Posting on here how we can opt out? Then everyone post to Facebook, Twitter etc,
NHS data chief Tim Kelsey admitted today that the health service had failed to adequately inform patients about how they can opt out of having their GP medical records shared throughout England. A leaflet carelessly posted out in among junk mail to 26.5 million households across the country was not "clear enough on the website …
Because there isn't a single, simple process.
You have to contact your GP to opt out. Your GP may have a website and there may be a form on it for you to print out. If there is a form, it will have two different levels of opt-out, neither of which is clearly explained but relate to some specific internal coding process used by the NHS.
It's almost as if they wanted to make it hard to say no.
While they have indeed made it as hard as possible to opt out (the original plans didn't even allow for an opt -out at all), the fact that there isn't an "official" form just allows for you to use any formal request you like. The MedConfidential site has links to template letters you can use, even spelling out the codes they need to apply to your records.
My GP practice has their own forms sitting front-and-centre on the reception counter. They can't officially encourage people to opt out, as they would lose their charter or whatever, but they ask each patient pointedly. I told them I had already opted out and my doctor nearly shook my hand with joy.
To opt out of the GP Extraction Service (GPES) you ask your surgery to put the opt out code on your medical record. When GPES comes across a record with that code it skips it and nothing gets pulled out in the first place.
Hospitals (broadly all NHS providers who are not your GP) have been submitting information to this systems forerunner (The Hospital Episode Statistics) for 25 years or so; this is where stats in the news about death rates and waiting times come from. If you want to stop a hospital including you in their returns you need to contact them; the medico-legal department or Customer Care team are a good place to try.
If you are having difficulty ring the helpline on 0300 456 3531.
As I opt out of junk mail, I haven't received anything about this through my door, and a quick google round I can only find propaganda from one extreme or the other. I'd be happy for the NHS to use the data internally, but I don't want it to be given to any private company. Is there an option to do that, and where do I go to sort it out?
"... there had never been a "single example of that data being compromised".
No, in 25 years there has never been an example
b) reported properly
And as we all know past performance is no guarantee of future performance.
It concerns me because as we all know, data governance has historically never been that good in public bodies. I know from time I've spent in the 90's on government projects data was whizzed about with little care. Dev & Test databases were just copies of live. Code and snapshots just left on network shares and I'm sure I saw the odd contractor laptop on the LAN.
So, smells of bullshit to me.
Also, this data is worth a fortune to some people so I'd imagine anybody who can 'borrow a copy' would get a handsome reward. And lets be honest, its not like the private sector is known for its honesty - why would an insurance company not like this data - even unofficially.
Thats why I opted out, and god help the doctor if he still decides to give my (and my families) data away. You can't stop it once its out there which is a major objection of mine! Maybe if they were more transparent about what they will actually give away I'd be a lot more willing.
Its a good idea but very badly implemented with what looks to me very little safeguard. (a promise to be really really careful honest - isn't a safeguard!)
Right....where is my tinfoil hat...
Another problem is defining what is in the NHS.
Most people would define their GP as being part of the NHS, yet when I was working for the NHS GP's weren't allowed to post jobs on the NHS jobs site as a GP's practice is a for profit independent business which simply bills the local NHS trust on an agreed charging scale for the work they do. The local NHS trust did not consider GP's part of the NHS and ran services directly in competition with GP's to get the job done cheaper.
I suspect that the definition of what is "in" and "out" of the NHS is going to be so nebulous and flexible to be worthless, especially if the people involved in selling the data are politicians.
This is where it gets difficult; many providers of NHS care are in fact private companies, or the NHS uses private companies or charities to perform research; Dr Foster are a great example of this.
You can stop information leaving the Health and Social Care Information Centre, which is closest to what you mean. This means that information related to you or your care should not get passed outside the organisation responsible for NHS statistics and information; regardless of whether it goes to an NHS organisation or not. You do this by asking for the following code to be placed on your record at your GP:
‘Dissent from disclosure of personal conﬁdential data by Health and Social Care Information Centre’.
code: Read v2: 9Nu4 or CTV3: XaaVL depending on which system your GP uses.
As I mentioned above, if you want to stop yourself being included in hospital returns (which are nothing new) you also need to ask the relevant NHS Trust(s) or other relevant provider to exclude you as necessary.
In your case, you should probably read the detail at http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/records/healthrecords/Documents/Patient%20FAQs%202014.pdf.
I listened to some idiot women describing a data base to me. She kept talking about how the data was "Anonymised" but, of course, it can’t all be anonymised, there is a "unique identifier (tm)" for each person which has the various “coded data linked too”!!
