Prevent DDOS? Good Luck with that!
Many bureaucrats (whether they claim cybersecurity in their title or not) have no useful technical understanding of what they are talking about. This is particularly true of that specific organization, which has a penchant for driving out any actual expertise that tells them things they don't want to hear.
To be fair, even otherwise smart academics have trouble grasping the down and dirt realities of cyberthreats and denial of service. I remember a presentation by a PhD candidate on his sure fire way to handle denial of service. Skipping past the details, it modified the TCP 3-way handshake by the server sending back a computationally difficult problem that would take several seconds to solve before completing the connection, thus slowing the attackers to a crawl.
The academic was very proud of this and I said, "Congratulations, you just made everything worse!"
He was shocked and affronted. "I explained that now his server needs to maintain problem state data for every attempted connection. The attacker is just going to drop the problem on the floor and initiate a new connection attempt over and over."
He looked at me and sputtered, "But ... but .. that would violate protocol!"
We won't even go into spoofing, UDP, reflection, ...