The Dutch consortium which promised to deliver NFC payments to the Netherlands in 2012 will now deliver in 2013, and without T-Mobile, but it's the EU's fault. The Dutch will spend another year getting EU approval for the planned joint venture, a body comprised of network operators and banks to which ultimate authority for NFC …
Friday 2nd December 2011 11:51 GMT Anonymous Coward
Also of note...
... is that there is a near-ubiquitous magstrip^Wchip+pin infrastructure* in place already, and two tries before to do much the same with a contact chip but without pin "for small payments" (one of which sort-of still survives, though I wouldn't know as I never use it). Oh and then there's the whole "PT-chip card" debacle that also is supposed to support pay-by-wave for non-fare things, "as an experiment". To much merriment as the thing was at the time equipped with a known-broken-into chip, and largely still is. That sort of thing has perhaps eroded customer trust in yet another scheme, just a bit.
Curious how you can get fired for simple mishaps but if it's entire banks, well, they get to try time and again with yet another scheme. I get a distinct feeling that what "the consumer" wants is entirely unimportant.
* Conveniently owned by a single entity, and suffering regular breakdowns as of late. But then all the banks have that, especially their web-based banking, as does the multi-bank webshop payment thing "iDEAL". All of this is supposed to replace cash, soonish, for cash is naturally suspect. So sayeth a national bank-led club full of "stakeholders" of which curiously few are consumer rights groups.
Friday 2nd December 2011 13:38 GMT Anonymous Coward
I have been in this space for years, and infrastructure and deployment costs are ALWAYS the major hurdle to set up any type of competition with VISA and Mastercard. This is why we took a different approach altogether.
In addition, I'm yet to be convinced that NFC is anywhere near secure. The only reason a payment terminal doesn't read a card until it is near is the same reason a London Underground card doesn't read until it's on the scanner: deliberately bad aerials - which does NOTHING to secure the card itself.
If you build your own antenna and a better, more sensitive receiver you can read RFIDs from about 30 meter, and NFC chips from about 10. Not my idea of decent containment..
Friday 2nd December 2011 15:03 GMT Anonymous Coward
You know that...
... but the rest of us has to go by the word of the executives pushing the thing, and they "prove" their case by sticking their head... somewhere, claiming that because they can't see anything wrong, the thing therefore must be secure. This certainly isn't the only place where ostrich security proofs abound, of course.
It's just that more business for a security consulting industry, for admonishing users to not do some things and do do some other things, all obvious to the point of being meaningless, for eating the mishaps, maybe refund the odd victim if they complain persistently and loudly enough, and raising the fees for everyone as an adequate answer, that sort of thing. And somehow the problem won't go away. I wonder how that can possibly be.