But it’s ok because “it’s all coded.....”
10 years ago, technobabble worked, people didn’t understand what people were talking about when they were talking about computers.
Now technobabble just shows the speakers incompetence, when I don’t understand what someone is saying about computers it is no longer because I don’t understand about computers but because the speaker is an idiot or lying.
I have worked for the NHS, and no fucking way would I give them access to my data if I could help it.
I suggest you opt out before this stuff is used against you
I agree I heard that very same interview, in the same sentences she was saying the data was anonymous and yet has a unique ID (NHS ID) that links back to you. But it's OK they have no plans to sell it to private companies. The explanation was as clear as mud, she had no idea what she was talking about. As for the coded bit, I guess she means something similar to hash tags on twitter.
Another question I have to ask listening to this interview, she said they have been doing this for the past 25 years. So I'm not sure why they needed a new system now? sounds to me like opting out is a wise choice.
GP had what looked like a self generated form. I only opted out as I don't trust the Government not to move the goalposts on who can access the data at a later date. Of course they may either "accidentally" miss the opt-out flag during the import or decide it is in my "interest" to opt me in later, but at least I tried.
AC because whatever the shrink says they are out to get me!
It's absolute rubbish to claim that the data can't be re-identified. OK, perhaps not ALL of the data but consider this example:
If I've got the "Maternity Data Set" (see HSCIC website for details), then if you give me any newspaper report about any well-known woman (celebrity, politician, sportsperson, etc.) who has just given birth, I can tell you with a high degree of certainty from that one data set alone whether that person had a sexually transmitted infection during their pregnancy, for instance.
*Any* data set that has any significant use will have enough detail to identify certain individuals - individuals for whom you know enough about them such as date of birth, roughly where they live, etc.
The only way you can sufficiently anonymise such data sets is either by aggregation - in which case you lose a lot of the meaning and you still have problems should the aggregation in any area result in a total of "one" - or by stripping enough information out of it that everyone loses interest in trying to make use of it.
According to the Beeb, Tim Kelsey, NHS England's national director for patients and information, said "Can I be categorical? No one who uses this data will know who you are."
However, if we hop over to NHCIC's web site and look at it's scale of charges* we see "Standard extract – containing personal confidential data" for a mere £2,782. It also lists "Patient status and/or tracking" as a "Product".
Maybe Mr Kelsey "mis-spoke". Or maybe we are just being lied to. Anyone want to let this bunch have all your medical records so we can find out?
I haven't seen any leaflet from the NHS.
I have, however, had a leaflet from the local practice asking me if I want to opt in or out of a data sharing arrangement with 'any other NHS service that uses the same computer system'.
It's not clear if this is the same thing, but as far as I can tell it's opt-in (there's no mention of a default).
what are the sanctions or remedies in the inevitable cases where someone who has dotted i's crossed t's and done everything correctly, in order and in time to opt out, finds they *haven't* been opted out ?
If, as I suspect the answer to this question is measured on a scale from "fuck all" to a generic "we know how important etc etc" with no way to (a) unring the bell, and (b) gain any recompense, then you can't help but feel "what's the point ?".
We can only hope that as time rolls on, and more people realise how irrevocable a loss of personal data is, the clamour for proportionate punishments grows.
People like Max Moseley are a good example.
How would you check that the surgery or others have followed your instructions regarding the opt-out for your data. I did receive a leaflet but it was wasn't very clear and personally this whole thing is the wrong way around, your data should stay private unless you say it can be released.
Once the data is out there you can't get it back so why is it assumed you can chuck it out by default.
I can tell you of a constant, daily compromise of that exact data that has been happening for years and is probably still going on.
A few years ago I worked as a contract programmer on an NHS system used by doctors to refer patients to specialists and then by the specialists' secretaries to arrange appointments. All such systems require data for testing and the standard procedure is to use fake or anonymised data, so you'd expect the NHS to have a large test database of fake data.
Wrong. After I had been there for about a week I was testing part of my code that printed the appointment letters when the manager supervising me came over and told me to make sure I put the printouts in the shredder. Apparently the database was real data from a few years earlier and it had not been anonymised at all. Their only concession to privacy is it was from a different part of the UK to where I was working. Unfortunately for them I am originally from that area and was able to look up the cancer treatment appointments of one of my parents' friends. I already knew the person had battled cancer and did this to check if it was real data because I could not believe what I had been told.
I was on a 6 week contract. There was no criminal records check or other screening process.
