.
That this was not declared previously as it may well have changed the outcome of the contract decision.
The danger here is that not only were cases settled out of court or dealt with via third party but many DWP cases
may have been overlooked because of secrecy orders.
This rot goes deeper than anyone imagined, and I predict that it will be a confidence matter very soon.
In 1962 my dad was second in command of the new Prudential Assurance data processing department, and we relocated to just outside reading where the new department building was. It was pretty much essential that they could contact him at home by telephone in emergencies, so he contacted the post office to organise this. They claimed there was no service in the area and wouldn't be for at least 18 months.
Dad took a photo of the street, showing a post directly opposite our house with a couple of lines to other houses, which they flatly denied was our street. However, dad sent a copy of the photo and their denial to the London Prudential head office... We got our telephone.
A few weeks ago it was revealed that Fujitsu & PO signed a contract that explicitly set out that there were discrepancies between the data entered at the POs and its central records. The contract
went on to described the method by which F could alter the data nd how much would be paid for this service.
This contract was signed in mid 2006. Given how long it takes to sort out a contract with a Govt. dept. or agency, negotiations must pre-date the signature by months, and the knowledge that drove the parties to this contract must have existed for years.
But in the Inquiry many people at the heart of the legal and business processes affirmed, under oath, that they were unaware of the defects and that there was no way central data could be changed. The existence of this contract demonstrates beyond any doubt that the Inquiry has been treated to perjury on a grand scale.
Nut after the initial new item about this contract was aired there has been silence in the media? Why?
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