Feds offer big rewards for info on suspected Russian Sandworm intel officers

Uncle Sam will dole out up to $10 million for vital information on each of six Russian GRU officers linked to the Kremlin-backed Sandworm gang, who, according to the Feds, have plotted to carry out destructive cyber-attacks against American critical infrastructure. It's hoped the money, offered via the US Department of State's …

[Anonymous Coward]

So, just suppose you work in one of those outfits, and we know are targetted for certain. And said outfit employs at least one Russian ex-pat. One in particular who is extremely vocally anti Putin?

I have no reason to distrust the public sentiment, but how is anyone to know if it's a front? Carefully placed for multiple years?

Paranoia and what ifs are how the Stasi became so powerful, and we have to avoid that. So what is a reasonable control measure and how can we put it in place?

A/C for very obvious.

[trindflo]

Moles

If I understand your question, the solution is to not let a "lone ranger" handle security. That sort of thing should be checked by multiple competent people. Granted this isn't practical for small companies.

The fact that your coworker speaks with a Russian accent shouldn't be the red flag (no pun intended) anyway. It isn't a very good indicator.

[Anonymous Coward]

Re: Moles

The downvotes were expected it has to be said on my post. But it is a legitimate question. At the height of terrorist paranoia, if your org recruits internationally, how do you employ decent security checks on individuals coming in, and can you trust them? Or even trusting your own citizens?

Entry to genuinely critical areas is logged and tracked; were someone to attempt to indulge in malpractice on the real critical systems (e.g. attempting to plug a USB into systems they aren't supposed to) it would be both logged and spotted on camera; to say nothing of the USB being disabled on those systems in the first place. (Good luck getting hardware without certain features...)

Trust is earned, and, equally, can be a cover story. Swiss cheese model of defences. Could something still get through? An informed and determined org could probably figure something out.

[Claptrap314]

As a reminder

for any bounty hunters out there, "Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko (Юрий Сергеевич Андриенко)" is about as unique as "John Paul Smith". Be certain that you get more than the name right...