The horse of software paranoia fled from its stable already, and short of some kind of generally and internationally accepted standard of proof for "verifiability of benevolence" for software, the door cannot be shut.
For at least several years now, certain types of employee for certain types of organisation have taken only disposable electronic devices (phones, tablets, laptops) into China because those devices would be destroyed upon return, before being allowed anywhere near a network. For a similar period, organisations aware of serious security needs have avoided installing stuff with a Chinese component or software.
We all know why. It is incredibly easy to propagate malcious wares, and this is an ideal asymmetric intel/warfare route for many hostile or even "friendly" countires. It's relatively cheap, readily deniable and perfect for skulduggery.
The Russian government's increasingly perilous use of malware, spyware and the rest is hardly a secret. It makes perfect sense to be as wary of Russian stuff as it does Chinese. Then you can include North Korea, and from there build a long list of suspects.
In truth, only a fool assumes that the Americans, especially under Trump, don't steal everything hand over fist too, potentially with the complicity of NSA. There will be people in every major government on Earth saying "We'd be dumb not to steal everything we can reach". If Russia had e-voting, open speech and anything resembling a functioning democracy, do you seriously think the USA wouldn't have tried to thumb the scales a bit, if it thought it could get away with it?
My point being realism (no, it is not cynicism, I'm sorry to say) and the fact that no country with a scrap of sense should put trust in the bits and bytes emerging from any other country—arguably, including allies. (Britain, with its laughable "special relationship", was f**ked over by the US at least as frequently, and arguably more effectively, as it was by the Soviets since WW2, something that surprises most ordinary people.)
So I think Kaspersky are wasting their time. Countries will become increasingly careful about using only closely-monitored home-grown hard- and software, the market for carefully verified technology exchange between alliances will only grow, and we can already see the logical endpoint, where the World Wide Web is gradually fragmented by Great Firewalls, Broad Filters and Deep Inspections, into a patchwork of ever more controlled, censored and monitored national internet implementations.
This battle is already lost.