3DES because it still uses DES which has been cracked for a long time
In what sense has "DES ... been cracked for a long time"?
DC and LC against DES are better than brute force in simple complexity but infeasible due to the large number of chosen or known plaintexts required - around 239 for the best attack. The best variant of the Davies-Murphy attack seems to require 245 known plaintexts, so linear cryptography still has the best result, and it's still infeasible.
Any modern competent DES implementation avoids weak and semiweak keys, so forget about those too.
DES is vulnerable to brute-forcing because it has a short key. That's not "cracked"; it's simply reached the end of its design life.
3DES EDE with key mode 2 is weaker than it should be, with an effective key length of around 80 bits. That could be considered "cracked", but it's poor terminology at best. 3DES EDE with key mode 1 has an effective 112-bit key (due to meet-in-the-middle) and again the best known attacks are not feasible, with large computation and memory requirements (plus 232 known plaintexts, which is tough even if you have an oracle).
It's only a matter of time for it to be thoroughly cracked.
While it's true that "attacks only get better", as the saying goes, there's no proof that any better attacks against DES or 3DES will be discovered. DES isn't a group, so the obvious route for a complete break is closed.
What's more likely is that computing power available to well-funded attackers will make 112-bit keys (for symmetric ciphers) unsuitable for medium-term protection of highly valuable data - just as NIST and every other entity in the field has been saying pretty much since the invention of computer cryptography. But again that's not a "crack". It's just a cipher reaching the end of its design lifespan.
And then you can worry about sites that only support SSLv3, or TLSv1 and so are vulnerable to BEAST, and so on.