Re: Inrage and outrage
There is zero possibility of chatting with bank staff on work equipment over any chat app other than the banks system, and just like all phone calls the content is recorded and or documented. Sadly not even employees are trusted due to the one in a 100,000 that would scam someone. There is always more to know, but I hope this clarifies a little just how serious financial places have to take access to data.
What you describe is not end to end encryption.
End to end is like me sending you a WhatsApp or an iMessage or making a call or video over those systems. No one along the path would be able to decipher and replay the communications.
What you describe is like end to point encryption. My comms between my computer and your bank would be encrypted and safe from eves dropping but once at your bank your systems are free to do whatever including recording and monitoring. From your messaging server to your staff’s chat client would be encrypted too, that could be end to end, neither end being the customer who initiated the comms.
I don’t think traditional social media does e2ee otherwise I wouldn’t be able to read public posts from a Google search.
It seems like being pedantic and splitting hairs but it’s a hugely important distinction.
Apple is struggling with this for their iCloud photos where they want “true” end to end encryption where no one but the customer can read the data but also want to negate csam and have proposed scanning on the client to flag specific content for further analysis and reporting.
There is likely room for a halfway house where comms to trusted (large providers like Facebook, twitter etc) being encrypted in transit but the scanned at the other end. That would preclude iMessage, WhatsApp, telegram etc as the providers can’t scan the content in transit as only the sender and receiver can decrypt.