(Anon because it was a well paid contract and a good place to work so I don't want to shoot myself in the foot if the chance ever comes up again.)
'Kelsey insisted this morning that that argument was flawed. "I'm really pleased we're having the debate, but it's not identifiable," the NHS data chief said.'
Kelsey is simply lying. His very own document "Care Episode Statistics: Technical Specification of the GP Extract"* makes it very clear that they are aware of the dangers of "malicious re-identification of patients from inference (a so-called “jigsaw attack”)" (see page 13, paragraph 3). They are going to attempt to mitigate this by controlling who can get access to enough data to do that, but the danger still remains.
Ultimately their defence (and this is acknowledged in another document I can't lay my hands on again at the moment) is legal, in that it would be an offence to re-identify patients. I can't see that working well if there is sufficient rewards from, say, a tabloid for passing on the information they desire.
Legal penalties are an acceptable defence, but the penalties need to be severe, such as everyone involved in re-identifying a patient being given 10 lashes per patient record re-linked.
but most importantly the data should never be sold, the data should only ever be used to provide healthcare for the patients!
(although Facebook tends to be used with other C-words).
Despite the fact I have never been near Facebook, they know an awful lot about me. First off they know I don't have a profile. They know who my friends are. And were. They know when I make new friends. They know who I work for. Who I used to work for. They know what music I like. What films I like. My age. My marital status. Number of kids I have. Simply by cross-matching all the chatter from people who have my email address in their contacts list.
No one can be anonymous in a non-trivial dataset. The only crumb of comfort, is that the politicians too dumb to understand this now, will find out the hard way.
How about: You get an STD from playing away from home. Your shared email at home suddenly fills up with STD medical adverts directed to you by name.
Or: you have a disability that you don't want your agency to find out about. They cross-check and find you and all about your disability and you don't get the job.
Or: You get an embarrassing condition you'd rather be kept private. You find your FaceBook page targeted with ads for creams for this condition.
Or: your insurance company decides to hike your premiums because they found out about a temporary condition and have added you to the 'risky' file without your even being aware of it.
I coudl go on and on...
There's this thing that happens in any large organization, public or private, but giant public organizations are the easiest to observe. As the organization grows, and stays alive longer, they lose sight of their mission and focus their attentions inward.
A pamphlet that is worthless to their customers is a good example of this. The people that put the pamphlet together know the ins/outs, nooks and crannies and internal definitions of their organization and it skews their development and review of the document.
Staff forgets how horribly confusing it all was when they started, but years, or decades later, they know every detail of their processes. They unintentionally plug the 'missing info' into documents and processes: A trees/forest visibility kind of thing.
It's always institution wide as well. As staff near total assimilation into the collective their mission shifts from providing quality service to customers to making certain all the fields on the FAP2014 form are populated and entered into the system by 09:03 on the first Wednesday following a full moon: "It really is too bad the customers aren't getting good service, but hey! If the FAP2014's aren't filed correctly, on time, that reflects poorly on me. I'm not risking my raise for some random person".
It really sucks, because new staff have to work with the internal rules. Sara in FAP Assistance has been doing that job for 23 years, and if things aren't done her way she ruins everybody's month. So a big, slow and developmentally challenged organization gets slower and even less useful.
You can overcome a lot of that in a private organization if you want. If it's a choice between filing wholly internal forms correctly, and on time, or ensuring good customer service, you just correct or fire the staff who have issues prioritizing issues. Sometimes that happens, sometimes not. A lot depends on how many lawsuits you're willing to put up with. You'll certainly win the employee suits, but it's still expensive and time consuming.
Public organizations are terrible at dealing with it. To a large degree they are screwed by their own rules which have been tailored to make performance metrics look good, not to actually improve things. Unless they are law enforcement or intelligence agencies, government agencies have to follow government rules. It's pretty stupid, all of it.
I wouldn't be opposed to considering proposals that tie government employee salaries, promotions and raises, maybe agency budget as well, to customer (taxpayer) satisfaction. Like most businesses, more money can't fix the problems in public agencies, so if their budget doesn't increase it won't actually hurt the taxpayer.
And for those of us who don't see junk mail (either because the dog eats it or someone else recycles it, or because the whole lot is instantly recycled) and haven't visited a GP in a couple of months....
Stupid process - should be a simple question at your next appt. (or next routine hospital visit if that's sooner)
NHS data chief Tim Kelsey is wrong. We have already seen what happens when too many people have access to our medical records.
