Re: Question not adressed
Depends on the vendor, mostly.
Quite a few of the exploits rely on already-patched vulnerabilities - so several of the iOS, OSX and Android ones won't work on modern equipment regardless. Others are of questionable value to patch - anything which requires them to actually nick your phone to deploy is unlikely to be considered a high priority, for example.
Of the remaining ones, Microsoft, Apple, Google, Linux and Cisco are likely to go into patchmode overdrive to clear up actual vulnerabilities of zero-days. High-end phone manufacturers (Sony, Samsung etc) will probably look to implement some fixes too. Some of the leaks are pretty specific (say, the Windows control panel exploit) and so can be patched around. others are vague to the point of useless.
Lower-end phone manufacturers, mid-range and below models from the big names, and 95% of IoT vendors, on the other hand, are pretty unlikely to do anything either way; as a rule, anything IoT doesn't require any effort whatsoever to hack right now and so is unlikely to see any improvement from this. There's 2 or 3 devices this doesn't apply to (Nest thermostats, Amazon Echo and Google Home, one or two others) but even they are unlikely to be particularly secure and shouldn't be given access to any sensitive information.
In terms of non-vendor security stuff, we could add extra blocking rules to firewalls and monitor back-end traffic based on some of the information in the leaks, but the odds of the CIA continuing to use any easily-changed stuff (like port numbers or C&C server IPs) after this are basically zero, so any short-term fixing on that score will be obsolete before you read this post.
On the other hand, unless you're either a high-ranking member of the Russian government or presently running an Al Qaeda cell, you're probably not on the CIA's radar anyway and not likely to be a victim of any of the exploits listed. They don't really care what most people are doing unless it's directly pertinent to a current investigation, and having useless extra data to analyse is generally considered detrimental by most spy agencies.
There's about 3 billion phone calls made in the USA alone every day. The NSA may be recording them all, but no-one is listening to them for the most part; they use heuristic software (like your antivirus) to try and filter it down to a manageable number for human analysts to look at in real time, but not particularly successfully. I recall at least one senior intelligence official specifically stating that the NSA's mass-tapping program was a waste of time, effort and money that yielded far less useful intel than old-fashioned spy work did, and made the agency complacent on top - it's almost pure security theater with very little benefit. You're just not that interesting to the US government.