I'd point out that a CDN could also legitimately patch the script with a version which isn't API-compatible and my site would also instantly break without notification. (Or it would become buggy for no discernible reason.)
The literature around SRI, such as Frederik Braun's (a co-editor of the draft) "A CDN that can not XSS you: Using Subresource Integrity" strongly suggests that untrustworthy CDNs are the target of the technology rather than untrustworthy web hosting companies. I don't disagree that it could be useful in ensuring that one's own code hasn't been altered. I find it strange to think that a hosting company wouldn't have access to both the document and its first-party resources, but I'm practically a lay-person when it comes to paying others to host content.
I'd personally rather face a broken website than allow one to be taken over by a supply chain attack, and that applies doubly when I'm the user of a site rather than someone involved in running it. I would consider it unconscionable for a bank's website to be using a third-party CDN for script dependencies without using this technology, for instance.