Does anyone remember the case of 94-year-old Rose Addis? Her family criticised the competence of Whittington Hospital after the lady had spent an entire weekend waiting for treatment in a hospital corridor. It created such a furore that in defence of the hospital (its medical director was a Labour activist) Tony Blair appeared on TV and, in a complete betrayal of patient confidentiality, made public the private medical records of this poor lady.
Compromised is one of those magic words that sound important, but because the word has so many different meanings, depending on who says it, the subject and who they're saying it to.
If we narrow the field of use solely to IT, the following are just a few examples of how 'compromised' could be used within a single organization:
1) For an executive at (x), 'compromised' data could be an accounting error that forces them to rectify and restate four years of financial reporting.
2) For a systems security person 'compromised' data could mean malformed server side action that is allowing people in through what should only be an exit.
3) For a database admin 'compromised' data could mean an automated process has been forcing an alpha datatype into a time field for the last nine weeks and all staff who were scheduled for the 07:Toucan shift have now accrued over $79 million in overtime.
Pick any IT role and plug 'compromised' in anywhere you like, and the meaning won't be the same for any two or more people. The severity of the 'compromised data' is also different depending on your role and how the data affected you.
For #1 up there, it doesn't matter, at all, to the company groundskeeper, but everyone in finance is sick with stress because the Executive Director/CEO just publicly executed the CFO.
Make your own examples if you like, regardless, the fact remains 'compromised' is plastic in shape and appearance and it's never the same twice (if it is twice or more its a breach, not a 'compromised' thing). So it's perfectly acceptable for an exec to say 'data hasn't been compromised'. It hasn't, at least in his view anyway.
As a rule, words with plastic meanings should be avoided if you aren't going to share your definition. Without that agreed upon definition someone could prattle on for days about the organizations stability while knowing full well they spent the last nickel 55 days ago.
If you have had dealings with non-GP elements of the NHS, such as hospitals, your un-anonymised data is already being held by the HSCIC for sale to whoever comes up with a feeble 'it's medical' excuse for getting their hands on it. It's not clear how you can stop them from doing that.
We provide information for our medical treatment, and most of us quite reasonably assume that the data will not be used for any other purpose. We certainly wouldn't envisage it being given away top some accountable quango to sell off. that's one breach of the Data Protection Act. And it's a long standing breach since the NHS is already playing merry hell with data from hospitals.
Medical data has never gone through a data cleansing exercise, and is notoriously inaccurate, which makes the entire exercise a waste of public money.
The anonymity of the data subjects is in no way safeguarded by the process, so there's another breach of the DPA.
What we really need is for all this stupid 'look at me, I'm a great commercial hero' activity to be stopped, the perpetrators top be kicked out, and the NHS to start to provide reliable care for patients on a national basis.
Christ, the whole tinfoil hat brigade is in tonight. Why the rush to opt out? This data will save lives - thousands of lives. Good data analysis is at the heart of all successful medicine. People need this data so they know which treatments work and which don't.
Frankly if you opt out of this you should opt out of the whole NHS and sod off to BUPA.
No one is arguing about the NHS use of the data, it is the selling of the data including individually identifiable data to more or less anyone who has a couple grand to spare, and the surreptitious way that the whole process has attempted to be slipped under the radar of the average person.
I'm interested in the approach to presenting the choices to the public. I suspect that the UK Government Behavioural Insights Team have been at work applying 'Nudge' theory. Especially the 'Status Quo' bias.
As much distance as possible has been put between a person and their opting out: (a) You are default opted In (b) you are forced into a manual process to change that choice and (c) your important notification leaflet is hidden amongst the pizza offers.
I wonder if this duplicitous approach is expected to create trust?
I work for a small software house providing niche software for the NHS, which holds a database of patient data. I can tell you that patient data confidentiality is taken *extremely* seriously.
All patient data is encrypted, and access to the de-encryption keys is restricted to only a few senior managers, and the use of which is carefully logged and audited. In all the years I've worked here, I've never seen patient data, despite doing core development on the application and database. This is because access to the live system is locked down internally, and all development is done on data that's first been scrubbed of patient identifiable data.
The management know that if there was a breach of patient confidentiality, the company's reputation would be in tatters; a situation that could financially ruin the company. I would guess that patient confidentiality is take far more seriously in the private sector, than in the NHS itself.
On the general point of opting out of data sharing, the NHS is just beginning to realise what a wealth of information they have available. Our own database is used, in a completely anonimised way, to plot trends in treatment and outcomes, and identify treatments that are more or less effective. This anonimised use of patient data is improving clinical care and directly positively affecting patients' lives.
