why paper at all?
why not eliminate the air-gap and go end-to-end electronically?
(though that would be an, um, interesting challenge to secure ... though Estonia seems to have managed)
An international group of security, encryption, and electoral academics believe Australia's Senate voting software needs an audit. The group, including researchers from MIT, UC Berkeley, and the University of Melbourne, took a look (PDF) at the Australian Electoral Commission's (AEC's) implementation of electronic counting for …
No thank you. That would only serve to reduce the transparency of the process. I have no major quarms about a self service kiosk system that lets people fill out their intention and prints out the form to be placed in the box (real toner on real paper that is, not a receipt printer that fades a week later) but there are a number of practical challenges for handling faulty hardware, and ensuring booth attendants can't ballot-stuff.
> For most of the other States, it seems it would take a lot of errors to change the outcome
I know it's a quote, but it seems that someone has forgotten many many many years ago in 2013, the WA senate election had to be rerun because a small number of ballots went missing whilst being transported for counting and it was realistically possible for preference flows to go one of two ways which changed the number of labor, liberal, pup and green senators depending on that variation.
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