Metadata retention is no worse than STALKING: Turnbull Metadata retention, which George Brandis has most frequently described as reading the front of an envelope, is also like standing outside a lawyer's office watching who goes in and out. That metaphor emerged perhaps accidentally from communications minister Malcolm Turnbull, in explaining why there's no need to exempt what …
Someone who is seen loitering about a premesis can be asked to leave the area, which then means they need to collect such evidence by other methods. Restraining orders can be taken out on individuals too.
The same is not true of this data retension scheme where in we don't even have to know that it is happening. In any case it is likely to produce a lot of noise.
Taking and storing every bit of information about
where I go and when and how often and how long for
who I talk to and when and how often and how long for
who I call and when and how often and how long for
who I write to and when and how often
who I email and when and how often
who I txt and when and how often
who I Skype and when and how often
etc
and all this again when I am a recipient
is surely an invasion of privacy. If not, the definition needs changing.
Metadata my ass.
All this is undoubtedly data. Useful, meaningful, private data.
One big problem with all this stuff is that these analogies just don't hold up in the 'digital age'.
I realise that me going to a doctor or lawyer can be monitored by, say, the police and they don't need any warrant as I am in public view.
That's fine.
BUT, to do that they have to first identify me as a person of interest and justify tasking an officer or two to tail me around to see where I go and compile that information, recording times and locations and taking photos and so forth.
That is labour intensive so they only do it when there is good reason to. Further, it's not retroactive; they can't decide I'm of interest today and then follow me last week.
In other words, the nature of the process imparts certain safeguards for the public; it's just not physically possible to follow every person around every day or stand outside every "doctor’s surgery" and record who walks in.
Digital surveillance all but removes those limitations and so the analogy breaks down unless modified - the retention scheme is not like waiting outside your lawyers office to see if you walk in, it's waiting outside every lawyer's office and recording everyone who walks in. But even then the analogy is poor because they're watching you, not the location so it's like following everyone around all the time and recording everywhere they go. It's a man in a trench-coat peeking over a newspaper on every park bench; a shadow in every doorway you walk past.
That sounds very dramatic but if the Hon Malcolm Turnbull, MP wants to make the comparison between metadata retention and people watching you, that metaphor must admit of the fact that everyone is being watched, all the time, whether they are currently of interest or suspected of a crime or not.
But even then, this is not so simple because web addresses (i.e. URLs) can tell you much more than this. In most cases they show precisely which pages you visited, which is the equivalent of not just watching you walk into a store but following you around the aisles as you browse the products. It's not just watching you walk into a travel agent but looking at which brochures you pick up. It is not - to labour the point - just someone watching you buy a newspaper, but someone standing behind you craning their neck to see exactly which stories and articles you are reading. And it's not just adults - it's people of all ages; it's following school-children into the library and seeing which books they pickup.
It's all that and more, for every person in the country, every day of our lives.
And, while the retention is set at 2 years for the main honeypot, if some agency wants access to data, there is no restriction on how long they can keep it.
Also remember that, because National Security, even being indirectly connected with someone of interest may mean that this data about you is requested and retained by the police or ASIO for review now or in the future - just in case, you understand.
Brother suspected of dealing drugs? Work colleague found posting Islamic-tinged statements online? Boss under investigation for providing misleading information to ASIC? Guess what . . .
"That is labour intensive so they only do it when there is good reason to. ... the nature of the process imparts certain safeguards for the public; ... "
Those 'safeguards' are also accidental and not designed in; a happy accident as it were.
What safeguards are designed in for the metadata retention processes and laws? Is there legislation to forbid the use of information for blackmail and harassment purposes? Can a police officer or civil servant be prosecuted for leaking news about your little STD problems in order to punish/embarass you? Where are the protections?
Of course the safeguards are a 'happy accident', but the point is that they are part of the physical process that Turnbull is using as an comparison to try and imply this is all very much normal and nothing more than an updated version of something existing.
In doing so, he is misleading the public because the metaphor breaks down in this very crucial aspect. I don't think any reasonable person would object to the powers for police to follow suspects without a warrant because that is a right the general public has anyway, but this proposed law is just not in the same league.
If they are being honest that the public disapproval of this is just a case of a misunderstanding then they need to stop throwing around loose metaphors and comparisons and start being accurate.
I have said in other posts that the whole 'address on the envelope' analogy is only really applicable to e-mails and phone calls but there is something missing in that, which is that the outside of an envelope generally only shows the delivery address and need not contain any information about the sender at all. Hell, the contents don't have to either.
I can write a letter to anyone I want and pop it in a post box anywhere - there is no record of me doing so and no real way to trace it back to me without some sophisticated forensics - and even then it'd be a slog and far from certain.
So why are we having this discussion as if there is some capability that the police have now lost?
They can bitch and moan all they like but there is no one with any degree of intelligence who believes that the police and our intelligence agencies actually have less ability to monitor the public than they did back when they were, apparently, reading the 'address on the envelope'.
As for you question about protections? Oh, roughly, fuck-all.
All this talk about the metadata collection and retention has failed to mention that the technology itself is neutral - it is the govt. agencies putting it to possibly unlawful use. Already there are groups out there who have started "watching the watchers" using the internet technologies.
Do Malcolm Turnbull and young Brandis really believe that they are not being watched also?
As the technology becomes more sophisticated, affordable and ubiquitous, how would any goverment be able to stop sousveillance?
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