Public code repositories are toxic
... and until developers and organizations learn that lesson, we're going to continue to have widespread issues with them.
Rust's Cargo.io will have code signing? Yeah, that's super useful, because that one dev in Nebraska will no doubt have excellent private-key hygiene. Code signing has always worked out great so far.
PyPI (which I think lags only GitHub and Node.js as a popular vacation spot for malicious packages) will use OIDC. Excellent choice. A bafflingly complex, over-engineered authentication mechanism based on one of the truly idiotic security technologies (JWT), which certainly no one ever has trouble implementing securely. What could go wrong?
Maven ... wow, people still use Maven? Huh. Good for them, I suppose.
I mean, sure, let's MFA the MFers. Couldn't hurt; these repos are such a disaster that almost any move is an improvement. But we're unlikely to see significant improvement in the problems of malicious packages and malware inserted into legitimate packages from any of this.
There have been proposals which might make some difference, such as CHAINIAC, though whether they'd be workable in practice is another question. More automated scanning, including both static and dynamic analysis (in sandboxes), might help a bit. Random audits might help a bit, if you could staff them. At least the repos might catch some of the easy stuff. But the whole idea of "fetch a package of unknown provenance from this repository and run it" (which in its modern form goes back at least to CPAN, and obviously has roots in public FTP sites, BBSes, contrib tapes, and the like) is fundamentally flawed.
Organizations need to at least perform due diligence. Download packages to a secure internal repository. Check signatures; check diffs; check for online buzz about the package. Run static analysis. Test in a sandbox with dynamic analysis, including program behavioral analysis. Don't let any devs use the package until it's been vetted, and then every part of the chain, from developers through production builds, must fetch from the internal repository only.
And, of course, reduce your external dependencies. No, your application almost certainly does not need a thousand Javascript packages.