Sadly not necessarily, DMARC with SPF+DKIM is broken.
Due to the way both are specified, using them together(as is nearly mandated) opens up possible spoofing. Microsoft being one of the main clowns enabling this issue, as you could bounce messages through azure/outlook.com and whitewash the checks. The problem at it's heart being that in DMARC if it passes either it "passes". There isn't the ability to set granular enough policy to define one that says it must pass both, or from which domains each will work with what keys.
Subdomain issues are also huge concerns with the current system, as many companies use remailers like Mailchump and ConstantCrapware, which request wildcard authorization. So if anyone in the chain if trust includes an expired domain, your organization is screwed.
So ESET and it's Israeli affiliate may have dropped the ball, or the message may have been slipped past the checks by other means. The messages would show some information in the headers, but unfortunately, most mail clients would include the results of the failed or supicious checks in the headers and still mark it a PASS per the policy rules, meaning the user never saw the warning, only the IT team doing mop up.
This is broken in specification and needs to be fixed, but even if it is, getting the major players to update their systems is a decade long nightmare. So this will probably go on for some time.