I would urge you NOT to opt out of data sharing; I haven't!
The top-down approach to the procurement of a £360 million data platform for NHS England is said to favor incumbent supplier Palantir as fears grow the project could be making the same mistakes that led to the failure of the country's infamous £10 billion National Programme for IT.
Reports emerged recently showing that the secretive spy-tech business was making the competition, launched in April this year, a "must-win deal" following its recruitment of Indra Joshi and Harjeet Dhaliwal, key figures in NHS England's data science and AI teams.
The UK's National Health Service (NHS) has committed to implementing electronic health records for all hospitals and community practices by 2025, backed by £2 billion (c $2.4 billion) in funding.
The investment from one of the world's largest healthcare providers follows Oracle founder Larry Ellison's promise to create "unified national health records" in the US after the company paid $28.3 billion for Cerner, an American health software company also at the heart of many NHS record systems.
In the UK, health secretary Sajid Javid has promised £2 billion to digitize the NHS in England, including electronic health records in all NHS trusts (hospitals or other healthcare providers) by March 2025.
More than two years after England launched a COVID data store, keeping details of National Health Service (NHS) patients, the country's National Data Guardian (NDG) remains unsatisfied with who is accessing the data.
The COVID-19 data store was launched in March 2020, and would pull together medical and operational data about the spread of the virus across the country.
A phishing operation compromised over one hundred UK National Health Service (NHS) employees' Microsoft Exchange email accounts for credential harvesting purposes, according to email security shop Inky.
During the phishing campaign, which began in October 2021 and spiked in March 2022, the email security firm detected 1,157 phishing emails originating from NHSMail accounts that belonged to 139 NHS employees in England and Scotland.
"The true scope of the attack could have been much larger, as Inky detected only those attempts made on our customers," the company's VP of Security Strategy Roger Kay wrote in a blog post. "But given how many we found, it's safe to say that the total iceberg was much bigger than the tip we saw."
US surveillance-tech supplier Palantir has hired a one-time director of AI for NHSX – the former UK health service digital agency.
Indra Joshi quit her role at the end of March as NHSX and NHS Digital were merged into NHS England, a non-departmental government body.
Her arrival at Palantir will raise concerns among NHS watchers and privacy campaigners.
NHS England is planning the procurement of a data platform with up to £240m million ($312 million) on the table to help in re-organization of the health service and recovering from the COVID-related backlog in care.
The government body responsible for directing £136 billion (circa $176 billion) worth of health service spending in England has set out plans to buy a "Federated Data Platform (FDP)" that it says will be "an essential enabler to transformational improvements across the NHS."
In a tender notice published earlier this month, the non-departmental government body said the FDP would be "an ecosystem of technologies and services implemented across the NHS in England."
At least 100 NHS trusts in England are to start using machine-learning software to predict the number of patients expected to be admitted to Accident and Emergency departments each day.
The tool, built by British startup Faculty, aims to help managers figure out how best to allocate staff and resources during predicted surges, up to three weeks in advance.
"By better forecasting patient demand, we are helping staff tackle treatment backlogs by showing them who is set to be admitted, what their needs are, and which staff are needed to treat them," Myles Kirby, director of Health and Life Sciences at Faculty, said in a statement to The Register.
Ten months after attempts first began to extract the medical information of 55 million citizens in England, NHS Digital's former chairman is warning the merger of the agency with NHS England threatens the privacy of people's personal data.
Concerns are being raised over UK government proposals to extend emergency powers introduced during the pandemic, giving it access to patient data held by general practitioners (GPs).
The government has decided to put in place a plan "omitting the expiry date contained within" emergency COVID powers and "to make a consequential amendment to the review provision", with the aim of "establishing and operating information systems to collect and analyse data in connection with COVID-19."
The instructions were sent in February [PDF] to Simon Bolton, then interim chief executive of NHS Digital, by Simon Madden, director of data policy at NHSX, and signed by the Secretary of State.
The UK health secretary has invoked "the latest technology" to clear a 6-million-strong waiting list in England as the National Health Service struggles with a patient backlog caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) and its quango NHS England have at the same time awarded millions of pounds' worth of technology consultancy contracts while launching a new £500m procurement for more of the above.
Announcing NHS's Delivery Plan for tackling the backlog yesterday, Sajid Javid said 300,000 people had now waited longer than a year for elective care – non-urgent but necessary treatment or operations – while 6 million were now waiting for care, up from 4.4 million before the pandemic.
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