Nah, follow the money...
I discard outright any possibility of it being an outside website hack - too hard, an attacker would need access to the TC website, the Sourceforge TC site, and to the code signing key.
The "Warrant Canary" theory doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense either. It's possible, but why recommend BitLocker? When did someone have time to write all those code changes between being served the warrant and having to execute it?
The theory which makes most sense to me is that it was an at least partly commercially-motivated self-takedown by the devs.
The recent change in name on the otherwise "same old code and binary signing key" is possibly significant here - the developers, or perhaps just some of them, may want to start up a commercial product in the new name.
Their commercial aspirations are well-known, witness the previous license issues, the failed crowdfunding and donations campaigns, the "TrueCrypt Developers LLC" registered in Nevada (thanks to Piergiorgio Sartor for that info). And they already own a good chunk of the the IP rights in the TrueCrypt source.
The ending of the project was graceful, to some extent at least - people were not left with unrecoverable archives, and temporarily acceptable but not-as-good alternatives were suggested. A whole lot of work went into that.
It is obvious that this wasn't done in the heat of the moment - it must have taken at least several weeks to do the code revisions for the 7.2 release. There have also been hints (eg the robots.txt file) for about six months that something might be happening.
The only reason I can think of for doing all that work is maintaining reputation (or technical reputation at least - TrueCrypt devs are not exactly known for being people people, or for being particularly into "free open source" either).
No reasons why the code is/may be broken are given. Actually the "WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure as it may contain unfixed security issues" does not even actually say TrueCrypt is broken, just that it may be.
And the unfixed issues might be fixed later, in the commercial version.
Which would have been independently audited... at no cost to TrueCrypt...